A World Community



JOHN HERMAN RANDALL

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A WORLD COMMUNITY

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A WORLD COMMUNITY

The Supreme Task of the Twentieth Century

By

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL

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To

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR.

COMRADE AND FELLOW-WORKER

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General Introduction

THE rising tide of interest in international affairs has made inevitable some effort to coördinate for general readers the considerable volume of literature which represents the reaction of scholars and educators to the new world scene. From summaries of modern history to studies in special fields such as race relations or international finance, the man or woman beginning to feel a sense of responsibility toward the larger issues of war and peace is confronted with a choice of titles and treatments which the American tradition of isolation makes peculiarly difficult. The very concept of "internationalism," in fact, still carries in certain quarters an unfortunate and distinctly unjustifiable connection with radical economic movements.

To overcome this difficulty, the World Unity Library *has been planned with the coöperation of authors of recognized authority and unquestionable scholarship. The books published in this series are, for two reasons, a noteworthy contribution to the new knowledge of human relationships rapidly developing since the war. The series as a whole deals with the more significant aspects of world affairs in the briefest possible detail, thus providing a carefully organized approach for general readers as well as students. Each volume, moreover, while conforming to no artificial standard of uniformity, and arguing for no particular doctrine or thesis, falls into general harmony with every other volume from the fact that the participating authors share at least one common ideal—the possibility of peace and coöperation among the nations, races, religions and classes of mankind. The essential value of the series per-*

haps derives from the fact that it has enabled a number of authors to deal with world affairs without those benumbing restrictions so frequently imposed in the name of social or political authority. The World Unity Library *is nothing else than a free discussion of those facts, conditions and principles which afford a sound basis of hope for the triumph of the spirit of coöperation as the organic truth of human life. Nothing less could be acceptable to intelligent readers grown conscious of the inadequacy of prewar education in the face of the revolutionary changes of our time.*

Too few people yet realize to what an extent contemporary scholarship confirms, in terms of history, science, philosophy, psychology and religion, to say nothing of politics and economics in their development as branches of social science, the new, yet world-old, spirit of coöperation and peace. Few of us appreciate, either, how far the modern scholar has left behind the cultural cloister of tradition to take his stand as interpreter of the most vital human problems. Just as chemist and physicist for several decades have made definite impact through industrial research and invention, so now the historian and the sociologist are powerfully affecting the trend of events, through their contributions of that more important knowledge, knowledge of man and men.

The World Unity Library, *then, aims to extend to adults in all walks of life an opportunity for acquiring the broader outlook demanded by the many transformations taking place in human life. From whatever source the new knowledge is derived by the reader, its possession seems to be the greatest intellectual and spiritual privilege in the world today.*

HORACE HOLLEY,
Editor, World Unity Library

New York City,
December 16, 1929

FOREWORD

THE greatest event of the twentieth century is the birth of a world. There existed before vast continents, great empires, separate races, divided nations, isolated peoples; but there was no *world* as such. For centuries prophets had dreamed of the coming of a human brotherhood, a few statesmen had visualized the possibility of nations one day learning how to coöperate for the common good, philosophers had drawn up plans looking toward world peace, and humanitarians in all lands had proclaimed the essential oneness of all mankind. But all such ideas remained enshrined in the realm of dreams and ideals, waiting the coming of certain conditions that might make their realization possible. The world was not yet ready to bring these age-old dreams to fruition.

During the last part of the nineteenth century there was a small number of thoughtful people in all civilized countries who had come to think in international terms, who had begun to be world-conscious. They realized that, dear as their country was to them, there were many other countries equally dear to the people who inhabited them; proud as they were of their race and its achievements, there were hundreds of millions of others just as proud of the particular race to which they belonged and of what it had accomplished; precious as their religion was to them, they perceived how equally precious were the older religious faiths to the many other millions who professed them. In a word, they were the few people who had risen above the

plane of racial self-consciousness, of national self-consciousness, even of sectarian self-consciousness, who were able not only to realize the presence of these other groups on the planet, but also, in spite of all differences, to accord them the same respect and sympathetic appreciation given to the members of their own group.

But this widening of consciousness on the part of a few to include an interest in, and an appreciation for, those of other races and nations and creeds, was by no means the only, nor even the chief, influence at work in the nineteenth century to produce the international mind. The growing realization on the part of the most thoughtful minds of the deep significance of the new forces at work, and the revolutionary changes they were effecting in the general life of the world, the gradual understanding of how these new forces were creating a thousand and one new ties and relationships that were binding the peoples of East and West, of North and South, into one living Whole, in which no people any longer lived unto itself alone, no nation was any longer independent and self-sufficient, where all existed in a community of mutual interests, and where what hurt one, hurt all, and what helped one, helped all,—it was this growing knowledge of a new world-synthesis into which we had come, thanks to the new forces at work, that made possible the limited number of internationally-minded and world-conscious people of the nineteenth century.

In the early years of the twentieth century, however, such people were few and far between, especially in the United States, where the prevailing provincialism and the public policy of isolation so long pursued had kept us in ignorance

of, or indifferent to, the tremendous changes that were taking place in world relationships. Devoted to the cult of prosperity, absorbed in our own interests as a people, possessed by a narrow and blatant nationalism, filled with a blind optimism, we paid little attention and gave no concern to the rest of the world; we went blissfully on our way in seeming ignorance of how the mighty changes in world relations might some day affect us. Until the fateful year of 1914 there was little or no international mind here in America; our provincialism precluded any intelligent world-consciousness.

Few possessed any accurate knowledge of the geography of the world outside of the beaten track of the conventional tourist. A still smaller number knew anything about the great and unique contributions that other races and earlier civilizations had made to the general cultural life of man. Only the very few among the special scholars realized the menace of modern nationalism or the dangers lurking in the rapid growth of economic imperialism. The voices raised against the "mad race in armaments" found little response from the responsible leaders of the nation. As we look back now to the decade that preceded the War, it is difficult to understand how the great mass of intelligent people could have been so ignorant and blind to what was going on in the world. There are only two explanations: the absence of available knowledge dealing with world politics and international affairs, and the lack of the international mind,—the last, in large part the result of the first.

The War brought to their inevitable and tragic climax the disruptive and disintegrating forces that had been in-

creasingly at work during the nineteenth century. It revealed the spirit of modern nationalism in all its narrow pride and selfishness and greed, it tore the veil of sophistry from the "white man's burden" under which economic imperialism had masqueraded and revealed it for what it had been—the exploitation of the weaker peoples of the earth by the stronger nations, it exploded the ancient fallacy that preparedness is the way to peace, it shattered the blind optimism with which we had entered the twentieth century, and it made startlingly clear the fact that we were not yet living in a civilized world.

The books that have come so rapidly from the press since 1914, from the scholarly pens of the new historian, the scientific philosopher and the recognized publicist, have made available a flood of new knowledge bearing directly upon world politics, world conditions and world problems of every kind; and, thanks to the widespread disillusionment produced by the War, these books are finding a steadily increasing reading public. Still more significant are the recent books by representative scholars in this country and in Europe, dealing most explicitly with the influence of modern science and industrialism upon traditional ideas and modes of life, and pointing out the resulting revolutionary changes that have already come, and the still greater changes that must come in the near future.

One clear implication runs through all these books from the recognized historian and philosopher. The War was the inevitable result of the disintegrative forces at work during the nineteenth century; science and industrialism have given us a new world in which nationalism and imperialism and war and ruthless competition, as we have known

them in the past, are anachronisms in the twentieth century. As a result of this new world which has been created, mankind today is faced with just two alternatives: either to continue our relations as nations and races as they have been in the past, which will inevitably mean greater and deadlier wars which civilization cannot survive; or else, to find the way out to some kind of unity in the life of nations and peoples that has never yet been known, to achieve a degree of coöperation in the life of nations that has never yet been tried, to come to an understanding and an appreciation of other peoples and races that shall lead eventually to a genuine fellowship in the life of humanity. Mankind is standing at the cross-roads today, facing just these two alternatives.

It is this new knowledge of our world and of our changing civilization, disseminated in books, appearing more frequently, the farther we get away from the War, in the daily press and leading magazines, proclaimed from forum and lecture platforms and, to some degree, from the more liberal pulpits, that is helping to create the international mind and to awaken a world-consciousness. This new knowledge has been made available not one day too soon. The question is, whether it can be taught in schools and colleges without fear and evasion, and whether it can be brought to the rank and file of the people in a clear and compelling way, before it is too late to be effective.

All intelligent people who read, and reflect upon what they read, know today that at last we are living in a world that has become one; we are no longer living in separate, isolated and independent countries. They know that science and industrialism and the growth of our cultural

knowledge have broken down the old barriers that have divided peoples for so long, and have ushered us into a veritable world community—geographically, economically and culturally.

And they also know that this new world that is thus coming to birth in the human consciousness is going to grow and develop. It is going to create its own political institutions, its own economic systems, its own social philosophies, its own morals and religions. There is no man wise enough to predict the form that these will take, or what further changes in man's life the future may bring. The one thing that stands out more clearly than all else is this: The supreme task of the twentieth century is to take this new Great Society, as Graham Wallas called it,—this one physical neighborhood into which the new means of communication have brought us, and this one economic community which industrialism has created,—and transform it into a genuine World Community, in which there shall be awakened the community consciousness broad enough to include the whole world, and the community spirit that shall reach out to all mankind. Unless we have the intelligence, the will, and the spirit to achieve this great end, the future holds out little hope for humanity.

In this introductory volume to the World Unity Library, the author proposes to treat first, the forces at work in bringing to birth a world consciousness, then, the obstacles in the way of the realization of world unity, and lastly, the implications for the twentieth century. In the limits of space prescribed for the volumes in this Library, it is impossible to do more than briefly outline the new ideal of World Unity that is emerging today, and the rea-

sons therefor, state the problem, and suggest the implications of both ideal and problem for the twentieth century. Subsequent volumes by recognized scholars will deal more specifically with various important phases of both the ideal and the problem. This book, let it be clearly understood, is only introductory to the others that will follow.

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL.

New York City
January 1, 1930

Part I

THE FORCES CREATING A WORLD-CONSCIOUSNESS

A WORLD COMMUNITY

I

THE NEW MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

CIVILIZATION has passed through many revolutions in the centuries that are gone, and each one has left its impress. But no revolution in all the past has plowed so deeply into settled modes of life, disturbed so profoundly traditional ideas and ideals, and transformed so completely the relations of nations and peoples, as has the industrial revolution that began in England a little more than a century ago. It was ushered in with the coming of the machine and has grown apace with the rapid development of science and technology.

From England it spread to Western Europe and reached across the Atlantic to the United States, then gradually moved on to Eastern Europe, and today is penetrating the Orient. Japan is already an industrial nation. Even China has begun the process. If China secures a stable and permanent government, as she will in time, the West will be amazed at the rapidity with which her four hundred millions will become industrialized. In ancient India new factories are springing up every week. A paper recently published contrasted pictures of the old and the new way of crossing the Sahara desert in Africa—the old way by camel train, the new, by auto and auto-trucks. Soviet Russia is

pushing industrialization just as fast as her capital permits, and it is reported that a Ford factory is to be built in Russia that will turn out 100,000 cars per year.

In the short space of a century the industrial revolution has literally spread round the world. The demands of the educated younger generation in the Far East are for Western science and Western machines. It is safe to predict that by the end of the century our industrial life, not in its fluid present form, to be sure, but in its essentials—the machine and the factory—is destined to become, for weal or for woe, the foundation of a widely distributed world civilization.

We of the twentieth century and those of the two generations that preceded us have been more or less vaguely conscious that something new was coming into the life of the world. We have been born and reared in the presence of the factory, and increasingly we have all been using and enjoying the vast variety of machine-made products that filled our homes, multiplied our stores, and crowded our streets. We have known in a general way of the rapid growth of the urban over the rural population, and occasionally we have perused the statistics giving the increase in exports and imports, and pointing out the development of foreign trade. But we have been so habituated to traditional ways of thinking about everything, so absorbed in our own interests, so bound up in our own pursuits, so satisfied with things as they were, that very few have stopped to inquire what was this new thing changing our whole manner of life. Even more seldom have we asked its significance for the life of tomorrow. The books that dealt in any scientific and thoroughgoing way with the meaning of these changes have been few and far between.

The real significance of what had been happening during the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century did not begin to be apparent until the World War tore our civilization up by the roots. Then the veil was lifted, and since 1914 historians and scientific philosophers have made it increasingly clear that we of today are participating not in a civilization, but in "a conflict of civilizations." Our times resemble one of those crucial epochs in history, like that of Alexander, or the fall of the Roman Empire, or the breaking up of the mediæval city states, when men live in one dream that is dying and another coming to birth. The "something new" presaged by the developments of the nineteenth century turns out to be not *new things,* of which we certainly have a multitude, but a literally *new world,* in which the very structure of society, the very nature of civilization, the whole character of our cultural life, including morals and religion, are being remade from top to bottom.

It is only imaginations fertilized by history that see clearly the true significance of what is taking place. It is to those scholars who, in recent books, have given us such historical perspectives that we are most deeply indebted for our understanding of the present age. The great majority who live in this twentieth century accept the *new things* that are coming, though they are more or less vaguely bewildered by the expression of new ideas, attitudes and habits. But as they look out upon the world they see merely a confused coming and going. They conclude that all things are in a flux that is due to the general demoralization caused by the war. They believe that if we can but be patient, we shall in time get back to "normalcy." It is only those fortunate enough to have gained an adequate historical per-

spective who see clearly that one chapter in human history has ended and a new chapter opened, who are able to distinguish what is going from what is coming, and who are, therefore, the true and authoritative interpreters of this complex age.

Most civilized persons are as yet scarcely conscious of the profound struggle that is going on all about us between two different conflicting types of civilization. This is why we try to adjust ourselves so readily and unthinkingly to an age of maladjustment. The great majority see nothing incongruous about going to church in a Ford car, or praying for social justice, or legislating for a Victorian marriage. For from a practical point of view such things are obviously not incompatible. But as soon as a person abandons this superficial, practical point of view and enters upon the freer and more imaginative pursuit of understanding a world in which both the church and the Ford operate, in which experimental technics and authoritarian Gospels join hands, in which Venus is a pencil, and *La Gioconda* advertises mineral water; as soon as the historical settings and functions of our ideas and practices are understood, the moral and imaginative incompatibilities become glaring indeed.

Perhaps the most important changes wrought by the industrial revolution in human relations have been brought about by the new means of communication which science has devised. One hundred years ago, the peoples of the earth were widely separated from one another by vast stretches of land and still greater expanses of water. The fastest means of travel on land was the horse, and the only sea traffic was carried on at a slow and irregular pace by

wooden sailing vessels, subject to the vagaries of wind and storm. Their tonnage was light, their accommodations very poor, and their passenger and freight rates very high. They could therefore carry only goods of small bulk and great value. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, transoceanic trade was limited to a few luxury commodities such as spices, bullion, ivory, silks, tea, coffee and sugar. There was no telegraph, no telephone, no cable. The only means of carrying news or information from one village or province or country to another, was by letter conveyed personally by horse or sailing vessel.

All travel, therefore, was a painful and precarious undertaking, with the result that the vast majority of people remained at home, living and dying where they were born, seldom even going beyond the confines of their native province. "Students at Harvard College living at some distance came by way of the stagecoach or on horseback. From Providence to Boston was a two days' journey when the roads were good, and they were generally bad. From Boston to New York took five days. When Samuel Morse, the painter and inventor, tried to get to New Haven, Connecticut, from Washington, D. C., to the bedside of his dying wife, it took him seven days. Some of the difficulties experienced by members of Congress in getting to the Capital are described in the following letter: 'Burke was shipwrecked off the Capes; Jackson and Matthews with great difficulty landed at Cape May and traveled one hundred and sixty miles in a wagon to the city; Burke got here in the same way. Gerry and Partridge were overset in the stage; the first had his head broke, the other had his ribs sadly bruised. Tucker had a dreadful passage of sixteen days with per-

petual storms.' From one month to three months elapsed before European news reached the United States, and the battle of New Orleans with all its savage slaughter was fought in ignorance of the fact that more than two weeks before, peace had been signed between England and America in the city of Ghent, Belgium."[1]

Even after Louis-Philippe had endowed France with its wonderful roads, four or six horses and two men were required to carry a few tons at no greater speed than ten leagues a day. A bale of silk took twelve days to reach Paris from Lyons, and a wine barrel, a month to come from Marseilles. In practice, cheap bulky goods could rarely be carried beyond the narrow limits of a province. Every region was therefore separate and autonomous. The harvest surplus might rot in one place while famine raged a comparatively short distance away. It was almost impossible to work a mine that was at too great a distance from its market.

It is hard for us of today to realize that we are not discussing ancient history, that only so far back as the days of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers there were no electric lights, no bathtubs, no furnaces, no hot-water faucets, no plumbing, no sewer systems, no sewing machines, no matches, no coal or gas or electric ranges, no victrolas, no elevators, no refrigerators, no canned food, no ice-cream freezers, no rubber goods of any kind, no bicycles, cigarettes, typewriters, alarm clocks, asphalt or macadam roads, parcel post, money orders, etc., etc., *ad infinitum*. In the days of our great-grandfathers only a very small propor-

[1] Raymond B. Fosdick: "The Old Savage in the New Civilization," p. 3.

tion of the population lived in cities. The farm and the village housed the rest. The factory system had just begun to develop in connection with weaving and spinning, and no one dreamed to what lengths it would grow. The home was still the unit and center of most of the industrial arts People in all lands lived for the most part simply and quietly, engaged in a routine of work and simple recreations, from which, for generations, there had been but little variation.

"From the days of Rameses II and Moses down to the days of our grandfathers amazingly few fundamental changes occurred in the material existence of the common people. The physical factors of life were practically stereotyped. Transportation and communication between peoples were no more rapid and efficient a century ago than they were with the ancient Egyptians. Nothing swifter than a horse was known to Nebuchadnezzar or Thomas Jefferson. A letter sent by Napoleon from Paris to Rome took as long to deliver as one sent by Julius Cæsar from Rome to Paris. The farmers in the United States in 1822, when James Monroe was President, used largely the same methods and the same instruments that were in use in the days of Augustus."[1]

The thing to remember is that these revolutionary changes that have taken place in the life of peoples during the last century are due, broadly, to the development of the machine and the factory, but more explicitly and primarily, *to the new means of communication* which science has devised, urged on by the expansion of trade and commerce. If it had not been for these new methods of transportation

[1] Raymond B. Fosdick: op. cit., p. 5.

and communication, the factories would never have multiplied, world markets would never have been established, industrialism would never have assumed its present gigantic proportions, the new civilization would never have gone round the world, and the nations would never have been bound together into one economic unit as they are today. So long as the peoples of the earth were so widely separated by the great expanses of land and water, so long as transportation was slow, laborious and precarious, so long as people possessed no easy and efficient means of communication, the faintest suggestion of a world community was merely a figment of the imagination. Our profoundest debt to science is not for the machine in general, but rather, for those particular machines that, by facilitating travel and transporation, have brought the ends of the earth into constant communication with each other. All the other benefits of our industrial civilization have flowed primarily from these inestimable sources.

First came the steamship, which today traverses every sea and has made its way up every navigable river. In 1850-60 England began the building of large iron hulls provided with powerful steam engines; they have steadily increased in size, in efficiency and in safety. Today such carrying vessels are able to transport to all parts of the world thousands of tons of coal, ore, cotton, grain, or other freight. Their speed is infinitely greater; three weeks are now required for a voyage that formerly took three to five months. The modern freight liner is able to carry, within a definite period, hundreds of times the quantity of goods that were transportable by sail. It also enjoys the advantage of a fixed time-table, a most important item for the trader or

manufacturer, who can thus count on regular deliveries and has no need to lay in considerable stocks. Its security, however, is its most precious asset. Powerful insurance companies have been established which compensate for loss of ships and cargo, and their rates are very low in view of the enormous quantity of insured goods and the comparative rarity of disasters. Such has been the progress achieved, that it costs less today to carry a ton of cereals from New York to Bordeaux than it once cost to carry it from one French village to another. American corn from the Great Lakes is sold at Havre at a lower price than the corn that grows a few miles from the Havre quays. This is what has made possible the formidable extension of international trade by which the economic activities of nations have been so rapidly specialized. The number of ships has grown apace with trade. In 1842 the total tonnage of the merchant navies of the world amounted to 6,763,000; in 1927 the figure is 56,802,800.

Then came the railroad, which today belts every continent and penetrates the inaccessible forest and mining regions, finding its way at length to the smaller villages and most out-of-the-way places. All those products which formerly could never be moved because of their small value, have now suddenly entered the immense circuit of international traffic. Corn, cattle, phosphates, ore, coal and machinery have left the most remote towns to reach the furthermost markets. Thanks to the rapidity of railway communications, and more recently, to refrigeration, even the most perishable goods are transported safely for thousands of miles—fresh fish, oysters, lobsters, meats of all kinds,

melons and fruit in every variety—and even rare and exotic flowers are brought to our tables every day.

The railways, during the last three-quarters of a century, have not ceased to spread and ramify in all directions. Entire continents are thus rapidly being linked up, from Cadiz to Vladivostok and Shanghai, from Cape Town to Cairo; from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from Canada to Chile. They join up with shipping transportation at all the great harbors. Together, steamships and railways envelop the world in so close a network that no farm in the Argentine pampas or the mountains of New Zealand is too remote to send its produce to the cities of the United States or the farthest corner of Saxony or Scotland, or to receive in return American, Saxon or Scotch commodities. Transportation has become internationalized no less than production.

Then followed the telegraph, the telegraphic cable, the telephone, and now, the radio and the radio telephone. They have made of this globe of ours a tiny whispering gallery. The hundreds of millions invested in constructing telegraph lines and laying transoceanic cables that literally bind the world together by a vast network of wires have paid for themselves again and again in the development of international commerce, in the saving of time to manufacturers and merchants, and in making more efficient a world economic machinery that has brought into closest interrelation all exchanges, all markets, all sources of supply. No one can begin to compute the saving of time and money that has come through the telephone alone, and in countries like ours, we marvel how people ever existed without it.

And now the radio and the development of wireless telephony bid fair in the near future to make obsolete all tele-

graph wires and cables. The ten million homes that it is claimed already possess radio sets in this country bear eloquent witness to the rapidity with which the wireless, as a means of communication, has developed. If Commander Byrd had made his expedition into the Antarctic region, let us say ten years ago, he would have reached a point in his journey beyond which he and his party would have been lost to sight and sound, for months, perhaps even for years. But today, thanks to radio, we read in our papers regularly messages from the headquarters of Commander Byrd's expedition, describing the conditions they are facing, and the next steps they propose to take. The use of the wireless on ships of every type has reduced to a minimum the dangers to life from sea disasters. The radio has enriched countless homes with the best of the great music, in spite of all the jazz we hear, though it is as yet only in its infancy as an educational and broadening influence in human life.

Through the transatlantic radio telephone, opened recently for practical service, the business man sits in his office in New York and talks into the transmitter, and his voice is carried literally across 3,000 miles of watery space so that the business man in his office in Liverpool or London hears distinctly what he is saying. More amazing still, the business man in his office in Los Angeles can telephone across the continent to a sending station in Maine, whence his voice is radioed across the Atlantic to a receiving station in Scotland, whence it is relayed to Liverpool or London, to Paris or Brussels.

No one alive in 1900 needs to be reminded of how the automobile has revolutionized transportation here in America, where "every home owns a car," and to a lesser but

steadily increasing degree in other countries. It has banished the horse from our city streets, and is fast displacing him in rural districts. The tractor is rapidly making all beasts of burden obsolete on the farm. The motor car has necessitated the building of good roads in every state. It has destroyed the isolation of the farm, and brings farm-dwellers to the nearby cities almost daily. It has turned the rank and file of the people into "a traveling public"; and as they thus take to the road, it adds immeasurably to their health and pleasure. More important still, it has lifted multitudes out of the provincialism of their immediate neighborhood and enabled them to wander at will far afield, exploring the beauties of out-of-the-way places, and becoming familiar with other parts of their own country, hundreds and even thousands of miles distant. In countless subtle ways the automobile is thus helping to broaden the mental horizon of multitudes.

Latest, though no one dares to call it the last, of these new means of communication, is the airplane and the airship. There is no man alive today who can even begin to visualize the mighty changes that are coming into human relations when air navigation has become safely and practically established; and the experts are telling us that this will be at no distant date. It is safe to say that the changes wrought by the automobile, great as they have been, are small indeed as compared with the tremendous changes destined to be brought about with the further development of air navigation.

Until recently the United States has lagged behind the countries of Europe in putting air navigation on a commercial basis, but the psychological effect of Charles Lind-

bergh's successful flight across the Atlantic has inflamed the imagination and changed the entire attitude of this country toward the possibilities of air transportation. The Guggenheim Foundation has spent large sums in developing the possibilities of air travel. Within the last year or two, huge corporations have been formed, capitalized for millions, whose sale of stock and bonds provides funds which in turn are loaned to other huge corporations whose business is to build aircraft or establish and operate air lines. The firms that are now constructing aircraft of all types report a rapid increase in output and difficulty in keeping up with the orders.

In the spring of 1929, it was officially reported that every twenty-four hours in the United States, 25,000 miles were being covered by aircraft, making their regular scheduled trips, and that plans were being then put into execution that would more than double that mileage by the fall of 1929. In July of this same summer, the Transcontinental Rail-Air Line, organized by the Pennsylvania Railway System, began its regularly scheduled trips carrying passengers from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts, the journey taking two days in the air and two nights on the sleepers of connecting trains. Every city of any size has either already provided its air-ports and landing fields or is in the process of doing so, and many of the smaller towns are following suit.

In the opinion of many experts, it has been demonstrated that the airship, from the viewpoint of carrying passengers and freight, offers the most practical means for transoceanic air travel. The *Graf Zeppelin* has successfully made the round trip from Germany to this country and, later, a spec-

tacular trip round the world in twelve days. In England they are now holding the final tests of two new huge dirigibles, each capable of carrying one hundred passengers besides the crew, together with many tons of freight. If the tests are borne out, England expects to put them into regular service in the immediate future, running one from England to Canada or this country, and one to South America. We are assured that it is only a question of a little time when we shall be making regular trips across the Atlantic by airship in forty-eight hours. Plans are under way for establishing trunk air lines from the countries of Europe to all parts of Asia, to Africa, to Australia and New Zealand, as well as to the United States. One has only to open our daily papers to realize, from the amount of space given to the subject, how large a place air navigation has come to hold in the public mind.

The rapidity with which air transit is to develop is, of course, any man's guess; but what has already been achieved, together with the plans now in execution, fills the future with wildest dreams, many of which will be translated into reality. New designs in airships and new types of planes are engrossing the attention of aeronautical engineers in all countries. The problems of greater safety and increased efficiency, through the combined efforts of expert minds, are gradually being solved, and no one doubts that eventually every difficulty will be overcome. The greatest of all the unsolved problems has been how to make a safe landing in a fog, but just now the papers announce its solution. A pilot can sit in his plane and talk with persons on the surface, procure weather data, advice as to whether or not to change his course, and anything else he may de-

sire to know. The new ocean liners are being equipped to take on and discharge planes whenever there may be occasion for faster service. All the American and European steamship interests are talking much about the future use of transoceanic flying craft; some of this talk at least will materialize. The proposal to establish floating islands in mid-ocean—huge rafts built to the designs of Edward R. Armstrong—is attracting no little attention. If plans materialize, a model of the Armstrong seadrome is to be set up between New York and Bermuda. It will be a steel platform about 1200 feet long, 400 feet wide, and riding normally 100 feet above the surface, anchored in a fixed position, and theoretically available to flying craft at all times.

When the *Graf Zeppelin* landed at Lakehurst the last week of August, 1929, after encircling the globe on her epoch-making voyage, another chapter was written in the history of airship development. Magellan laboriously sailed round the world in thirty-seven months; Jules Verne speculated on eighty days; Nellie Bly did it in seventy-two days; army airplanes took nearly six months, but flew only 363 hours for a total distance of about 26,000 miles. Collyes and Mears, the former record holders, required twenty-three days. And now, the *Graf Zeppelin,* carrying sixty souls, has made the journey in just twenty-one days elapsed time, and twelve days in actual flight. With better terminal facilities for refueling, she could have done it in fifteen days. The larger and faster airships of the future will be able to do it in even less time.

The unit of measure in our present-day life is time—not distance. The distance between any two countries today is

the transport time between the two. With this striking demonstration of how an airship can annihilate ocean distances at a speed nearly three times that of the fastest vessel, it is time for thinking people to stop and ponder the effects of this demonstration upon trade stimulation and better world understanding. Airships are certainly international; they break down, because of necessity they must disregard, all national barriers. The whole subject opens up so many possibilities for the coming world community that one's imagination is likely to run wild.

One of the experts in this field in summarizing the immediate development of air transportation, says, "United Aircraft and Transport, Aviation Corporation, and other important groups, are now working on their own transcontinental systems, and also on feeder lines extending north and south throughout this entire hemisphere. Every town promising sufficient traffic is included in the various programs for expansion. And the plans are very much the same—giant liners running day and night between all large cities, some of them making no stops between their terminals, others dropping down *en route* to discharge and take on passengers, and other planes coming in to the trunk-line junctions with their loads picked up on the feeder routes or taken off the railways and buses." In forecasting the immediate future, the same writer says, "The enthusiasts in the industry know that 3500 commercial airplanes were built last year, and they are predicting that in 1934—five years hence—150,000 planes will be in operation, based on the continuance of the present interest in flying. The more conservative will be content if in another five years 100,000 planes are in operation." The one thing that is

absolutely clear is that the end is not yet in the development of air navigation and that the future may see changes in this whole matter of transit by air that cannot now even be dreamed.

One of the most significant results of these new means of communication is the tremendous increase in travel that has inevitably followed. A hundred years ago, the man who journeyed from his farm or village to other places was a notable person; but today the one who does not travel far and wide is the great exception. The tourist agencies report that during the year 1928 more than 750,000 men and women from this country alone visited foreign lands, and this number is steadily increasing. It is to be feared that the majority of these conventional tourists return home more than ever confirmed in their 100% Americanism; but among them are many—the more serious of the thousands of college students going abroad each year, and those older men and women who make up the many conducted parties under expert leadership whose chief purpose is to study conditions in other lands—who come back to their own country to find that the old ignorance and prejudice against other nations or races is gradually being replaced by a new understanding and sense of appreciation of what these other people have to contribute to the common life of mankind. It is thus that the old barriers that have separated the various peoples so long are slowly breaking down. When we remember that a hundred years ago the number of people in this country who were even dreaming of going round the world might have been counted almost on the fingers of two hands, and that last January, from the single port of New York alone, there sailed a dozen huge, palatial steam-

ships, to make their regular annual trips around the world, carrying literally tens of thousands of men and women, it becomes apparent how the world-wide travel of today is gradually destroying the old provincialism of nations and peoples, and making impossible for the future the crass ignorance of other lands, of other civilizations, and of other races, that has prevailed in the past.

The facts brought together in this chapter are not new. We who have been born in the midst of all these new means of communication are familiar with them all, are using them and enjoying them every day. In fact we are *so* familiar with them, they have become so natural and integral a part of our daily life, that we cannot imagine a world where they did not exist. It is only as we deliberately seek and gain the historical viewpoint, as we intelligently compare the conditions of life a century ago when none of these means of communication had an existence, with the conditions of life as we know them today, that we can even begin to appreciate the significance of the mighty changes that have come about, and all that they imply and involve for the relations of peoples on this planet.

What science has done, in this respect, is practically to annihilate space; there is today no distance in the sense in which we used to employ that word. The oceans are no longer barriers; they have become broad highways. China is not thousands of miles away; she is at our very dooryard. The old isolation in which nations were obliged to live has been banished forever by these new means of communication. We are in constant, closest touch with events taking place in all parts of the globe. Compare an issue of any of our leading dailies with an issue of the same

paper twenty years ago, or even up to the war, and note how much larger the space now given to foreign news and happenings of all kinds. To be marooned on a vacation in some out of the way place where only the local sheet is procurable is to feel oneself literally shut off from the world. No business man could survive without the cable and telegraphic news of trade conditions, rate of exchange, money market, etc., brought to him daily and hourly from every section of the world.

What science has done, and that in the short space of a century, has been to bring us all together into *one physical neighborhood;* we are living today on this planet in what amounts to one geographic community, thanks to all these new means of communication. The trouble with the world as yet is that it has not yet gained the world-community consciousness; it has not yet developed the world-community spirit. As long as nations and peoples were widely separated by these great expanses of land and water, and there were no easy means of communication, it made little difference what nations thought of one another, or what their attitude toward each other was. But those conditions have been swept away by the work of science; today we are all living in the same neighborhood, we are rubbing elbows and treading on each other's toes, and getting in one another's way continually. In such a world-neighborhood, it makes a tremendous difference what nations think of one another, or what their attitude really is.

Some one has figured it out mathematically in this way: if you take the length of time required only fifty years ago to travel any given distance either on land or sea, and compare it with the shorter time required today to make the

same journey, it means that during the last fifty years our planet has shrunken, mathematically, from the size of a football to the size of an English walnut; and that shrinking process is steadily going on with every advance of science. No one can say how tiny a thing our planet will become when air navigation is once practically established.

So long as individuals lived on isolated farms at some distance from their fellows, they could do pretty much as they pleased; they raised their own food, killed their own meat, made their own clothes. But when, in the course of time, they moved into the village or town, and became a part of a settled community, they were obliged to conform to the laws and conventions of the community; they could no longer do just as they pleased, but were forced to learn how to coöperate with all the rest for the sake of the best good of the community as a whole.

Something like this change that has taken place in the lives of millions of individuals who were formerly free and independent tillers of the soil, living in more or less isolation from their fellows, has taken place on a vastly larger scale in the lives of nations. When people are crowded together in modern cities that contain millions of inhabitants and in the countless factory towns and villages, brought into existence by the industrial revolution, they must learn how to live together in harmony, coöperation and peace; they must readjust themselves to the life of the community and come to share the community spirit. By analogy, common sense, not to mention idealism, would suggest at least, in view of the fact that these new means of communication have brought us all into one neighborhood, and bound us all together by innumerable economic ties, that the nations

thus finding themselves living in one geographic community and all sharing mutual interests, should also learn how to live together in harmony, coöperation and peace; that the nations *must* readjust themselves to the life of the new world-community that has been brought into existence, and come to share the world-community spirit.

The difficulties in the way of achieving such an end reside not in things as they are, but in our conception of them; they are not material but psychological. This is the fact that no nations and but few of their leaders appear to have perceived. The obstacles in the way of the coming of a world-community lie chiefly in our mental outlook—old habits of thinking and feeling, old ideas and conceptions, old formulas and methods—the legacy of an earlier period that is fast being outgrown, and that is ill-adapted to modern conditions, and wholly inadequate to solve our modern problems.

This much is sure: the life of mankind, including all races and nationalities and groups of every kind, is not to be lived in the twentieth century on isolated continents, it is not to be divided into separate fragments by national boundary lines, it cannot remain broken up into antagonistic and warring groups kept apart by mutual ignorance and prejudice. For henceforth the life of all peoples who inhabit this earth must be lived in the closest physical proximity. The new lines of communication have stretched forth to the ends of the earth; they have practically annihilated distance and space; they have brought all peoples into what amounts to one physical community; they have forever banished geographic isolation and physical separateness; and they are fast destroying the old ignorance of one another. In this

matter of communications and transportation alone, mankind has made greater strides in the direction of a world-community during the last century than in all the preceding centuries of human history.

Physical nearness and easy communications, however, are not enough to ensure the coming of a world-community; it may mean only the intensification of racial and national rivalries and competitions and jealousies of all kinds. That this has been the immediate result of the industrial revolution is now clearly apparent, for this is the alarming condition of the world that is presented to us just now. On the other hand, the one physical neighborhood into which science has brought all peoples *does* furnish the material foundation upon which, through intelligence and will, there *may be* built a veritable world-community in which political relations and economic needs and the moral life of all peoples shall come to be dominated by the genuine community spirit of coöperation and good-will.

II

THE NEW ECONOMIC ORGANISM

It is neither possible nor does it lie within the scope and purpose of this book to deal with the many radical and more subtle changes brought about by the industrial revolution except as they bear directly on the relationship of nations and peoples. The fundamental fact that the historical viewpoint makes clear is that in less than a century the manner in which men earn their livelihood on this planet has been revolutionized. The manufacture of a pair of shoes, a hat or a fabric, even the running of a farm, is totally different from what it was in the days of Napoleon I.

A hundred years ago the chief business of every country in the world was agriculture. At that time the nations might well have considered themselves as autonomous and sovereign entities, for every nation was practically independent, in the sense that it was able to raise its own food supplies and provide its own housing and clothing materials. There was no system of exports and imports such as we now know. The basic necessities for the life of the people came from within the borders of each country. The interdependence of the little industries hardly extended beyond the confines of the village, and that of the larger industries, hardly beyond a province. Foreign trade was undeveloped. For some time hardy adventurers had gone

to the Orient, bringing back tea, spices, silks, ivory ornaments and the like, but these were in the nature of luxuries, with which the people in Western countries could safely dispense. In the whole range of the actual necessities of life, each nation was really independent of the others.

But within two or three generations all this has been altered by the development of machinery. As factories multiplied and industrialism spread from one Western country to another, agriculture in these countries was of necessity crowded more and more into the background. In increasing numbers the people left the farms and took their places before the machines in the factories. A hundred years ago it is estimated that 90% of the people in the countries of Europe were engaged in agriculture, and only 10% in all other pursuits. Today in the countries that have become most completely industrialized those percentages have been, roughly speaking, reversed. As a result, all nations have ceased to be self-supporting. Not one is any longer independent in the economic sense.

There are three basic demands of an industrial civilization: (1) for the raw materials with which to run the factories—coal, iron, copper, oil, rubber, etc.,—a very large proportion of which must be secured from other parts of the world; (2) for the outlets where the finished product of the factories can be sold, and since the domestic consumption of manufactured articles sooner or later reaches the saturation point in the industrial state this necessitates the creation of new markets in all parts of the world; (3) for a large proportion of the food necessary to the existence of its people, which its own diminishing agricul-

ture is no longer able to furnish. It is estimated that if the food supplies coming today from outside to industrial nations like England, France, Germany, and Italy, were to be shut off, the peoples of these countries would starve to death in from three to four months. And yet, a hundred years ago these same countries were self-supporting and able to furnish their own food supplies. To be sure the population of these countries has greatly increased, but this does not alter the fact that agriculture has diminished as industrialism has grown. The historian tells us that what ended the Great War was not so much any decisive victory on the battlefield as the fact that the blockade and the submarine had played such havoc with the steady stream of food supplies coming from across the seas to the countries of Europe that the people of those countries were starving to death and the War had to end.

But there is still a fourth demand of industrialism. Sooner or later the developing industrial state produces a surplus of capital which is constantly seeking places for investment where it can secure larger returns than are possible in its own more highly developed country. And thus this capital gradually goes out into all parts of the world, wherever there is the opportunity to build railroads, construct docks, develop mines, grow rubber, dig oil wells, and the like. The foreign investments of the United States today amount to between 14 and 15 billions of dollars, exclusive of the Allied indebtedness. If we include these debts, the total is close to 25 billions; and our foreign investments are increasing at present at the rate of a billion a year. The same is true, to a greater or less degree, of every industrial state.

The fascinating story of the rapid expansion of Europe during the nineteenth century and of the expansion of the United States in the twentieth, with the consequent growth of colonial empires, is simply the story of how the developing Western industrial states have been seeking to satisfy these basic demands of their new civilization. They have reached out into the countries of the Orient, of Africa, of South America, and of the islands of the sea, after the raw materials, a large proportion of which must come from the tropical regions, for food commodities which today come from all parts of the globe, for new world-markets in all lands, and eventually, for places to invest their surplus capital where it will bring the largest returns.

The result of this rise and rapid spread of our industrial civilization has been to force the nations to become specialists. Hence today we have the great agricultural countries like Russia, Rumania, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, sending their steady streams of food supplies across land and sea to the great industrial countries; and on the other hand, the leading industrial countries are sending their steady streams of manufactured articles—clothes, shoes, tools, furniture, books, etc., across the land and sea to the countries that still remain wholly, or chiefly, agricultural. This constant interchange of the food commodities and raw materials of the less highly developed countries, and the manufactured articles of all kinds of the industrialized nations, is the fundamental characteristic in the relation of nations today as compared with their relations a century ago.

From a position of practical independence as respects all the basic necessities in the life of a people, the nations

have moved on, thanks to the rise and spread of our industrial civilization, to a relation of the most complex interdependence. We are today all mutually dependent one upon the other. The interests of nations are no longer separate and isolated, but all bound together inextricably by a thousand and one new economic ties and relationships that had no existence whatever a century ago. No nation, not even the strongest, is in a position to break with the others without depriving itself of the sources of its indispensable supplies and of its necessary customers, and consequently, without bringing ruin upon itself.

From the economic viewpoint the world has changed to a greater extent within the last four generations than in the twenty centuries that have elapsed since the beginning of the Christian era. In the whole range of our economic life, as nations and peoples, we are today living in a world that has already become internationalized; it is only on the political side of the life of nations that we are still trying to live as if we were independent, self-supporting and sovereign entities; and the simple fact is that there is no such nation in the world today. The international banker and financier, the intelligent big business man realizes this. He knows that during the last century there has come into existence a vast, complicated, intricate economic world machinery that has made this world *one* in the whole range of its economic life, and that is demanding new readjustments constantly if there is to be a larger measure of justice and a truer coöperation in the life of nations. But there are very few who know even the facts of this tremendous change that has taken place,

and a still smaller number who see the significance of the facts for the world's future.

The trouble with this muddled and chaotic world today is that the statesmen, and rulers and leaders generally, with a few notable exceptions, are trying to solve problems, however honestly, that are in their very nature economic and international by means that are political and national; and it simply cannot be done. They are seeking to force this new internationalized economic world that has been brought into existence by the industrial revolution into the old thought-forms and formulas and practices of the independent and self-supporting political state, forms that have become obsolete and that have no more existence in reality than the myths of ancient Greece.

Production of commodities in every field has long since become internationalized. When in the late eighteenth century, a few business men, making use of Crompton's invention, set up in Lancashire the first mechanical spinning "mules," their purpose was simply to sell cloth more cheaply than their competitors. It never crossed their minds that the woolen industry might run short of raw material. Sheep raising had been for centuries one of the main sources of wealth in Great Britain. But a time came when the spinning mule was run at such a low cost that orders flowed in from all sides. Factories multiplied and soon there were not enough English sheep to go round. Then the gold seekers of Australia, the gauchos of the Argentine pampas, the Puritans of the Cape turned to sheep rearing. They had at their disposal immense prairies belonging to nobody where innumerable flocks might graze under the supervision of one man and

a few dogs. The wool cost practically nothing beyond the outlay for shearing, and soon the spinners would have no other. The English farmer, unable to hold his own against his remote competitors, became an insignificant factor in the world production of wool.

With an ever increasing demand from Yorkshire, flocks have mutiplied on the tablelands of the Transvaal and of Natal, in the prairies of Argentine and in the mountains of New South Wales and New Zealand. These great sheep countries do not spin and weave their own wool to any great extent, for the simple reason that coal and skilled labor are not so easily obtainable as in England. Thus has each country become specialized. Industrial England produces relatively little wool; Australia, the Cape and the Argentine make little cloth. Division of labor has been imposed upon the nations by the freakishness of the cost of production. At the same time, it has made them absolutely dependent upon each other. Should distemper break out among the sheep on the pampas, at once the price of wool goes up on the Bradford market. An industrial crisis in Yorkshire will ruin the sheep raisers in New Zealand. Thus two countries situated at the antipodes one of the other are as closely united as the limbs of the same body.

At Roubaix in France are spun Australian and Argentine wool, purchased in London, cleansed at Verviers in Belgium, and finally sold to tailors throughout the Western world. In Germany, the fleece of Uruguay sheep is spun and woven by Saxony and Silesia; until the War it provided clothing to the Balkans, the Levant and Turkey. Today in industrial Europe and America, no less than on

the Australian tablelands, every article of dress is the product of the collaboration of continents. From Buenos Aires to Bedford, from Roubaix to the Cape, from Melbourne to Plauen, a woolen thread unites the two hemispheres.

The cotton industry, the silk industry, the shoe industry, the hat industry—in fact every article of human apparel—all have followed the same evolution. A heavy frost on the banks of the Mississippi, or the increase of activity on the part of the boll-weevil due to a wet season in Georgia or Texas, provokes a violent rise of the price of raw cotton on the Liverpool exchange, and the disturbance reverberates rapidly from Rouen, Lille, and Calais to the furthermost depths of Saxony. A change in the dictates of fashion, or the introduction of a new product like rayon, will bring on an industrial crisis among the silk-worm growers in Japan. Such is the solidarity that binds the different parts of the world together.

All this prodigious mechanical development presupposes a powerful metal industry. It seemed at first as if England would be able to supply the needs of other nations while retaining enough for herself. Since then the insatiable appetite of blast furnaces has almost exhausted her iron ore, and the United States has discovered her vast resources of iron, copper, and other minerals. The steel works on the Rhine have exhausted the Sieg valley. The Belgians who have no ore, have sought for a supply in every direction, among the rocks of Algeria and under the snows of the polar regions. Today the metallurgical trades of Europe are supplied by the ore of Spain, of Canada, of

Swedish Lapland, of Algeria, as well as by that of the United States and other countries.

At the outset the driving force required for all this machinery was coal, and coal has played as important a part as bread in modern life. The nation that is without the fuel necessary for its factories is no more master of its destinies than if it were unable to feed its population. On the other hand, the coal supplying nation secures for itself a very real preponderance over the others. Coal lay at the basis of England's supremacy during the whole of the last century. Producing more coal than she required for her own industries, she had established coaling stations at every important point of the globe, and every other navy thus became her tributary.

Today, however, with the invention of the Diesel engine, oil is rapidly replacing coal in industry, in the mercantile marine and in the navy. England, which achieved naval, commercial, and industrial supremacy primarily through her coal, is without oil; she imports three-quarters of her supply from the United States and Mexico. In her turn, she thus becomes dependent upon other countries for what is today, and will be increasingly tomorrow, an indispensable fuel. England, with all other civilized countries, is frantically seeking to lay her hands upon any available oil wells that may be found in the most remote regions of the earth.

It is thus that the development of machinery has had the singular result of gradually and forcibly internationalizing the great industries. It has grouped together enormous agglomerations of factories and workshops mainly in the vicinity of coal basins. Local resources having been

promptly exhausted, it has had to seek its raw material in distant countries across the seas. Little by little, specialization has taken place, some people furnishing the raw material which they do not transform; others transforming raw material which they do not produce. Thus they have become complementary one to the other and solidarity has been established between them. However national pride may seek to disguise it, the nations have ceased to lead an independent existence.

In three or four generations, the world has become so transformed that every nation has ceased to be self-supporting. Specialization has been forced upon the nations as a result of the development of machinery, and has brought enormous prosperity. But at the same time economic interdependence between the nations has become an unalterable law. They grow rich only by standing together; separated, they perish. Without coöperation the world that the machine has created could not exist a single day.

A series of intricate problems had to be solved in connection with the growth of international trade. How were these enormous masses of commodities to be transported to great distances across both land and sea? How were bargains to be clinched? How were payments to be effected, and how was capital to be transferred? It became necessary to devise a new kind of machinery in which railways and steamships, telegraph and cable, leading markets, stock exchanges, etc., all coöperated toward the smooth and effective running of this world machinery. This extremely complicated mechanism was gradually brought into more and more perfect running order during the second half of the nineteenth century. It constitutes today

the circulating apparatus of the international economic organism; on it depends the life of every people.

The internationalization of trade is an obvious fact. But the intricate international mechanism by which purchases are made, and prices and payments are settled, is little understood even by those who make use of it. Because of the development of the Cotton Exchange, for example, a manufacturer is able to purchase his raw material at a distance of thousands of miles and without seeing what he buys, or to sell from an equal distance without ever having met his purchaser. Similar exchanges exist for wool, corn, sugar, metals, rubber, chemicals, and generally, for all commodities involving considerable transactions. All of these exchanges in the different countries are linked up together by telegraph and cable, so that the chalking up of a figure in a New York bank can make or mar fortunes in London or Paris, in Stockholm or Brussels, in Rome or Tokio. Orders are transmitted, prices fixed and accepted, goods delivered and payment made, all through the accurate working of the international mechanism that has come within half a century to underlie and control the world's economic life.

"How does the ordinary respectable citizen of Paris spend his day in 1927?" asks Francis Delaisi, a French economist, in his recent book, *Political Myths and Economic Realities*. Here is his illuminating answer:

"On awakening, he washes himself with soap manufactured out of the Congo peanut and dries himself with a cotton towel of Louisiana. He then proceeds to dress himself. His shirt and collar are made of Russian linen, his coat and trousers of wool from the Cape or Australia.

He puts on a silk tie made of Japanese cocoons, and shoes whose leather is derived from the hide of an Argentine ox and tanned with a chemical product from Germany.

"In his dining room, adorned with a Dutch sideboard made of wood from Hungarian forests, he will find the table laid with plated metal made of Rio-Tinto copper, tin from the Malay straits and silver from Australia. He will find a fresh loaf of wheat which, according to the season of the year, may come from Beauce, from Rumania or from Canada. He may eat eggs newly arrived from Morocco, a slice of frozen 'Présalé' from the Argentine, and preserved small peas which have seen the California sun; his sweet will be English jam made of French fruit and Cuban sugar, and his excellent coffee will come from Brazil.

"Restored to vigor he now goes to work. An electric tram, run on the Thomson-Houston system, takes him to his office. After making a note of the quotations of the Liverpool, London, Amsterdam or Yokohoma exchanges, he dictates his correspondence, which is taken down on an English typewriter, and he signs it with an American fountain pen. In his workshop, 'Paris articles' for a Brazilian clientele are being manufactured out of materials of many origins, by machinery built in Lorraine according to German patents, and fed with English coal. His instructions are to send them to Rio by the first German steamer that puts in at Cherbourg.

"He then proceeds to his bank to pay in a check in guilders from a Dutch client and to buy sterling to pay for English goods. The bank manager will take the opportunity to point out that his account shows a considerable

balance and that oil shares are rising. He accepts the suggestion, but unwilling to put all his eggs in one basket, he gives orders to buy at the same time four Royal Dutch shares and ten of a French company affiliated with the Standard Oil.

"Satisfied with a profitable day he proposes to spend the evening at a show with his wife. She will don her best frock from Paquin Ltd., her pretty fur of Blue Fox from Siberia, her diamonds from the Cape. Then they will dine at an 'Italian Restaurant' and debate whether to go to the Russian Ballet or to a music hall to hear Raquel Meller, or perhaps decide for one of the d'Annunzio plays acted by Ida Rubenstein with designs from Bakst.

"After having supped at the 'Caucasian Cave,' to the accompaniment of a Negro jazz band, they return home. After a day so well spent, our Parisian falls asleep under his quilt made of feathers of Norwegian duck, and dreams that France is decidedly a great country, entirely self-supporting and able to snap her fingers at the whole world."

And these are the significant concluding words of our French economist: "Whether for clothes or food, for work or pleasure, we are all dependent upon every other country under the sun today. We cannot make a gesture without displacing some object that has come from the most remote region; and conversely, every important event on the surface of the globe finds its echo in our daily life. *Modern man is truly a citizen of the world. But he is completely unaware of this fact.* And herein lies the tragedy of our time and the cause of all the turmoil of the post-war age from which a means of escape has yet to be devised."

In these last words, our author lays his finger on the

secret of so much of the confusion in our thinking, and so much of the futility of our efforts, as we seek to solve the many complex problems that now confront the world. In the whole range of his economic life, modern man has indeed become a citizen of the world. His prosperity, and equally his ruin, are inseparably bound up with the fate of all other peoples. As a matter of grim reality, leaving all sentiment and idealism aside, no nation can longer live unto itself, any more than can the individual, in the world economic community into which our industrial civilization has brought us. And the tragedy does indeed lie in the fact that the vast majority of men, not in France alone, but in all countries, are totally ignorant of the facts of these new relations into which we have come, or else they fail utterly to see their significance for the world's life today.

All men know that the United States conducts an export and import trade of large and growing extent, but only a small proportion of our citizens realize all that this means in our relations to other nations. Few even visualize the extent to which the products of other lands enter into all our activities, rural as well as urban. All the facts are not obvious; many of them are obscure. A housekeeper buying domestic supplies from a department store or a mail-order house might be amazed to be told that she was getting goods from abroad that her own country was unable to supply. Her kitchen equipment and personal apparel witness to it. We accept as a matter of course statements which place our country at the head of the nations in all that makes for material power. And such state-

ments occupy the front page of our papers and feed our 100% Americanism.

The United States occupies less than 6% of all the territory of the world and has but little over 6% of the world's population. Yet, as a responsible authority states: "The United States is more richly endowed with material than any single country of the world. In regard to material resources we have coal, iron, copper, water power, petroleum, cotton, lumber, crude salts. Our resources far exceed those of our industrial competitors. The United States produces 60% of the world's pig iron output, 53% of copper, 43% of coal, 72% of petroleum, 52% of cotton, 52% of lumber, and we have 40% of the world's developed water power. Yet our most important resources have scarcely been touched."

We can add to this that our farms provide more wheat, corn and potatoes than those of any other nation. We hold most of the world's gold in our possession, and we read of an annual increase in our wealth reckoned in billions, and of savings enormous in amount and all but universal in extent. Our national debt is being steadily diminished and the Treasury is so overflowing that the reduction of federal taxation is seriously considered. Whichever way we turn we are met with superlatives as to our wealth, our power, our prosperity. The development of our manufactures is on a scale commensurate with the gifts of nature. It would be tiresome to recite the long list of industries in each of which our production is the largest. Communications are on a like scale. We have more than one-third of all the railroad mileage, more than one-half of all the telephones, and far more automobiles

than the rest of the world. We produce as much electricity as all the other nations together. So far as material advance can contribute to human happiness we have reason to rejoice in the progress we have made. It is not strange that the average citizen, looking at such facts and hearing such glowing statements oft repeated, should be filled with complacency and should comfortably infer from them that while the world may need the United States, the United States itself does not in any real sense need the world.

The United States is doubtless a more nearly self-sufficient nation than any other. The development of our standards of life is such that our social life makes more extensive and imperative demands than that of any other country, and this has led to an economic development that is itself unparalleled. Without in any sense disparaging our material progress and economic power, with whatever real benefits these have conferred, what we do not realize is that our complex needs go far beyond the power of any one nation, even our own with all its rich resources, to satisfy. The thing we must learn is that no nation today is self-contained, not even the United States, and that it is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of our very life as a people that we should reach out into all parts of the globe for the goods we require. Our insufficiencies and needs are as notable as our resources.

In 1926, William C. Redfield, former Secretary of Commerce, published a little book entitled, "Dependent America." In his position, the author was able to secure much interesting and authoritative data dealing with the economic relations of the United States to the rest of the world, data never before available to the general public.

If every business and professional man in the country could but read and ponder this little book, it would tend to dispel the widespread illusion of our self-sufficiency; it might also chasten the blatant type of 100% Americanism that thrives on ignorance of the real facts.

On the cover-blurb of the volume the Publishers ask these questions: "Did you know that more than one hundred substances necessary for national defense must be imported from other countries? Or that half a million animals are killed every day throughout the world to supply us with leather? Or that we import each year a million miles of sausage-casings and twenty-five million toothbrushes? Or that we produce no tin and yet we are the largest makers of tin-plate and consume more than one-half the tin output of the world?"

This is a good introduction, but as we turn the pages of the book we discover that the steel production of the United States, "our greatest industry," requires at least forty different commodities brought from fifty-seven different countries. Some of these commodities, like coal, copper, lead, iron ore, we produce on a great scale, but we also import large quantities of each of them from other lands; of others, such as manganese and chrome, we have only a limited quantity that would be exhausted in a very short time did we not depend on other countries; and of some, we produce nothing at all. Our leading steel makers have no rivals in the volume or variety of their output and their products go all over the globe. We make over half the world's steel. American locomotives are drawing trains in every continent; and in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia our machinery and steel products

are of widespread use. But this is only half the story. The modern locomotive is possible only through the sweat of the toilers in the Caucasus, or in the heat of India and Brazil, through the labors of miners in distant Rhodesia or in New Caledonia in the South Pacific, through the aid of Canadian workers in nickel mines, through the help of Peruvian Indians extracting vanadium ore. These have supplied for that locomotive what America lacked; their far off labors have united with our efforts at home. Manganese and chrome, nickel and vanadium, tools of steel alloyed with Chinese tungsten, all have met in the steel fabric of our locomotive—literally the product of all the continents.

The United States is the foremost leather making, using and exporting nation in the world, and is still an important source of hides and skins; our production, however, falls short of domestic manufacturing requirements. In the year 1924 our supply of calfskins, cattlehides, goatskins, sheepskins, and horsehides was over 101,000,000 pelts, of which 62% were imported, as the Tariff Commission says, "from all corners of the world." According to the official records for July, 1925, we drew hides from twenty-seven countries, calfskins from twenty-two, sheep and lambskins from twenty-nine, goat and kidskins from thirty-one, and "other hides and skins" from twenty-four. In all, sixty countries sent us some kind of animal pelts in that one month. But if the collection of hides for our tanneries is a "study in geography," the gathering of tanning materials is little less so. The Official Report for 1922 states that nearly half of the materials used for tanning purposes in this country was imported from all parts of the world. "The peasant

families gathering valonia in Asia Minor and Greece, the Italians sending sumac through Palermo, the natives of Natal shipping wattle from Durban, Indian nut harvesters in the hinterlands of Madras, and those collecting pods in Venezuela and bark in Madagascar, are all fellow workers with the tannery employees of Pennsylvania."

In September, 1925, an English authority wrote: "America is the great consumer of raw rubber, taking between 70 and 80 percent of the world's total production, but she does not directly control a single ton of the raw material. American manufacturers are entirely dependent upon alien sources for the very existence of the enormous industry they have built up in the course of a single generation." It is but a few years since the production of rubber boots and shoes was the largest single element of the rubber industry. That was the case as recently as 1901; but in 1923, as against 16,440 tons of rubber used in boots and shoes, and their parts, more than 220,000 tons were consumed in making tires, tubes, and their accessories. In the year 1924 we imported 734,845,000 pounds of crude rubber, of which 407,849,000 pounds came from the Straits Settlements, 131,762,000 pounds from the Dutch East Indies, and 61,074,000 pounds from Ceylon. Brazil, once the chief source of supply, sent only 29,025,000 pounds. More recently, however, American companies have made large investments in Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and Liberia.

Matching Francis Delaisi's description of the average Parisian is the following, taken from Raymond Fosdick's recent book, "The Old Savage in the New Civilization": "From the time an American citizen rises in the morning until he goes to bed at night he is surrounded with the

products of foreign countries. His linen comes from Ireland, his necktie from Japan, his suit of Australasian wool is padded with jute from India. The buttons on his clothes come from South America, France or the Philippine Islands. The bristles of his hairbrush are from China, his toothbrush is from Japan. He cannot even wash his hands without calling on help from abroad. He sits down to a breakfast of grapefruit, coffee, sugar, and perhaps sausages—all of which are, in whole or in part, the products of foreign countries. His newspaper is made of Canadian wood pulp. He puts on a felt hat that comes from an Australian rabbitskin. The doormat at his front door comes from India. The nickel that he pays for his street car fare was mined in Canada. The tires of his automobile come from the rubber plantations of the Dutch East Indies. His briar pipe comes from France. Even the locomotive that pulls his train cannot be manufactured without imported materials—the manganese comes from the Caucasus, the chrome from New Caledonia, the vanadium from Peru."

Mr. Fosdick quotes Senator Reed of Missouri in a recent argument against the World Court where he drew a comparison between "this newfangled doctrine of internationalism" and leprosy. "Our policy," he says, "has been to guard ourselves against its contamination by keeping away from leprosy-infected districts and colonies, and by guarding our gates against the entrance of its victims." And then Mr. Fosdick adds, "Quite apart from Mr. Reed's incapacity to realize what time it is in the history of the world, his figure of speech was singularly infelicitous. For in the new era of transportation in which we live, even

diseases are no longer the property of particular countries. Like raw materials, they go wherever man goes. The bubonic plague from its base in northern Arabia creeps northeast into Thibet, out of Thibet into southern China, up the Chinese coast to the Chinese ports, where it reaches out long tentacles to menace the rest of the world. The influenza epidemic of 1918 started in the German prison camps; it leaped over into Spain; it crossed the Pyrenees mountains, growing in virulency as it advanced; it jumped the English channel to Great Britain; it swept over the Atlantic, burned its way across the Western Hemisphere, took the Pacific at a single bound, and laid waste all of Asia and the South Sea Islands. It destroyed more lives than were lost during the entire war in Europe. Modern transportation carried the disease from the Eskimos of the Arctic circle to the savages of the Solomon Islands. No race and no tribe escaped. All were caught in the meshwork with which modern science has woven the world into a single community."

The devastating ravages inflicted upon this country today by the boll-weevil in the cotton plantations of the South, the corn-borer in the Middle West, the Japanese beetle, and latest of all, the Mediterranean fly among the fruit-growers of Florida—all these insect pests are importations from other lands, and all bear eloquent witness to the oneness of the life that is lived on this planet in the things that curse as well as in those that bless.

What is true in all the major industries is equally true as respects many other requirements for our daily life and needs. Read the chapters in Mr. Redfield's most informing book, and you begin to realize how far from self-

contained and self-sufficient is even the United States, in spite of its wealth, its resources and its economic power. In the food we consume on our tables, the clothes we wear on our backs, the furnishings with which we adorn our homes, the thousand and one raw materials which we must have to run our factories, we are dependent to a degree that few realize on every country under the sun. America may be justly proud that through the application of science and skill to production and transportation, she has brought the material wealth of the world into the home of the average man to an extent never achieved before. We have gone farther than any other people on the way toward the conquest of poverty. But we should remember that it is the wealth of the whole world and not merely our own wealth that we have thus put at the service of the average man. Were it not for these immense contributions made daily to the needs and demands of our complex social and individual life by all countries of the world, what would become of our wealth or our power?

In briefest outline, this is the transformation that has taken place in the economic relations of nations and peoples, as the result of the rise and rapid development of our new industrial civilization. From a position of practical independence and self-sufficiency, all nations have been forced into a relation of the closest mutual interdependence where each needs the other, must have the help of the other, or else must perish. There is not a man or woman in America, or any other civilized land, whose daily life, both in the necessities we must have and in the luxuries we all crave, is not in constant touch with the life of peoples across the seas whose customs are strange to us, whose

languages are unknown, of whom we may never have heard, but without whose daily toil our existence would be impossible. No one of us lives through a single day without in some way getting help from all lands and all peoples.

To borrow an analogy, a century ago the world was like an immense polypus wherein myriads of juxtaposed enterprises led an almost independent existence on a common rock. But today, the world has become a sort of huge vertebrate, whose various organs complement each other; the limbs and members grow together, suffer together, and die when separated from each other.

The machine, and the civilization it has created, have made of the world an economic unit wherein we are all indispensable members one of another. The world has in fact become one organism. And one of the chief problems of the twentieth century is so to develop and perfect the world economic machinery that has already come into existence as to secure a larger measure of harmony, of justice, of honesty and fair dealing among all the various members of the new world-community, be they large or small, strong or weak.

III

THE NEW KNOWLEDGE

It is not alone, however, in the field of material progress that the new civilization has revolutionized our world. Science has given us the machine and the machine has created an industrial civilization which, in turn, has bound all nations together in an economic interdependence never known in the past. The achievements of science in the field of technology and invention are indeed amazing, and their results have completely transformed the entire material life of man. But even they are not to be compared in significance with what science has done in the broader field of our general cultural knowledge. This may be less apparent to the eye than are the ubiquitous signs of material progress, but it is none the less convincingly clear to the intelligent mind.

There are conservatives who hold that all basically important discoveries and inventions have been made, and that henceforth we must look only to the application and further development of what is already known. But this is to underrate both the possibilities of science and the powers of the creative imagination of man. It would be nearer the truth to say that in the matter of invention we stand where Columbus stood after his third voyage. His was the basic feat of discovering America. He had established a few great facts, but neither he nor the world knew the meaning

of those facts. Just as all this vast continent lay shrouded in mystery before Columbus, so the illimitable continent of science in the field of invention stretches before us today. We have not penetrated even the forest which guards its coast line.

But if this be true of science in the field of invention, and for that matter, in the whole range of the physical sciences, where so many fundamental discoveries have been made, it is also true that in the field of the social sciences we have as yet scarcely touched the shore, to continue the figure, of the new continent of human nature and human relations. When Francis Bacon first pointed out the importance of the experimental method as an approach to human knowledge, he was laying a foundation upon which the nineteenth century has built a marvelous structure indeed. In astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, in biology, in physiology and anatomy, in medicine and surgery, we have wrested the facts from nature by the experimental method, and the new knowledge thus gained has made obsolete every scientific textbook of a generation ago. The body of knowledge in these physical sciences has developed with bewildering rapidity. In this twentieth century we are fairly intoxicated with the wealth of this new knowledge. We await with keenest eagerness each new promise of discovery, and wonder at what is to come next. This modern age is alert with expectancy and on tiptoe with curiosity to see what tomorrow will bring. There is no way of halting the steady advance of science, even if we would, and we would not if we could. For weal or for woe, science is here to stay to the end. Never before has man been possessed of such a profound preoccupation or such an intensity of desire to

wrest from Nature all the secrets which she still conceals which may have a bearing on any slightest phase of material progress. Man has indeed come a long, long ways, since the days of Galileo and Copernicus, in his mastery of the forces of nature that play about him, but the end of his journey is still in the distant future.

When we turn to the social sciences, however, there is not the same cause for pride. In the knowledge of man, of his natural equipment and impulses, of all his manifold relations to his fellows, and especially, of the regulation and control of human relations in the interests of justice, co-operation and harmony, science is still in its infancy. It is this wide gulf between the brilliant development of the physical sciences on the one hand, and the almost stationary position of our knowledge of man, that presents to the twentieth century its profoundest problem. If the scientific advance of the last hundred years had been more symmetrical, that is, if the social sciences had kept pace in their development with the physical, the difficult and complex problems which now confront mankind would not be so marked. As James Harvey Robinson has pointed out, Aristotle's treatises on astronomy, physics and chemistry have long since become obsolete, while his politics and ethics still represent the highwater mark of human thought.

Within the last generation, however, the social sciences have begun their real development. More thought and energy are today being devoted in the truly scientific spirit to anthropology, ethnology, sociology, psychology, economics and political science than ever before. There is not a college in the country in whose curriculum they do not appear, and an increasing number of students are turning to

such studies. Although the experimental method is not as easily applicable to the study of mankind and its problems, research in all these fields is being rapidly developed. Foundations are established for carrying on investigations in special fields, and within the last few years a system of international fellowships in the social sciences has been organized on a comprehensive basis. It is as though the social sciences were trying with feverish haste to catch up with the more advanced physical sciences; but though the hope of the future lies in their future development, there is still very much to be desired.

In his recent book, "The Old Savage in the New Civilization," Raymond Fosdick puts the need most clearly when he says: "Social science today is still lacking in the fundamental groundwork of knowledge. It is still too largely based upon inspiration rather than upon facts. Consequently, social reform gropes in the dark where it should walk with assurance. It is as though engineers were at work without an adequate development of physics, or as though physicians were practising in the absence of biology and chemistry. So much of social science, too, is what Professor Robinson calls 'an orderly presentation of the conventional proprieties,' a timid and uncritical acceptance of beliefs and customs that have long since lost their value to mankind, if ever they had it, a rationalization of old prejudices and ancient mistakes and tribal taboos whose roots are buried deep in antiquity. Moreover, even when after long experiment and patient research the social sciences come to some conclusion that is capable of immediate realization in reshaping the practical relationships of men, this conclusion is not adopted, or is most grudgingly adopted.

Man is so lethargic, so suspicious of innovation in everything that relates to himself, that only with difficulty can he be pursuaded to desert any fraction of his inherited practices and routine.

"With the allegiance of our age and generation so completely committed to the physical sciences, we must face the fact that the social mechanism can be kept from cracking under the strain only as we develop the sciences that relate to man. Unless we can marshal behind such studies as economics, political science and sociology the same enthusiasm, the same approach, and something of the same technique that characterize our treatment of physics and chemistry; unless the results of this research can be applied to human life as freely and boldly as we apply the physical sciences to modify our methods of living; unless we can free ourselves from prejudice and stale custom and harness intelligence to the task of straightening out the relations of man with his fellow men and promoting an intercourse of harmony and fairness—unless, in brief, in our generation we can make some appreciable progress toward this goal of social control, then pessimism has the better of the argument."

But with all its shortcomings, due to youth and the complexity of the social field, modern science is unquestionably the great unifying power in the world's life today. If science be the systematized body of ascertained knowledge, then science must be universal; it recognizes no national boundaries and transcends all racial distinctions. We cannot conceive of a Chinese science, or a German science, a French science, or an American science. Science, in just so far as it is Science, must be one—a World Science. Until

recently we have spoken of "Western Science," as if it belonged exclusively to the occident. But while modern science originated in the West, today the one thing that the countries of the East are demanding of the West as an unquestioned good is our science and technology. The same science that is taught in our laboratories at Yale and Harvard, at Columbia and Princeton, is being taught in the colleges and universities of Calcutta and Madras, of Shanghai and Pekin, of Tokio and Yokohama, and in just the same way.

It is as if there were a vast conspiracy to wrench from Nature all her hidden secrets. This common purpose overflows the boundary lines of all nations and constitutes the outstanding element of cohesivness in Western civilization. But with the coming of thousands of students from all parts of the world to our American and European universities every year, and the resulting awakening of interest in all the outlying countries in science and technology, this common purpose of the West is fast becoming a world purpose. The plan of attack is being developed on an international basis. The scientists of all countries are meeting regularly in international congresses of all kinds. "The scientists of one nation are seeking light in the laboratories of another. Niels Bohr at Copenhagen and Rutherford at Cambridge and Onnes at Leyden—to mention only a few—are attracting the research workers from a dozen foreign countries. A German biologist goes to Rovigno, Italy, to study marine biology; a Dutch crystallographer goes to the Royal Institute in London; an Englishman, studying the potentials of gases, is sent to Göttingen to continue the same line of research. The recent reports of the International

Education Board throw new light upon the situation; from all over the world investigators in paleobiology, mathematical physics, astrophysics, pure mathematics, plant physiology, and other subjects of scientific importance, are migrating to the laboratories best adapted to their purpose. It is a world-wide movement that we are witnessing, a definitely planned advance into the unknown."[1]

Science today is only possible through the coöperation of scientific workers in all lands, and scientific results are only procured through sharing and bringing together the conclusions, patiently and laboriously reached, by those in every country who are animated by this common purpose. If the new means of communication and the new civilization, both of which science has created, have served to make our world one, as previous chapters have illustrated, more subtly still have the spirit of scientific investigation and the coöperation of many minds that such investigation involves, served to foster the sense of a world unity in all that makes for scientific advance and the progress of real knowledge in every field of investigation.

But more explicitly, one hundred years ago the knowledge we possessed of other nations and peoples was decidedly limited—superficial, inaccurate, and prejudiced. The East knew nothing about the West, and the nearest thing to actual knowledge that the West possessed about the East were the vivid tales brought back by explorers and travelers. It was long before the day of scientific histories of any nation, least of all, of those nations lying beyond the confines of Europe; in fact, the new historian has but just begun to

[1] Raymond B. Fosdick: "The Old Savage in the New Civilization," p. 39.

write the scientific histories which are fast making all earlier histories obsolete. Nothing was known, in the scientific sense, of the origin of races, and of their slow migrations into all parts of the globe, of the rise and development of the various race cultures, of the slow growth through many long centuries of the ancient civilizations, and of the many complex influences at work to produce languages, forms of government, social institutions and practices, laws, morals and religions, as they exist today outside of Europe and America. This whole vast field of investigation is but just now being opened up to scientific research, and the ancient past of the peoples of these other continents is still largely shrouded in mystery.

During the last generation, however, the "new historian" has turned his attention increasingly not only toward the peoples of Europe and America, but also of Asia and Africa and all the outlying parts of the earth. A flood of new light has been thrown upon the origins, migrations, development, civilizations and cultures of practically all peoples who inhabit this planet. There is now available a large mass of new knowledge of other peoples that was non-existent a generation ago, and it is steadily accumulating. This knowledge is rapidly banishing the old ignorance, superficial theories, pseudo-scientific conceptions and age-old prejudices that for so long have separated the various groups of mankind.

In 1853-55, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau published his four volume *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines,* proclaiming the superiority of the white over the colored races. It came at the time when the great interest in the origins of the "Aryans" lent added zest to the romantic doc-

trines of the comparative philologists, and it enjoyed great popularity. The author was a literary man rather than a trained scientist. In fact, anthropology and ethnology, the sciences working in this particular field of races and race relationships, had scarcely begun to be scientific. The essence of Gobineau's philosophy of history was briefly this: The supreme race among men is the Aryan, of which the Germans are the purest modern representative. All civilizations have sprung from conquests of weaker peoples by Aryans, and all have declined when the Aryan blood became diluted by intermarriage.

This conception of racial superiority, more recently attributed to the Nordics, has been widely preached of late years in this country, serving only to deepen race prejudice and hatred in large numbers of people. Such books as those of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Alfred Edward Wiggam, and others, which have had a wide reading in the last fifteen years, have been based upon this theory of racial superiority advanced seventy-five years ago by Gobineau. Such authors are in no sense scientists, but literary men, and as such, they have given popularity to pseudo-scientific ideas, apparently in utter ignorance of the progress made by anthropology and ethnology in the last three-quarters of a century. The recognized authorities in the matter of races and race-relationships are by no means these popular writers but, in this country at least, such men as Franz Boas, Robert H. Lowie, Alfred L. Kroeber, A. A. Goldenweiser, Frank H. Hankins, etc., who in recent books have made available to the reading public the conclusions to which the scientific investigator of today has come, in regard to races and race relationships.

In briefest summary, their conclusions are as follows: The older divisions of the races, among whom the Aryans were supposed to hold the supreme place, and the more recent division of Europeans into Nordics, Alpines and Mediterraneans, in which the Nordics are accorded the superior place, are more or less arbitrary, and are based on rough generalizations rather than on any clean-cut scientific distinctions. That there are racial differences is indisputable, but that these differences go back to any fundamental distinctions, either physical, mental or moral, is not admitted. In fact, it is claimed that no hard and fast line can be drawn between any of the races, as there has not existed for centuries any such thing as a "pure race."

From the biological viewpoint, the oneness of mankind is scientifically admitted. The scholars are agreed today that the human race with all its various differentiations, goes back ultimately to one common source. The cradle of the race is now supposed to have been in the ancient land of India, somewhere in the vicinity of the Himalaya mountains. From that source through pre-historic ages, early peoples wandered to and fro, extending their migrations ever farther and farther, reaching at length even the Western world—as witness the ancient ruins in Central America.

The differences that exist today between the various races of mankind—differences in language, in government, in institutions, in morals, in religion, in dress, in manners and customs, grew up gradually through a long period of time, and are due primarily to differences in environment, climate, soil, food, etc., as these primitive peoples became separated farther and farther from each other. But in spite of all these differences, developed through tens of thousands

of years, the biological source of humanity is one; the same blood flows in all our veins. This last is no mere poetical statement; it is as hard a fact as any fact we know. We all, you and I and everyone, are but parts of one universal flow of life and blood.

With the evidences that we have of the wide wanderings of pre-historic tribes, and remembering the ceaseless movements of peoples to and fro on the earth's surface during historic times, with the inevitable intermarriage of individuals from different tribes and races constantly taking place, we are forced to realize how baseless is the idea that there is any such thing today as an essentially distinct, or separate, or "pure race." If any race has stood apart, it is such an isolated group as that of the now extinct Tasmanian primitives, or the Australian blacks. But even here, in the early days of navigation, may have come shipwrecked mariners; or some half-breed woman kidnapped by wandering Phœnicians, may have carried the link of blood back to the Western world.

The subject of race mixture is so complex, and so many different elements enter into the question, that in this connection we can only give the brief summary of Frank H. Hankins, in his recent book, "The Racial Basis of Civilization." "We may summarize . . . by noting, first, that there is no record of a pure race having of its own initiative developed a high culture. On the contrary, and second, all areas of high culture are areas of race mixture. Such mixture has always occurred before the cultural advance, at least so far as the record goes, and this seems to have been the case with the introduction of Neolithic, bronze and iron cultures, into Western Europe. In the third place, the

mixture is likely to be increased with any advance in the arts which raises the economic level of the culture area distinctly above that of contiguous areas. Finally, race mixture has the varied biological effects of widening the range of variability, of favoring the appearance of superior men through heterosis, and of making possible a multitude of fresh combinations of genetic factors, which increase the versatility of the hereditary talents available in the population."

As Franz Boas has said, "The world has nothing to fear, biologically, from the intermarriage of the races, for the simple reason that the races have long since become hopelessly mixed." What we have in every race,—white, black, yellow or brown,—is superior individuals; and what we have in every race,—white, black, yellow or brown,—is inferior individuals. But the terms, superior, or inferior, do not apply to races as such at all; only to individuals, regardless of race. The intermarriage of inferior individuals, or of one inferior and one superior, regardless of race, is likely to be followed by inferior results. But the marriage of two superior individuals of different races is apt to yield superior results, oftentimes types that we regard as possessed of "genius." And on general grounds it may be claimed that race crossing on a more or less extensive scale has always preceded the development of a high state of culture. In other words, there is from the strictly biological viewpoint no sound argument against the intermarriage of the races.

In the light of the new knowledge of the intellectual achievements of the various peoples of the earth, we are profoundly impressed with the essential like-mindedness

of all men. So long as there were no easy means of communication between different portions of the globe, and men and nations lived of necessity separate and isolated lives, each group naturally worked out its particular problems in its own way. It is thus that the ideals of government, of social and economic systems, of science, and philosophy, of the arts, of morals and religion, were originally developed; each separate group slowly working out its ideals, theories and general systems of knowledge, independently, as if there were no other groups in the world.

In more recent times, however, with our modern transportation facilities and the resulting tremendous growth of travel, with the knowledge gained of other languages, the interchange of literature and the vast extension of commerce and trade, we realize how this old barrier of simple ignorance of one another is gradually being torn away; and we have discovered, with amazement at first, and later with joy, that all unconsciously these different races and nations of men have been working out their separate destinies in harmony with their particular environments. along essentially the same lines of development. Some, to be sure, for obvious reasons have been moving more rapidly than have others; some have made greater progress and approached more nearly their ideals than have others; but the differences that exist are due to the reaction of the same human nature to different environments.

All men, however isolated, have from the beginning confronted the same universe of mystery, have been forced to face the same problems of human existence, and have been drawn to reflect upon the same experiences of the inner consciousness; and while the conclusions at which they have

arrived by no means agree, owing to the absence of facts which the scientific method has alone revealed, still the original impulse, the mental processes involved, and the general aspiration, have been essentially the same. As a result, there is but one conclusion to which we are forced: The human mind is one, the whole world round; its activities everywhere conform to the same laws of mind; its powers, given the same opportunities and an equal time for development, are practically the same for all men.

The Phelps-Stokes Fund that recently sent an Educational Committee of eighteen experts to make a careful study of the peoples of Africa has given its report to the public. After spending nine months in visiting the coast towns and penetrating to the interior parts of the continent, here is, in part, their conclusion: "The improvability of the African people is clearly shown by their response to the efforts of missions, governments and commercial organizations. Africans occupy positions of importance in every colony visited. There are physicians, lawyers and ministers who have completed the requirements of European universities. While the number as yet is small, it is sufficient to prove the capacity of the people. The clerical tasks of government, industry and commerce are very largely entrusted to young African men. The mechanical operations on railroads and in construction are more and more being taken over by African workmen. In view of the inadequacy and lack of adaptation of educational facilities in Africa it is greatly to the credit of the native African that he has been able to achieve the success observed in every colony."

Nor are the possibilities of the African to be judged by

those who have entered the ranks of civilization, whether in Africa, Europe or America. An adequate study of the tribal customs and capacities of those who are still in barbaric and primitive stages will more and more reveal the fact that the present conditions of the masses of the African people is normal and comparable with those of other peoples, with the same environmental opportunities. Their folklore, their handicrafts, their native music, their forms of government, their linguistic powers, all are substantial evidences of their capacities to respond to the wise approaches of civilization. What does this mean if not that, given the same opportunities and an equal time for development, even the African negro may reach the same heights of intellectual and moral ability that have already been achieved by the more fortunate white man?

The children of the immigrants that formerly used to stream from the steerage of the vessels at Ellis Island came from countries where for centuries their ancestors have lived in ignorance, many times ground down under the heel of tyranny. But give these same children five or ten years in our public schools, and then note the change. They not only catch up to, and keep pace, with our American-born boys and girls, but in many instances they outstrip them, carrying off the highest honors in college and university, and taking positions of usefulness, responsibility and leadership in all walks of life as they reach years of maturity. The brilliant foreign students that are coming to this country by thousands from India, China, Japan, Syria and other lands, and who in recent years have distinguished themselves at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Cornell, and many other American as well as European universities,

have demonstrated that the same capacities and mental powers exist among all peoples regardless of nation or race. In the light of such facts, known to all, it is too late in the day to talk about "superior" or "inferior" races. Backward peoples there may be, and are, but we know today that they are backward simply because they have not yet had the opportunity for development that others have enjoyed, and not because of any intrinsic racial inferiority.

The comparative study of the world's great literature, so large a portion of which has but very recently been available to the Western world, reveals the same like-mindedness everywhere—the same gropings for truth, the same heart-hungerings for beauty, the same outreachings for love and goodness. The history of the development of literature among all peoples follows the same general course. First and earliest come the folk-lore and legends, then song and poetry, and later, the drama and the novel, the essay and the treatise. It is not to be wondered at that the same general themes run through all the world's literature, for it is the common drama of human life that everywhere seeks expression, and it is, in every age and clime, the same human nature that is revealed. The language of the world's literature differs, but the substance is always the same, for true literature speaks a universal tongue.

We have also learned that art, in all its different forms, is also universal, although it begins in the particular and finds expression in local or individual forms. The artist working at his canvas is seeking primarily to give expression to the artistic materials of his own people, to translate into form and color their traditional conceptions of truth and beauty. In so far, art is particular; but the artist in just so far as he is

the true artist, soon transcends the limits of his own conventions, and in his efforts to reveal the harmony and hidden beauties of his world, sooner or later reaches the plane of the universal where he is one with all true artists the world over. This is why we stand entranced before the great picture in the world's galleries, all unmindful of the race from which the artist came or the particular school he may represent, for the truth and beauty he reveals is beyond race or nation or school—the beauty for which all mankind have yearned.

It is the same with the musical composer who seeks to translate into sensuous sound the truth or the beauty "that never was on land or sea." He is striving to express the deepest that lies within himself, and in that particular striving, in just the degree that he is the real musician, he transcends the merely particular, and he also reaches the plane of the universal where music speaks a common language to which all hearts respond. That is why we thrill to the world's greatest music regardless of the race or nationality of the composer, content alone with the message which it brings.

So, too, the poet who seeks to translate into words and rhythm the lofty vision that has dawned on his soul begins his creative work on the plane of his particular group, but in just the degree that he is the true poet, he soon transcends the limitations of the particular and strikes the note of the universal that finds an echo in human hearts throughout the world. That is why there are a few volumes of poetry that we love to have within easy reach, and why we await with eagerness each fresh translation of the ancient poems of Persia, of India, of China or Japan.

But it is moral values that give the weightiest confirmation of the essential oneness underlying all the differences in the life of humanity; and that chiefly, because the unity we seek and that really exists, is itself a moral and spiritual thing. During the last century we have discovered that the greatest minds in all ages have ever been impressed by the essential spiritual unity of mankind, and have indeed been captivated by its profound significance and simple beauty. Out of this consciousness have grown all the great religions of the world in which we find, beneath all varying creeds and differing forms, the same universal outreachings after the highest and the same hungerings for righteousness.

In 1754 a Frenchman came across an old manuscript in the Royal Library of Paris, which proved to be a portion of the "Avesta." This led to further discoveries, and today, we have 183 manuscripts representing the sacred books of the Parsees or Zoroastrians. In 1787 the "Rig-Veda," part of the oldest Bible in the world, was discovered in India. This, with subsequent discoveries, has given us a total of sacred Hindu literature that is over four times the size of the Christian Bible. A little later, the "Pitakas," the sacred literature of the Buddhists, were discovered, which are eight times the size of our New Testament.

From these discoveries of the sacred literatures of the Orient, which have now been translated into some fifty volumes, accessible to all who care to read them, has come the modern study of comparative religions. This study has proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that all such moral sentiments as justice, temperance, truthfulness, patience, mercy, love, etc., far from being the peculiar property of one religion, are to be found inculcated in the Bibles of all

religions. It has also discovered that the great spiritual sentiments out of which all religions have sprung—such as awe, reverence, wonder, aspiration, worship, the capacity for faith and hope and love, have found rich expression in all the varied systems of faith. It has also found that the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament and the Golden Rule of the New Testament, are more or less, and in slightly differing forms, to be found in all these Bibles of the race.

One of the most significant concrete results of the translation of these sacred books of the Orient was the World's Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago in 1893. Never since the world began was any such general meeting of representatives of all the world's faiths on the same platform, even deemed possible. The Parliament was conceived and carried out by a Presbyterian minister of Chicago. The closing address was by a Swedenborgian, the final prayer by a Jewish Rabbi, and the benediction by a Roman Catholic Bishop. At the opening session there walked out on the platform, Roman Catholic and Protestant, Greek and Jew, Confucian and Buddhist, Mohammedan and Parsee, Baptist missionary and Hindu monk—one hundred and twenty-eight couples—all marching in one grand triumphal procession of human brotherhood.

The effect of the parliament was singularly profound upon all who attended any of its sessions. To the non-Christian it conveyed a truer conception of the Christianity that had sent them the missionary and the Bible, but had also brought them the battleship, opium and rum. The effect on the Christians present was still more striking. The spiritual conceit that had formerly prayed, "Oh Lord, we

thank Thee that we are not like these pagan idolators," was removed forever from the hearths of all who watched and listened. They discerned heights of spirituality and depths of moral insight, reached by these so-called "heathen," of which most of them had never dreamed. They found among all these various delegates from different and opposing religions the same expressions of worship, of ethical teachings, of spiritual development and of religious ideals that exist, under different forms, in Christianity; and their hearts cried out irresistibly, "Are we not indeed all children of one Father?"

Gotama and Zoroaster, Confucius and Mohammed, may be less known to most of us than Moses and the Prophets, Jesus and Paul, yet we have come to see the essential unity underlying all their teachings and at the same time their unique and distinctive contributions to man's religious experiences. Whether it be the Papuan, squatting in dumb meditation before his feathered god; or the Aztec, dancing and chanting before his symbolical block; or the Moslem, prostrate in his mosque; or the Christian, kneeling in petitional prayer to his Father in Heaven; or the cosmic theist, silently seeking communion and at-one-ment with the Infinite and Eternal whence all things and beings are derived—in each case it is one and the same impulse leading one to seek to relate himself more intelligently with the universe about him, and to come into more harmonious relation with his fellows everywhere.

With our scientific knowledge today that the human race is biologically one, and that our different races and nations are but "bubbles and clusters of foam upon the great stream of the blood of the species, incidental experiments in the

growing knowledge and consciousness of the race"; with all the new knowledge that we have gained in the last century through research and investigation, through the increase of travel, and through widespread study and observation of the cultural life of other peoples, the unmistakable tendency among all intelligent men and women has been toward a better understanding and a truer appreciation of all who live on this planet. In six great phases of the cultural life of man—in philosophy and science, in art and literature, in music and in religion—it needs no uncommon vision to see the inevitable drift toward a yet closer brotherhood and truer fellowship. Every fresh step that is taken in the widening of human knowledge as it applies to human beings only tends to lower the barriers of ignorance and fill in the gulfs of prejudice that have for so long divided us from our fellows.

But even more significant than the likenesses that exist between the various peoples is the knowledge that we have gained of their differences. The various races and race cultures that have developed through long centuries, in different environments and in parts of the world widely separated from one another, have inevitably tended to stress certain ideas and ideals in the life of one people, while others are stressed to a different degree elsewhere; it is also true that different environments through long periods of time call out different traits of character; so that we recognize what we call racial traits and national traits, just as we do individual traits. This is especially true of the cultural life of a people; while the literature and art, the music, the morals and religion of all peoples are fundamentally the same, yet each has followed a somewhat different line of

development among various peoples. Therefore every race and people has some unique and distinct contribution to make to the general cultural life of man.

In the light of these differences and unique distinctions in peoples, our scholars are helping us to see today that the ultimate culture of this world is not going to be made up exclusively of Anglo-Saxon culture, or Teutonic culture, or Slavic culture, or Chinese or Indian culture. The ultimate culture of the world, as knowledge grows and appreciation broadens, will eventually be made up of the bringing together and the blending together of the highest and best elements in the cultural life of all peoples. As Mazzini once said, "God has written a sentence in the life of every people." And what we are trying to do today, by research, by study and by travel, is to interpret rightly that unique something that has been developed in the life of every people; for we well know that we can ill-afford to lose one single word of any sentence that has thus been "written in the life of any people" the whole world round.

IV

THE EMERGING IDEAL OF WORLD UNITY

With the coming to birth of a world-consciousness, with the growing realization of the interdependence of all peoples through the expansion of our industrial civilization, and with the steady widening of our cultural knowledge, there is gradually dawning on the minds of all intelligent people the new ideal of a world unity, the conception of a world-community, in which a genuine community spirit may eventually displace the old spirit of fear and suspicion, of rivalry and jealousy, of hatred and bitterness, that has for so long characterized the relations of nations and races.

All the lesser struggles of our time—political, social, economic, moral and religious—can be traced to two sets of forces: the forces making for disunity and strife on the one hand, and those making for unity and coöperation on the other. It is also clear that the disunifying forces belong to an age that is gone. They grew out of conditions that no longer exist; they are anachronisms today. The forces making for unity and coöperation, however, are just as clearly the products of the new age. They are the inevitable outgrowths of the new science, the new civilization, and the new cultural knowledge; they constitute indeed the very genius of the modern age. But the old forces are still largely in the saddle, for old forces

always die hard; while the new forces are as yet in the process of birth.

The real struggle today, let it be remembered, is not between opposing forces in one civilization. It is much more profound and thoroughgoing than that. It is the conflict between two totally different civilizations; and the problem is, how to preserve all that is good and true in the old while adjusting ourselves frankly and intelligently to the new. Deeper than all schemes of reorganization, all new social programs, all economic readjustments, all creeds of the modernists, the one fact that stands forth above the confusion and uncertainty of our times is the realization that this world *must* achieve a kind of unity that has never yet existed. It *must* find the way to a coöperation that man has never yet known. It *must* create a fellowship between races and nations and classes and creeds that has never yet been experienced. This is no longer a matter of choice but of the sternest necessity; the grim logic of events demands it.

The kind of a world into which we have come, the very nature of the life we are now forced to live on this planet, thanks to science and industrialism, demand imperatively this new spirit of unity, this world-wide coöperation, this true and intelligent fellowship. The old barriers of ignorance and prejudice, of separation and division, leading sooner or later to strife and war, are hopelessly doomed; they no more belong to the twentieth century than the petty quarrels of childhood belong in the life of the full-grown man. Not to see this is to be absolutely blind to the significance of what is taking place in the world today. And to have no intelligent part in this supreme struggle

of our age is to miss the greatest opportunity that life affords to this generation.

For us, the essential fact in human history has come to be the slow awakening of a sense of unity in the life of mankind, the gradual unfolding of a feeling of community between men, nations and races, the dawning possibility of coöperation, of undreamed of collective powers, of a coming synthesis of the human species, of the eventual development, out of all the present confusion, of a common general ideal, a common universal purpose for humanity as a whole. This is the "meaning of history" as H. G. Wells has read it for our generation in his *Outline of History*. When we take the limited view, or scan merely the surface page of history, it is a strange, kaleidoscopic picture that presents itself: one civilization rising only to begin its decline and be succeeded by another; one dynasty swept aside by others; everywhere through all the centuries the record of wars and bloodshed, of tyranny and oppression, of cruelty and strife. But when we take the long view of history and look beneath the petty surface facts, we begin to discern a movement, very slow and halting, often imperceptible for long periods of time, often completely submerged by the reactions following the strife of war, and then gradually emerging again. It is a movement whose trend toward an ultimate world unity, in spite of all the disintegrating forces at work, grows more apparent during the nineteenth century. It emerges into clear view only when these older forces reach their tragic climax in the years 1914-18, and reveal their utter incompatibility with the changes wrought by science and industrialism.

In the strict sense, however, this is not a new ideal; it

is as old as the great prophets of the race. For from earliest times, in every age and clime, there have been men of vision who have foreseen the coming day when there should be unity in the divided life of mankind, when a genuine human brotherhood should come to exist on this earth. This has been the teaching of the prophets of religion from Laotze down to Baha'ullah. But their followers have rarely grasped the lofty vision, and even those who did, have been powerless to make the dream come true. The conditions necessary for its realization were not yet ripe.

The supreme ideal of the middle ages was one version of this dream. In the poet Dante's classic, *De Monarchia,* we find a most appealing expression of an ideal in striking contrast to the competing nationalisms of the modern age. "Never was a more faithful son of the Church; yet Dante was also the apostle of an idealized Empire. Fascinated by the dream of world peace, inspired by the renewed vision of the achievement of the organizing power of ancient Rome that came with the revival of the study of Roman law, he conceived the magnificent ideal of Pope and Emperor, as the two heirs of the Roman State, ruling the world for the same end, each by his own means and in his own sphere. But this ideal of an all-inclusive Empire soon faded into the dim distance, never to be revived again."[1] With the coming of the Renaissance there entered into the life of Europe all the stir and ferment of the New Learning; then followed the breaking up of the old city-states, the gradual coming together of new groups, the emergence at length of the modern national state, and

[1] J. H. Randall Jr.: "The Making of the Modern Mind," p. 78.

the still more recent development of nationalism as we know it today. Since Dante's time the world, seemingly, has moved farther and farther away from any conception of unity, and the ideal has been well-nigh lost until our own age.

The ideal of the Middle Ages, however, was in reality far removed from the ideal that is emerging in human consciousness today. It implied uniformity both in political and in religious control. It would have tended to minimize and eventually to destroy the unique elements in the cultural life and ideals of other peoples, gradually substituting the standardized systems of Roman government and of the Roman Catholic Church. Any such uniformity, which is a mechanical thing foisted on from outside, had it been possible of achievement, would have proved fatal to all growth and progress in man's life.

The last thing that any sane man wants today anywhere is uniformity of any kind. It is Henry D. Thoreau who says, "When you see a man breaking step with his comrades on the march, do not upbraid him; perhaps he hears the sound of another drummer." And then he adds, "Let every man keep step to the sound of the drum *he* hears, however measured or far-away." In these words we have a good expression of what in this country we mean by individual liberty—the right of every man to think his own thoughts, to stand upon his own feet, to worship according to the dictates of his own conscience. Man has struggled too long and has suffered far too much in order to win this right, ever now to surrender it easily to the power of either state or church. One of the great evils of our machine civilization is the tendency not only toward

the standardization of things but of minds as well. This is a danger that must be combatted at any cost, and against it the protest is rising everywhere. For if it were possible to standardize human thinking it would be the death knell of all progress.

We know today that we are living in a dynamic, not a static world—a world that is constantly growing, and therefore, constantly changing; and anything that even savors of uniformity, whether in outward forms or in man's thinking, is neither desirable or possible. The unity for which the twentieth century is searching has nothing whatever to do with uniformity—whether in government, in social institutions, in economic systems, in morals, or in religion. One of our great gains is not only the recognition of the rights of other peoples to think their own thoughts, create their own institutions, and work out their own civilizations in their own way; we have also come to see that only through such diversities of experimentation in forms of government or social institutions or morals, by different peoples, can progress be made by all peoples, through the eventual discovery of better and more adequate methods for meeting new conditions as they arise.

It is a *unity in diversity*, therefore, that we seek, and that we must find—a unity that exists, not in spite of differences alone but even because of them, a unity that necessarily goes deeper than all differences, that recognizes them all, respects them all, yes, and that accepts them all, and yet, that dares to believe that underlying all these differences there is a moral and spiritual unity that can, and should, bind us all together as the integral members of the living body of humanity. It is a unity that ever seeks to create

a new synthesis of the best and truest in the life of all peoples, that would not destroy any distinctive contribution which different races and nations have to make to the common life of man, but rather, that seeks to preserve these differences and blend them into one living Whole.

The unity we seek, therefore, is first of all, a spiritual thing—a mental attitude, a temper of soul, a new way of thinking and feeling, that is the direct outgrowth of a clear realization of the new relations into which we have come on this planet, and an intelligent understanding of the new knowledge we have gained of other peoples. Thus it is a growth in the widening of consciousness, not a mechanical something foisted on from the outside. But this new knowledge cannot remain inactive; it must seek ever wider expression in new conceptions, new ideals, new methods, new efforts, looking toward the realization in the life of the world of this new and broader consciousness that has been gained.

This new knowledge leading to the "awareness" of the new relations into which we have come, which imply and demand a unity in the life of mankind, is available today as it was not in the past. The books that contain it have been published; they are to be found in every book store and public library. Even apart from these books, this knowledge is being forced upon the attention of all who read the papers and magazines and reflect upon what they read, even though they may not be seeking it directly. It is only a question of time when all intelligent persons must see its meaning and become conscious of its spirit, for it is indeed the very spirit of the new age. To achieve this "awareness," to gain this broader consciousness of one's

vital relations to all men, is the next step in human evolution. And when this is attained it will not be so difficult to solve the many problems that perplex us so sorely today.

It is profoundly significant to note that, without exception, all the books dealing most competently with international problems and world affairs that are coming from both sides of the Atlantic, written by the recognized scholars, publicists, and students of human affairs, are in singular agreement as to the unmistakable trend of events and the imperative necessity of achieving a unity and a coöperation in the life of nations that does not now exist, before it is too late. These authors do not all agree as to means and methods, but they are absolutely at one in their emphasis upon the interdependence of all peoples today, the irreparable loss to, and the unquestionable ultimate downfall of, civilization if the old international anarchy, moral irresponsibility and selfish individualism on the part of nations are to continue, and the consequent demand that the nations must set themselves to the supreme task of learning how to live and work together on this planet in the spirit of friendliness, coöperation and peace.

Such writers, whose judgment and conclusions cannot be ignored or taken lightly, are not in the class of the "blind idealists"; they are not actuated by motives of sentiment; they are not moralizing in the name of religion; they are in no sense apostles of any millennium. On the contrary, they are the grimmest realists of our time; they have dared to face frankly the facts of the new world into which we have been brought; they know the past out of which this new world has come, and they are familiar with the many complex influences which have worked together to pro-

duce the Great Society. They see not only the trend of things but they realize clearly the inexorable logic of events; they know, as the multitudes do not, that we have come to a turning point in history, that one epoch is closing and a new chapter must open if humanity is to continue to make progress.

These writers are in no sense mere alarmists; they are among the soberest, sanest, keenest observers and students of world affairs. Most of them do not dare to express in detail all the dark forebodings that fill their minds as they contemplate the possibilities that lie before us for the ultimate destruction of civilization; they can only hint at these in general terms. They are in the truest sense the great prophets of this day and generation; they are interpreting for us the meaning of this critical age. They are pointing out in unmistakable terms the ruin that lies beyond if we persist in following the old ways; but they are also outlining for us the possibilities of a new and better day for mankind; and they are helping us to see how many of the events that have taken place since the war are leading in the direction of a truer unity and a closer coöperation in the life of nations. They are thus neither hopeless pessimists nor blind optimists as they confront the future, but clear-eyed, disinterested and thoughtful leaders, speaking the deepest they know and feel to a careless, unthinking, confused and selfish age.

But will their words be heeded before it is too late? This is the crucial question. If earlier ages have always been prone to stone their prophets, can we expect that this modern age will do otherwise? Will we of the twentieth century learn from the experience of the past? Will we heed

the revelations made by the War, and take to heart its great lessons? Will the messages of warning, and equally, those of hope, which are coming increasingly from the great prophets of the twentieth century, fall on deaf ears and unheeding minds? Or will they serve to arouse us out of our self-absorption and force us to face with intelligence and understanding the facts of the new world? Will they be sufficiently convincing to lead the rulers and statesmen and leaders of the people generally to abandon the old ways of thinking and feeling and substitute therefore new conceptions, new attitudes and new policies? Can these leaders, backed by an intelligent public opinion, begin to visualize a world in which order shall take the place of the old anarchy, and coöperation supplant the old ruthless competition? Can they achieve the will to set themselves resolutely to the task of gradually building a new world order, based on the new ideals and enthused with the new spirit? And will they be able to command the new intelligence needed, in the light of all the help that science and technology and the social engineers can furnish, so to reorganize step by step the complex life of the world as to achieve eventually a genuine world community? Have we of the twentieth century sufficient faith in ourselves to believe that we have come to that point in human evolution where we can control the social forces making for human development and turn them to whatsoever ends we will? In a word, from this time forward, are we to be controlled by all the blind forces playing about us and in us, or are we to determine, through the self-mastery and social control we shall gain, the future evolution of man's life?

Only the unknown future can answer questions such as these. There are, however, certain considerations that suggest that these modern prophets may not prove to be merely "voices crying in the wilderness," that today the old practice of stoning the prophets may give way to an attentive heeding of their message. This hope is awakened when we remember that, all down through the past, the vision of a world at peace with itself in which there should exist a genuine fellowship among peoples, and human brotherhood should become a reality, has up to the present time, been a beautiful, far-flung ideal in a world in which the prerequisite conditions for its realization had not yet come into existence. It is hardly just to blame previous generations, or to condemn religion *in toto*, because of the failure in the past to realize human brotherhood here upon earth. When we stop to reflect, we know that if anything approximating human brotherhood, or a fellowship among nations and peoples, is to be realized there are certain fundamental conditions that must first come into existence.

First, there must exist physical contacts between peoples, with easy means of communication breaking through all barriers of space and distance, thus making possible the acquaintance that must always precede friendship and the sense of brotherhood. It is only during the last century that such means of communication have come into existence; and hence it is only during that period that races and nations have had the opportunity of really becoming acquainted with one another. So long as peoples were separated by vast stretches of land and water, and rarely if ever came into contact with each other; so long as they did not know each other even in the most casual way, the

ideals of prophet and seer must have remained only ideals, with no possible chance of translation into reality.

Second, there must exist the sense of a community of interests, if human brotherhood or a fellowship of nations is ever to be achieved. So long as the various peoples lived their separate lives, in isolation from one another, so long as each nation was practically independent and self-sufficient, and able to supply all the basic needs of its people from within its own borders, so long as each people thus worked out its own destiny in its own way, developing its own forms of government, its social institutions, its economic systems, its morals and religion, with little or no influence from other peoples, there could be of necessity no sense of a community of interests. In the nature of the case, there could be no desire for, nor appreciation of, the need of a fellowship among nations; even the ideal of a human brotherhood could have little or no meaning. But with the rise and spread of the new industrial civilization all such conditions under which the nations had lived for centuries were radically transformed. Just as isolation in space has given place to proximity, so independence and self-sufficiency have given way gradually to the closest and most complex kind of interdependence between nations. It is now, all for each and each for all, and each nation must have the help of all other peoples, in some form, or else perish. This sense of the community of interests of all peoples, in which strong and weak alike must share,—the dominant characteristic of this new age,—by no means in and of itself insures a fellowship of nations or a sense of human brotherhood. On the other hand, this sense of a veritable community of interests, as it develops further,

may lead to more friendly relations, securing a larger measure of justice for all peoples, and banishing present fears and suspicions. At any rate a community of interests must be the precursor of an extension of the spirit of coöperation and mutual working together. It may at length bring about international fellowship; without it, any fellowship or brotherhood between nations is nothing but a dream.

In the third place, before the spirit of coöperation and brotherhood can come to control the relations of nations, there must be gained such a knowledge of other peoples—their types of civilization, institutions, religions, etc.,—as shall tend to break down the old barriers of ignorance and prejudice, and in their place, develop a truly intelligent understanding and appreciation of these other peoples, and of the great contributions they have to make to the general cultural life of man. Understanding must always precede fellowship, whether with nations or individuals. And this is the very thing that the scientific investigator in every field has been making increasingly possible for all who read and reflect, all who travel and observe. In the light of all this new knowledge, made available during the last century, there has come to exist in many quarters and in many minds such an understanding and growing appreciation of other nations, races and peoples. In itself, this is one of the prerequisite conditions for any realization of the age-old ideal; and as it becomes more widely extended, it should lead the way toward that larger fellowship in the life of peoples.

As previous chapters have pointed out in detail, these three prerequisite conditions to the realization of man's

ancient dream have been brought to pass in our day and generation, through the changes wrought by science, by our industrial civilization, and by the new knowledge we have gained. Let it be remembered, these conditions do not *necessarily* insure the coming of human brotherhood, but at least, they make it possible, as it has never before been possible in all the past. The physical and material foundations for a world-community have indeed been laid; there remains the building of the adequate and worthy mental and moral superstructure on this new foundation. Whether it will be built depends upon man himself. But if man has, all unconsciously perhaps, created for the first time, through science and industrialism, the conditions necessary to the coming of a world-community, shall we deny to him the mental and moral ability to rear upon these foundations the nobler superstructure they demand?

This new ideal of a world unity that is emerging with the birth of a world-consciousness in hearts and minds everywhere, has not yet been translated into the concrete terms of any hard and fast program. It is not a dogmatic creed, but a living faith and a burning hope. It does not believe in panaceas for all the world's ills; it preaches no short-cut to the millennium. In fact, it firmly believes that any millennium that may be reached in this world is only another milestone toward something still better and nobler that lies beyond. It has caught a vision and attained a glimpse of what *may* be possible in the new world, and it dares to dedicate its all to that possibility. Facing all the facts, dark and menacing, as well as bright and promising, with a clear and realistic knowledge of the old forces at work in the world, making for disunity, misun-

derstanding, hatred and strife, it dares to believe that through the educational process, using the term in its broadest sense, nations as well as individuals can be led to readjust, first, their thinking, and then, their lives and practices, so as to bring them into harmony at length with the new ideals dawning on humanity. It is not a task for a decade or a century; and of course, in the full sense, the task will never be completed. But it must be begun, and the hour is now. Not to take advantage of these new conditions, and of all our new knowledge, to say nothing of the wide-spread sentiment now finding expression in all countries for world peace and understanding, would be to prove ourselves utterly unworthy of the age in which we live and of the humanity of which we are all parts.

It is possible only to give a bare suggestion of what this ideal of world unity involves. The time has not come for detailed programs; the next steps will become clear only as the ideal is more generally accepted, and the new spirit spreads. There must come, first of all, the realization of the oneness of all life, the awareness of the new relations resulting from the changes the last century has wrought, the seeing clearly that just as individuals are the various members of the living body of the nation, so nations are the various members of the living body of humanity, that the fate of each today is bound up inextricably with the fate of all. And with the realization of all these facts, there must come the frank and loyal acceptance by nations and individuals of the ideal of world unity as the only working hypothesis, the one great synthesis toward which all the struggles of the past have been slowly leading.

This new ideal also involves the working out of prin-

ciples of group morality, to guide nations and peoples in their relations to one another. We must come to see that there are moral ideals for collective man as well as for the individual, and that nations must give allegiance to such ideals and principles; that no nation has the right to do whatever it has the power to do—the only principle that has governed nations in the past. "Each nation must impose on itself laws analogous to those it imposes on the individual. Whatever is a crime for the individual is also a crime for his country. If selfishness, cupidity, robbery, violence and murder are looked upon as vile and degrading for individual men, how can collective man, that is the nation, commit such acts without dishonor? In what does the honor of a nation differ from the honor of an individual? And of what use is it for a nation to assert this honor and defend it with her arms if she herself continually violates it publicly by her practices of plunder and her acts of disloyalty? The honor of a man consists neither in his strength nor riches. It lies rather in the spirit and manner in which strength and riches are acquired and the way in which they are employed. Honor consists not in control of others, but in self-control, in self-respect and respect for our fellows. When will the nations cease to boast of the very thing that degrades them even as it degrades the individual? For why should the citizen be more honest, or just or humane than his country? And how is it that up to the present individuals have accepted condemnation for the very acts in which their country glories? Or, rather, how is it that they have allowed their rulers to commit, in the name of their country, acts which must be infamous in citizens? The Mother-

country must set the example. If it is shameful for the individual to exploit the weak, to treat the helpless with scorn, to use his superior strength against the defenseless, then the mother-country must not and shall not, do these same things."[1] It is this new conscience that must be sought and created in nations as well as in men, that shall lead at length to higher ethical standards for international relations.

The new ideal involves also a frank analysis of the forces at work in the world's life, and a realistic recognition of the great obstacles that lie in the way of the realization of the ideal of world unity. We shall never approach the goal merely by writing books or preaching sermons on its beauty and desirability. It is only when we come to see and understand fully the political, economic, psychological and moral difficulties that prevent its coming, and are determined to remove the deep-seated causes that breed disunity and strife, that we are in a position even to begin our great task.

Above all, the new ideal demands the open mind, the attitude of inquiry, receptivity to new ideas and methods, infinite patience, and a living faith in the ability of human intelligence to achieve at length a world-community. Those who are wedded to the past, who are determined to crystalize things in the *status quo*, who believe that human nature can never be changed, who have no faith in any different or better world, will of course play no direct part in bringing in a new world order. By temperament and by training such conservative elements in society will hinder and impede the march of progress as they have always

[1] Paul Richard: "To the Nations," p. 43.

done, content to act as a check on new ideas and methods of procedure that proceed from an excess of zeal without knowledge.

The responsibility for preparing the way for the coming of a world-community will rest of necessity on the forward-looking minority, who know the facts of our new relations, who realize their significance, and who, in consequence, have visualized the possibility of a new and better world order. They must become, in all possible ways, the centers of influence from which the new knowledge shall radiate in all directions, permeating by degrees school and church and press, and thus gradually creating a body of public opinion and conviction that shall compel rulers and statesmen to abandon old policies and methods and turn their attention to the readjustment of governments to the demands and spirit of the new age.

This will involve the increasing development of the same scientific method and spirit in the social sciences that has already found expression in the physical sciences, and a frank recognition that it is only through the scientific, rather than the older political methods, that the desirable changes can be brought about. To this end the social engineers and technicians, as rapidly as they are developed, must no longer be regarded as "theorists," or "mere idealists," but must be recognized and accepted for what they are—the trained and competent experts in their particular field of social control and social reorganization, to whom rulers and statesmen must look for light on the new problems that old methods and formulas have proved themselves unable to solve. There must come the willingness to enter new paths, and explore new terri-

tory, and attempt new methods and policies in the experimental spirit, for only thus can we ever hope to discover the best roads to the new order.

If these suggested requirements demanded by the new ideal of a world-community seem impossible of attainment, demanding an almost superhuman ability and effort, the only reply is that the very exigencies of the age, the grave dangers threatening civilization on any other course, may arouse the people to the unusual effort, may awaken the needed intelligence, and may call forth the trained leadership necessary to bring about the imperative changes demanded in world relations. If the critical times through which we are now passing cannot succeed in doing this, then there is little hope for a better future.

Before his death, Victor Hugo is reported to have said: "Today we have the United States of America; tomorrow we shall have the United States of Europe; and then, one day, we shall have the United States of the World." In the course of its history, more than fifty million immigrants of every race, language and religion passed out of Europe into the United States. After a short sojourn in the states bordering on the Atlantic, they set out for the West to conquer new territory. Roads, railways and telegraph wires followed in their trail, and gradually, as they settled down, they began to set up an administrative system.

When their villages and towns had become numerous, they were authorized to form a new state. Each of these states was given the right to organize as it pleased its legislation, its jurisdiction, its police force, its budget and schools. It enjoyed almost complete political autonomy, but

was allowed to have neither customs at its frontiers nor a currency of its own—and there was no desire for one or the other. Consequently, men, goods and capital circulated freely throughout the Union. Enterprise developed untrammeled and without guarantee of success beyond the ability of its captain and the service it might render. No bounds were set to the economic specialization and interdependence of the states; there were no conflicts between them, no armies, and therefore no war.

Only once was there danger of a rupture. The North and the South, very different in structure, came up against each other in the Civil War over the question of slavery and economic power. But the victors were wise enough to respect the political autonomy of the seceding states, while maintaining the Federal Union and the unity of the common economic apparatus. Since then for six decades men of every race, language and religion, now comprising a population of over 120 millions, distributed between forty-eight states in a country almost as big as Europe, have been living in an unbroken peace, harmony and prosperity.

Let us suppose, however, that each of these states at its birth had received, like Poland or Czecho-Slovakia, its full economic and political sovereignty. Immediately it would have set up a tariff wall. Pennsylvania, an industrial state, would have come into conflict with New Jersey on the question of access to the sea; Ohio, in its desire to establish an independent metal trade, would have put a high tax on the manufactured articles of Pennsylvania—which in turn would have protected its agriculture by taxing Ohio wheat and cattle. Perhaps Ohio would have attempted

to prevent the iron ore of Michigan from reaching the blast furnaces of Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania would then have allied itself with Indiana and Kentucky in order to encircle Ohio; and the latter, to re-establish the equilibrium, would have allied itself with New Jersey. In the general atmosphere of diplomatic tension and insecurity, each state would have decreed compulsory military service, and devoted a considerable portion of its budget to armaments. Wars between the states would not have failed to break out and the United States would have boasted as glorious and bloody a history as the Old World.

Conversely, let us suppose that Europe were constituted on the model of the American Federation. France or Belgium or Italy, or any other European state, would retain her political autonomy, her constitution, her legislation, her fiscal, administrative and educational systems, and would organize them as she wished in accordance with the individual traditions of her race and civilization. National aspirations would be completely safe-guarded; but with a uniform monetary system, and in the absence of tariffs, raw materials, commodities and manufactured articles would circulate freely from country to country. Each people would manufacture only what it could produce at a lower cost than the others, and would buy from them whatever was cheaper than at home. There would be no artificial industry to protect—to the great detriment of the consumer—no tariff wars, no colonial conquests, no disputes over spheres of influence, no need for fluctuating alliances and coalitions; and consequently, no wars, and no armies beyond a police force. The citizens of the twenty-eight European states would live as peacefully on

their little continent as their brothers who have emigrated to the forty-eight states of the Union.

It is true that the United States, on entering the field of competition with nationalist-ridden Europe, felt compelled also to surround itself with a high customs barrier. This policy of high tariff protection prevented the free circulation of goods with other countries. To secure its due share in the distribution of raw materials and territory in all parts of the globe, it was obliged to provide itself with a navy and army. It too has fallen victim of that nefarious fusion of the political state with economic development which was the bane of the nineteenth century, and it too has entered upon the path of imperialism. When President Wilson felt the necessity for a higher standard of international relations, he sought to find one in the traditions of America, giving expression to his ideals in the famous Fourteen Points and in other addresses and messages delivered during the war. But his own people did not understand him, and Europe at the close of the war was altogether unprepared to exchange old standards for new.

If we could today organize *de novo* this new world, which science and industrialism with all its interdependence of peoples has created, in accordance with reason and common sense and without regard to any past, there is little doubt but that it would take on the general form of a United States of the World. But history forbids that; we must take nations as well as peoples as they are, and the heavy hand of the traditional past with all its settled habits of thinking and its deep-seated emotional attitudes prevents nations as well as men from acting logically or ra-

tionally. Man has a long way yet to go before he becomes a rational creature, especially in those group relationships where the psychology of the crowd dominates all action.

In view of the iron grasp of tradition on peoples, the very idea of a United States of Europe may seem utterly chimerical, and a United States of the World the ravings of an abnormal mind. Nevertheless, there are not a few of the most thoughtful minds in Europe who are visualizing such a goal as the only ultimate solution of both the political and economic problems of that continent. They realize the tremendous difficulties in the way, and they know that it will not come in any immediate future; but they also see that the whole trend of events, as exemplified in the international cartels already cutting across all national boundaries, is in the direction of an ever closer interdependence and unity in the economic life of Europe, regardless of political nationalisms.

Bertrand Russell has recently suggested that the present course of economic life points to the formation first, of some sort of Federation of the States of Europe, then of some kind of Federation of the States of the two Americas, already forecast by the Pan-American Union, and also, of some sort of Federation of the peoples of the Orient. When the various states have come together in these three natural geographical groups, he continues, it will be but another step to the merging of these three groups into a United States of the World, provided, of course, the generations then alive have become sufficiently emancipated from the dead hand of the past to organize their life on a sane, rational and sensible basis.

Such a consummation will not come in our lifetime or

in that of our children's children, but there is something thrilling in the thought that we who are alive today may have some real part in furthering the movement toward that great end.

Part II

THE CHIEF OBSTACLES TO THE REALIZATION OF A WORLD-COMMUNITY

V

NATIONALISM

THE ideal of a possible world-community emerging in the consciousness of humanity today has of necessity focussed attention upon the serious problems involved in its achievement. The clearest evidence that such an ideal has at last moved from the realm of dreams and visions to the more practical world of possibilities, is to be found in the awakened interest everywhere manifest in its realization, and especially, in the degree of attention and concentrated energy that during the past decade has been devoted by scientific historians and social philosophers to the problems involved, and the factors entering into them.

Recognized scholars of unquestioned authority have presented many careful and detailed analyses of the existing conditions, and of the complex forces at work in the world's life today that stand as obstacles in the way of the coming of such a genuine world order as the new world relationships would seem to demand. This knowledge, formerly the private possession of the very few, has thus been made available for all who care to know the facts of the real world in which they live. It is such clear analysis and description of the problems involved that must precede any intelligent efforts toward the realization of the ideal. The most hopeful sign today is that we are beginning to get a realistic view of our world, and to gain an understanding

of the nature and scope of the problems we confront in the presence of the new emerging ideals. Our debt, therefore, to the many scholars in all lands, who are thus helping us to understand the problems, is inestimable.

Within the narrow limits of this volume, we can furnish but a brief outline of a few of the most important factors that enter into the general problem, merely suggesting the nature and complexity of the more serious obstacles that stand in the way of the coming of a world order. For a more complete and comprehensive treatment of these factors, the reader is referred to the authoritative books on the subject, a list of which will be found in the index of this volume. It is earnestly hoped that the brief and imperfect treatment here given may serve to send the reader to the books of those scholars to whom the author is so deeply indebted for his material.

In spite of the fact that the word, "nationalism," has been so widely used since 1914, greeting us in every newspaper and magazine article we read, it is to be doubted whether many people have more than a vague impression of what the term really means. And yet, beyond question, modern nationalism is the greatest obstacle to the coming of any genuine world order. Every effort made since 1918 to adjust the reparations, to develop further the League of Nations, to consider seriously the question of disarmament, or, in the various international conferences that have been held, to consider any of the problems pressing for solution, has gone just so far, and then it has come up against the stonewall of nationalism, blocking the path to further progress.

The best and most comprehensive treatment of modern nationalism is to be found in *Essays on Nationalism* by

Carlton J. H. Hayes, of Columbia University, recognized as one of our leading American historians. He says, "The most significant emotional factor in public life today is nationalism. Of the current age it is the mark at once intense and universal. The state of popular feeling in France in respect of Germany, or in Germany in respect of France; the zeal of the Italians for the newer, greater Italy, the enthusiasm of the Poles for a Poland restored and unified, the determination of a Turkey for and by the Turks," are all the expression of nationalism. "Observe," he continues, "the outcome of the latest and greatest war in human annals; on the one hand, the smashing of the non-national empires of the Tsars, the Habsburgs, and the Sultans, and on the other, the building of the sovereign independence and national unity of Czecho-Slovakia, of Esthonia, of Finland, of Greece, of Latvia, of Lithuania, of Rumania, of Yugoslavia. Note the patriotic ardor of Englishmen in behalf of the British Empire and the no less nationalist reaction against it of Irishmen, East Indians and Egyptians. Perceive in the United States the pursuit of a policy of national isolation, the heightening tariff, the increasing restrictions on foreign immigration, the picturesque activities of citizens in masks and nightgowns, the vogue of Americanism and Americanization. Study the sentimental background of diplomatic intrigues, competitive armaments, and economic rivalries, not only in general, as abstract causes of hypothetical war, but specifically as concrete predisposing causes of the late World War and as definite motive forces in contemporary international tensions, exemplified most pertinently perhaps in the strains and stresses of Americo-Japanese relations. The background of all these

things and of much else is nationalism. Hardly a cloud appears nowadays on the horizon of domestic politics, social action, and international affairs, which is without a lining of natonalism."

Sidney B. Fay, another leading American historian, in his notable work on *The Origins of the World War,* declares that nationalism must be accounted one of the major underlying causes of the War. "In its chronic form of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, and *revanche,* it nourished hatred between Germany and her two neighbors on the East and West. It worked in curious and devious ways. It had contributed happily to the unification of Germany and Italy. On the other hand, it had disrupted the Ottoman Empire and threatened to disrupt the Habsburg Monarchy. In its virulent form, it had contributed for a century to a series of wars for national liberation and unity in the Balkans, and so led directly to the immediate occasion of the World War."

According to Professor Hayes, nationalism is a modern emotional fusion and exaggeration of two very old phenomena—nationality and patriotism. There have always been, so far as historians and anthropologists know, human entities that can properly be called nationalities. There has also been from ancient times the love of country, or native land, which is patriotism. But nationalism is a modern, almost a recent, phenomenon. It is only as we recognize this distinction between nationality and patriotism that we come to see what constitutes modern nationalism.

A nationality may be defined as "a group of people who speak either the same language or closely related dialects, who cherish common historical traditions, and who consti-

tute, or think they constitute, a distinct cultural society." The basis of nationality is not to be found in inherent mental or spiritual differences among human groups, or for that matter, in racial heredity or physical environment. Nationality is certainly an attribute or aspect of human culture and civilization, and the causation of national groupings and national traits must be sought in the factors described by the social and essentially humane sciences rather than in those of the physical environment. The distinctive marks and qualities of Russian, Greek, German, Japanese, or any other nationality, are no mere appendage of race or incident of geography; they are the creation of social circumstance and cultural tradition.

Patriotism means literally the love of one's native land. As such it must have been of slight significance to the member of an early nomadic tribe that knew no permanent abiding place. Patriotism did become a marked feature of ancient fixed and civilized life; but even then it was usually local, rarely national. It was applied, for example, by the Greeks not indiscriminately to all Greek-speaking lands, but to a fragment of land such as Athens, Sparta, Corinth or Ephesus. This sort of patriotism is natural enough. Everybody who is born and reared where his ancestors have lived from time immemorial is almost certain to feel a sentimental attachment to that locality. At an early date, however, patriotism was extended in application from one's native locality to one's political country, from an immediate place to the person of a military or political leader, and thence to the idea of a political state.

"Nowadays," according to Professor Hayes, "there is preached and practiced a two-fold doctrine, (1) that each

nationality should constitute a united independent sovereign state, and (2) that every national state should expect and require of its citizens not only unquestioning obedience and supreme loyalty, not only an exclusive patriotism, but also, unshakable faith in its surpassing excellence over all other nationalities, and lofty pride in its peculiarities and its destiny. This is nationalism today. It has been a mark of nurture, if not of nature, for human beings since the dawn of history to possess some consciousness of nationality, some feeling that the linguistic, historical and cultural peculiarities of a group make its members akin among themselves and alien from all other groups. But not until very modern times have whole peoples been systematically indoctrinated with the tenets that every human being owes his first and last duty to his nationality, that nationality is the ideal unit of political organization as well as the actual embodiment of cultural distinction, and that, in the final analysis, all other human loyalties must be subordinated to loyalty to the national state, that is, to national patriotism. These tenets are the very essence of modern nationalism."

To summarize, then, nationality has always existed. Patriotism has long existed, either as applied to a locality, or as extended to a state, or even to an empire. But the fusion of patriotism with nationality, and the predominance of national patriotism over all other human loyalties—which constitutes nationalism—this is a strictly modern phenomenon.

National consciousness, which began to awaken among European peoples during the late middle ages, did not immediately give rise to nationalism. It was, however, greatly quickened at the dawn of modern times. The way which

had been prepared for nationalism was now paved wide and deep by certain crucial differentiations taking place during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and which fall naturally into the following groups: (1) linguistic and literary, (2) political, (3) commercial and economic, (4) ecclesiastical, religious and cultural. By the end of the seventeenth century in many parts of Europe, religion, economics, politics and literature were nationalized. In Western Europe, the states of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, France, Spain, Portugal and England had really become national. Each comprised a definite geographical area inhabited by populations that were marked off from their neighbors by a difference of speech; each possessed an independent political organization and pursued an independent economic policy; and the citizens of each cherished peculiar customs and traditions. Thus the rise of nationalism—the process of transforming local, feudal, and imperial states into national states—had already begun.

There are three prime causes, however, why this growing national consciousness developed so rapidly and took the particular form we know from the last part of the eighteenth century down to 1914; (1) the French Revolution, (2) the Industrial Revolution, and (3) the vogue of Romanticism. The influences proceeding from these three sources are chiefly responsible for the particular type of nationalism developed during the nineteenth century, and also for the fact that it has literally encircled the globe. During the last century it has assumed a three-fold aspect. First, thanks to the Industrial Revolution, it has ceased to be restricted to Western Europe; it has gradually affected every nationality in Europe and most nationalities in all the other

continents. Today the nationalistic spirit is aflame in India, China, Korea, the Malay Straits Settlements, Turkey, Persia, Arabia, Egypt and the other countries of Northern Africa. As a matter of fact, nationalism is the outstanding factor in the life of all peoples, today, including the islands of the sea, unless it be in some portions of Africa. Secondly, it has advanced with tremendous rapidity in countries like England, France and the United States, which had already become national states. Thirdly, it has invaded non-national states, such as the Habsburg, Muscovite and Ottoman Empires, and broken them up into national fragments.

"For a century and more the principles of political democracy and national self-determination were jointly invoked by romantically inclined leaders of peoples throughout Europe and America. Old nationalities which had long been subject to the rule of alien nationalities were induced to struggle both for political liberty and for national independence. Nationalities which had long been broken into political fragments were moved to seek national unity and national democracy. Nationalities which had been burdened by monarchical despotism were prevailed upon to revolt and to set up a democratic government which would be more intensely national.

"In the 1820's appeared the embryonic national states of Greece and Serbia, and in America, a group of Spanish-speaking republics. In the 1830's the Belgians successfully freed themselves from Dutch sovereignty, whilst the Poles unsuccessfully rebelled against Russia, and the Italians against Austria. In the 1840's the Germans attempted to erect a democratic national state. In the 1850's and 1860's the Italians and the Rumanians alike established their na-

tional independence. In all these instances, the resurgence of a nationality was in part a romantic invocation of the past; but the actual driving force was the revolutionary sentiment of liberty, equality and fraternity, and the popular conviction that every people had the right to dispose of itself as it pleased. And the effect in every instance was the further fostering of nationalism."[1]

"For many years within the nationalist empires of Russia and Germany, the agitation of 'oppressed' nationalities proceeded. The more the Germans endeavored to Germanize their empire, the more the subject minorities of Poles, Danes, and Alsatians sought to preserve their national individuality. The more the Russians sought to Russify their domain, the more the subject peoples—the Poles, the Finns, the Esths, the Letts, the Lithuanians, etc.—worked for national emancipation. In Austria, the dominant Germans and Magyars were actually outnumbered by the subject peoples—Czechoslovaks, Poles, Yugoslavs, Rumanians, etc. —and as these became nationalist, they made of the Empire a ramshackle structure which the World War at last brought down to ruin."[2]

"Before the War, the Turkish Empire was known as 'the sick man of Europe,' and his sickness was primarily the same prevalent epidemic of nationalism: not only his Christian subjects—Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, Armenians, etc.—but a Mohammedan 'oppressed' nationality such as the Arabs, were consumed with the nationalist fever."[3] Thus during the nineteenth century the tide of nationalism rose steadily

[1] C. J. H. Hayes: "Essays on Nationalism," p. 57.

[2] C. J. H. Hayes: op. cit., p. 59.

[3] C. J. H. Hayes: op. cit., p. 59.

in Europe and overflowed into all the other continents. It culminated logically and inevitably in the World War. There are some indications that it reached its flood-tide in that tragic catastrophe, and that even now it is beginning to recede; but even should that prove to be true, the sources of nationalist propaganda are still exerting their influence in all parts of the world.

When we seek to appraise the value of nationalism as we know it today to pronounce it either a curse or a blessing, as most people are inclined to do, we are forced to admit that nationalism as an historic process has been great and long continued. To regret and condemn the process is utterly futile; we could not undo it even if we would. Certainly we could not refashion all those multitudinous factors, personal and social, economic and political, religious and cultural, which during many centuries now past recall, have gradually transformed city-states and feudal-states and imperial states into our present-day national states. The slow process of nationalism is simply a fact, like any other fact of history, and we must accept it regardless of praise or blame.

According to most contemporary students of the subject, national consciousness is not only natural and instinctive but valuable and useful, and should be fostered rather than repressed. We should not wish to get rid of it even if we could. To quote Mr. Alfred Zimmern, "Nationality, in fact, rightly regarded, is not a political but an educational conception. It is a safeguard of self-respect against the insidious onslaughts of materialistic cosmopolitanism. It is the sling in the hands of weak undeveloped peoples against the Goliath of material progress. . . . No task is more

urgent among backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality and the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character and self-respect. It is for this problem of the man without roots that nationality provides a solution. Nationality is the one social force capable of maintaining for these peoples their links with the past and keeping alive in them that spark of the higher life and that irreplaceable sentiment of self-respect without which all professions of fine ideals are but as sounding brass and tinkling cymbals. It is the one force capable of doing so because it is the one force whose appeal is instinctive and universal. Nationality is more than a creed or doctrine or a code of conduct, it is an instinctive attachment. It recalls an atmosphere of precious memories, of vanished parents and friends, of old custom, of reverence, of home, and a sense of the brief span of human life as a link between immemorial generations, spreading backwards and forwards." It is Mr. Zimmern's conclusion that the road to internationalism lies through nationalism, not through leveling men down to a grey indistinct cosmopolitanism, but by appealing to the best elements in the corporate inheritance of each nation.

In the light of the cultural and spiritual worth of nationality, as well as of its instinctive and universal character, it would not only seem utopian and futile but downright mistaken to advocate the wiping out of nationality by cosmopolitanism or imperialism, if that were possible. When we remember the contemporary vigor of the political institution of the national state, and the conveniences and benefits of political unity for a people who speak a common language, it would seem as if the possibility of realizing the

ideals of universal literacy and of political democracy, are better in the national state than under any other political institution which the world has ever known. Patriotism of some kind has been a mark of human beings from prehistoric times. It has always been one of the deepest and strongest emotional factors in human life. It is an aspect of loyalty; and since normal man has always been, and doubtless always will be, loyal to something or somebody outside of himself, some kind of patriotism will always exist. Patriotism, like sex, is liable to abuse, but it is needful to the life of the race, and it is capable of inspiring the finest sentiments and the noblest deeds. Nations like individuals are possessed of unique distinctions, and unless we are willing to see all nations and peoples reduced to a drab sameness under a standardized uniformity which our industrialism now threatens, then we must prize the national consciousness that keeps alive and still further develops the unique distinctions of different peoples.

Frankly admitting all these benefits and blessings, as well as many others, that flow from a developed national consciousness, it still remains true that modern nationalism in its blending of the sense of nationality—a good in itself—with patriotism—also a good in itself—and its demand that man's supreme loyalty should be given to the political state, has led to grave abuses that cannot be allowed to continue if we are to live in an ordered world. Unless we can look forward with equanimity to greater and deadlier wars, we must earnestly desire some mitigation of nationalism as we know it today. As Franz Grillparzer has suggested, the history of man's life has been from individualism on to nationalism, and the next stage, he says, will be bestialism.

There is just one alternative. Nationalism *will* lead to bestialism, unless we can build on our present nationalisms a broader and more inclusive internationalism. But if we are to accomplish this, if we are to be reasonable and practical, we must accept the teachings of history in regard to nationality and construct our internationalism of the future from the building-blocks of existing nationalities, and even on existing nationalisms.

Numerous critics have pointed out the evils and dangers existing in present-day nationalism that make it so serious a menace for the future. Let us attempt a brief summary. First, there is the spirit of exclusiveness and narrowness and self-righteous pride. The national state, through education in national schools, national army, and national journalism, through all the social pressure of national patriotism, inculcates in its citizens the fancy that they are a world by themselves, sufficient unto themselves; it teaches them that they are a chosen and peculiar people, that their particular brand of culture is the only culture worthy the name, and that they should prize far more the unique distinctions that are theirs as a nationality than the common and universal qualities and gifts that belong to them as human beings. This tends to develop into a pharisaic smugness that is ridiculous, an ignorance that is dangerous, and an uncritical pride that is despicable. It is responsible for the boasted 100% Americanism which is matched by an equally 100% nationalism in every other country.

Secondly, nationalism places a premium on uniformity. It prescribes national models of art, national standards of thought, and national forms of conduct, and to these it expects all the inhabitants of each national state to conform.

Individual differences, class differences, religious differences, are alike deemed unfortunate. If nationality seeks to prevent the reduction of the whole world to a drab sameness by keeping alive the unique distinctions of various peoples, then nationalism does much more to reduce everybody and everything within the national state to a dull and lifeless sameness.

Thirdly, nationalism increases the docility of the masses. "As a result of their national upbringing and their lifelong nationalist education they are seldom inclined to question the 'perfections' of their nationality, of their state, of their government, or of the economic conditions under which they live. In the name of national rights, national honor, national interests, they will forego their own individual rights, sacrifice their own individual interests, and even foreswear their own individual honor. They are ready in the name of the freedom and liberty of their nationality to abridge the liberty of fellow-citizens and to take away the freedom of other nationalities. They have, in supreme degree, the will to believe, and this will to believe renders them the easy dupes of nationalist propaganda in support of imperialism and war."[1]

Fourthly, nationalism in its present form focusses popular attention upon war and preparedness for war. "War is that historic tradition of a nationality which the national state, under present conditions, does most to keep alive and active in the minds and hearts of its citizens."[1] In spite of our boasted culture, military heroes outrank, in the teaching of history and in the popular imagination, the heroes of science and art and learning. It is self-evident how quickly

[1] C. J. H. Hayes: op. cit., p. 259.

a popular interest in some matter of social reform or in an economic problem is crowded into the background and forgotten when confronted by the fierce heat of nationalist passion for military "defense."

From this brief survey of the more patent evils of modern nationalism it is clear that whatever good it may possess or benefits it may bestow, in its present form, nationalism is a tremendous yet subtle force making, not for closer unity, better understanding and truer coöperation in the life of nations, but rather, the reverse. It divides and separates, it fosters ignorance and deepens prejudice; it creates untold frictions, arouses fear and suspicion, breeds bitterness and hatred, and is one of the major causes leading eventually to war.

Professor Hayes thus summarizes the evils of nationalism: "An intolerant attitude and behavior towards one's fellows; a belief in the imperial mission of one's own nationality at the expense of others particularly at the expense of backward peoples; a habit of carrying a chip on one's national shoulder and defying another nationality to knock it off; a fond dwelling on the memory of past wars and a feverish preparing for future wars, to the neglect of present civic problems; a willingness to be led and guided by self-styled patriots; a diffidence, almost a panic, about thinking or acting differently from one's fellows; a spirit of exclusiveness and narrowness which feeds on gross ignorance of others and on inordinate pride in one's self and one's nationality; these are all too prevalent aspects of contemporary nationalism. If in these respects nationalism is not mitigated it will be an unqualified curse to future generations."

As we trace the history of the development of the sense of nationality and its more recent identification with loyalty to the national political state, must we not admit that, though up to a certain point it has on the whole yielded many desirable and beneficial results, beyond that point it has become a grave danger and menace to civilization, especially in view of the changed relations into which we have come, and also, of the evils and abuses into which it has fallen? In other words, is it not becoming increasingly clear that nationalism as we have known it is not an end in itself, but rather a means to a larger end—a higher and broader internationalism, more in harmony with the new world into which we have been ushered? This coming internationalism will not ignore, much less destroy, anything that is good and true and worth preserving in the old nationalisms. But it will seek to purge our nationalisms of their present narrowness and exclusiveness and foolish conceit, free them from their prevalent intolerance and jingoism and selfish imperialism, cleanse them from all the unethical elements that have degraded their possible greatness and power, thus helping peoples to see that any nation is truly great, not because of its territory or population, its armies or navy, its commerce or its wealth, but only and ever because of the service it is able to render to the common good of all mankind.

If this seems like offering the nations mere "counsels of perfection," let us be reminded that there are forces in the world today that are operating inevitably toward the mitigation of our present nationalisms and toward a broader international coöperation. Science and industrialism have greatly expedited, not only an international traffic in com-

modities but also a world-wide exchange of ideas—ideas of science, philosophy, economics, politics, religion. They have created a new interdependence of nationalities and of individuals. They have at once created the necessity, and furnished the means, for mitigating the evils of a narrow nationalism. Let it not be imagined, however, that this most desirable mitigation of nationalism can be brought about by an interplay of blind forces of nature without conscious effort and direction on man's part. Bestialism is as possible as internationalism, unless man plays his full and intelligent part in the bringing in of a real world order.

Side by side with the development of modern nationalism in the nineteenth century, there has been also developed a steadily quickened international coöperation. Joint action by national states has been growing more and more prevalent. The limits of space prevent the mention of but a few illustrations. Thirty nations formed the Universal Telegraph Union in 1875; twenty-three adopted the common use of the metric system of weights and measures in 1875; sixty adhered to the Universal Postal Union, created in 1878; five joined the Latin Monetary Union in 1865 for the regulation of an interchangeable coinage; nineteen ratified the Berne Convention of 1883 for the standardization of patent laws; and fifteen signed the Berne Convention of 1887, providing for practically uniform copyright laws. These were a few instances of joint action for economic purposes in the second half of the nineteenth century. And before and since, has been the constant activity of a staff of diplomatic agents, not least among whose achievements has been the negotiation of a host of international treaties regulating commerce, naturalization, and extradition, and

providing occasionally for arbitration of disputes. All this reveals the influence exerted by the new relations of interdependence to bring about international coöperation in these particular fields.

There grew up, too, among the Great Powers of Europe, a "Concert" which though always quite informal and sometimes reduced to helplessness by war and other effects of domestic nationalism, performed valuable service by emphasizing interstate interests and by seeking to prevent war or to alleviate its miseries. In 1864 the International Red Cross Society was organized with branches in all European countries; and in 1882 the United States ratified the Geneva Convention, and later both Turkey and Japan established local branches of the Red Cross Society. The principle of the Concert of Europe was invoked repeatedly to halt war: in 1878, to prevent the Russo-Turkish War from precipitating a much vaster struggle; in 1885-1886, to restore peace between Serbia and Bulgaria; in 1897, to arrest Turkish aggression against Greece. In central Africa and in China the freedom of commerce of all nations was protected by international agreement. Central Africa was amicably partitioned, the middle part of it being established as the mutually guaranteed Congo Free State. In China, the Great Powers including the United States, united in an expedition which suppressed the Boxer insurrection.

In 1881, James G. Blaine, Secretary of State for the United States, invited the several independent states of the New World to participate in a conference at Washington "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." This conference, finally held in 1889, proved to be the pre-

cursor of a series of conferences—at Mexico City in 1901, at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, at Buenos Aires in 1910, etc., which served to accentuate the desire of the American republics for common peaceful development, and gradually to strengthen the sentiment for Pan-American solidarity. Argentina and Chile concluded in 1902 a treaty of arbitration for the settlement of all controversies between them and jointly erected an heroic statue of Christ on a lofty peak of their Andean boundary.

Still further, general international conferences were held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907. At the earlier one, twenty-six Powers were represented; at the later one, there were forty-four—practically the whole world. The Hague conferences failed to reduce armaments or "to make the great idea of universal peace triumph over the elements of trouble and discord," as Tsar Nicholas II defined its purpose in convoking the First Hague Conference; but they established international courts to which disputes between states might be submitted and drafted rules of international behavior in the event of future war.

These facts, and many others that might be mentioned, serve to illustrate how far the sentiment for a closer unity in the relations of nations had gone, and how much international coöperation had actually come into existence by the dawn of the twentieth century. There are other much more significant events looking toward the same end that have taken place during the new century, and especially since 1918, which will be considered in a subsequent chapter. But it must be remembered that the more recent forms of international coöperation, such as the League of Nations, the World Court, etc., were being prepared for, all uncon-

sciously to most minds, by these many international movements that sprang up during the last half of the nineteenth century. These movements were but the initial steps toward the larger and much more comprehensive and inclusive movements that were to follow the War.

It can, and will be said that the tragic events of 1914-1918 destroyed at one fell swoop all that had been gained previously in developing international relations, and in creating a better feeling between peoples. There is no question that the bitter disillusionment that the War brought to so many minds in all countries created, at first, the impression that there had been no gain in these directions, that modern "civilized and Christian" nations were no further along than those of earlier and even barbarous times. But this view is hardly just to the facts. The farther we get away from the War and all its strange hysteria, the more clearly we see that far from destroying the new forces that had been making for international coöperation, the War has only accentuated them. It has brought them and their true significance into the light of day for all men to see and ponder. Instead of wiping out the movements making for a closer unity in the world's life, it has served only to interrupt, for a little time, the process that is even now—only ten years after the war—once again in full swing, due to the steadily growing sense of our absolute interdependence as nations and peoples.

The pessimism, the cynicism, and often the despair that filled so many hearts and minds during the War and in the years immediately following, is gradually giving way to a new confidence and hope, more realistic even than idealistic, that a genuine world order can be achieved; that

the means are at hand, in the results of science and in the very nature of our industrial civilization, that must at length purge our narrow and dangerous nationalisms of their present evils and purify them of their unethical and unsocial elements, making possible the building on these various nationalisms a true and worthy internationalism.

The internationalism which is being visualized everywhere today is not, let us repeat, to be confounded with the old eighteenth century cosmopolitanism, which decried all local and national distinctions and every form of patriotism. Its ideal was to be a citizen of no country, but of the world. Internationalism, on the other hand, presupposes a prime loyalty of the individual to his national state, a cherishing by him of his national language and his national traditons, an intelligent patriotism within him. Its ideal is to be a citizen of one's country, *and of the world.* This new internationalist aims to build his world-state with national blocks; he would not suppress nationality but develop it; he does not desire to make all nations alike, but to make them all fraternal. He does not dream of one World State, but rather, of a Federation of the Nations, in which all nations and peoples shall come to know themselves as members together of the living body of humanity—a Family of Nations, in which mutual respect and consideration of each for all and all for each shall one day prevail. To move forward, therefore, from our present individual nationalisms to a broader and more inclusive internationalism is not to follow a strange and unknown path, but merely, as political states, to take a well-marked turn on the very highway on which the modern world in all other aspects of its life is already traveling.

To quote in closing from Professor Hayes, "Let us continue to be patriotic citizens of our respective national states. Let us cherish our national language, our national traditions, and our national ideals. Only, let us clearly recognize and frankly acknowledge that there are grave faults in contemporary nationalism and let us sincerely endeavor to remedy such faults by combining our nationalism with internationalism, by tempering our national loyalty with an honest and reasoned respect for all other nationalities."

Or again, in the words of Professor John Watson, "The feeling of loyalty must be sublimated into a form of patriotism which combines the most intense love of country with the desire to do justice to other nations. There are tasks enough for men to do without wasting their emotions on evil feelings against the citizens of a foreign nation, and really vigorous life is not to be expected from those whose devotion to humanity makes them indifferent to the immediate problems of their own country. The union of love of country with devotion to the cause of humanity is the true ideal, and neither a selfish patriotism nor a vague humanitarianism that leads to nothing but neglect of the duty that lies nearest."

Edith Cavell has phrased the ideal in her striking words: "Patriotism is not enough; we must learn to love all humanity."

VI

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

ECONOMIC imperialism, as practiced during the last three quarters of a century, is the particular form that modern nationalism has taken in its relation to other peoples. It is nationalism in its efforts to expand beyond its own boundaries. Of ancient imperialism, of the empires of Alexander, of Cyrus, of Cæsar, we have all heard much, and of Napoleon's spectacular exploits every school boy has read. But in this country, at least, the average citizen is but just beginning to realize the significance of present-day imperialism—its motives, its technique, and its inevitable consequences. "Though the general public little realizes the fact, economic imperialism is the most impressive achievement and the most momentous world-problem of our age. More than half of the world's land surface and more than a billion human beings are included in the colonies and "backward countries" dominated by a few imperialist nations. Every man, woman and child in Great Britain has ten colonial subjects—black, brown and yellow. For every acre in France there are twenty in the French colonies and protectorates. Italy is one-sixth as large as her colonies; Portugal, one-twenty-third; Belgium, one-eightieth. The nations of Europe are dwarfs besides their colonial possessions."[1]

Prior to 1914, the facts of economic imperialism were

[1] Parker Moon: "Imperialism and World Politics," p. 1.

known to comparatively few. The foreign offices of the Great Powers knew and fully understood what they meant by imperialism; and that is why they were continually clamoring for the increase of armaments, for the carrying out of their imperialistic designs demanded a large army and navy. A few students of modern history and world politics knew and understood whither the nations were tending, but if they attempted to raise their voices in warning, as did Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, J. A. Hobson and others, there were few who gave them any heed. The mass of people in all lands did not know or understand; even the conscripted soldiers who were sent to do the bidding of the imperialistic powers did not grasp the significance of the real cause for which they fought and laid down their lives. They had been taught that it was glorious to die for their country, but they seldom dreamed that they were giving their lives in order that their country might exploit economically, or enslave politically, some weaker and defenseless people.

The average American had been accustomed to think, at any rate until the recent disillusionment, that seizure of territory was somewhat akin to theft, that militarism and aggressive war were out of date among democratic nations, that conquest was contrary to the accepted principles of international morality. This, however, has not been the attitude of the imperialist nations of Europe or of Japan. "French statesmen have vehemently declared the conquest of colonies to be not merely permissible but imperative for France, and the Third Republic has won almost five million square miles. Italian patriots have proclaimed it a sacred duty, and Italy has gained almost

a million square miles. Englishmen have regarded it as 'the white man's burden' which civilized peoples dare not shirk, and in the last half century four million square miles have been added to the British Empire, besides many a veiled protectorate and sphere of influence. Germany plunged into world politics rather late, but not too late to appropriate a million square miles in Africa and the East Indies, to dominate the rich Asiatic empire of the Ottoman sultans, and finally to stake all and lose all in the war of 1914. Russian Tsars stretched acquisitive hands into Central Asia, Persia, Mongolia and Manchuria. Japan took Formosa, Korea, part of Manchuria, Shantung, German islands in the Pacific, and during the Great War, attempted at a single stroke to make all China virtually a Japanese protectorate. All the Great Powers, save the United States, boldly and frankly set themselves to the epic task in the nineteenth century of carving out stupendous colonial empires; and even the United States, feeling the same urge to action, reached into the Pacific and into the Caribbean for parcels of colonial territory."[1]

"Nor were the Great Powers more imperialist than several of the smaller nations. Belgium, with her vast property in Central Africa; Portugal, with colonies larger than the German Kaiser's; Spain, clinging tenaciously to a strip of Morocco, together with pitiable fragments of her former colonial grandeur; and Holland, glorying in a magnificent East Indian island empire, have vied with stronger nations in seeking the rewards which all hoped to win in the stirring game of world politics."[2]

[1] Parker Moon: op. cit., p. 2.

[2] Parker Moon: op. cit., p. 3.

The most striking and rapid development of economic imperialism belongs to the years between 1874 and 1914. In this modern sense, England began her imperialistic expansion under Disraeli, 1874-80, France, under Jules Ferry, 1879-85, Germany, under Bismarck, 1884, Italy, under Crispi, 1886, Japan, under her Prime Minister, 1895, the United States, under McKinley, 1898. According to figures given by Professor Hayes of Columbia University, the relative gains of the different imperialistic powers, both in territory and population between 1874 and 1914 are as follows:

	Square Miles	*Population*
Great Britain	4,037,000	119,000,000
France	2,900,000	36,000,000
(Exclusive of Sahara Desert)	1,500,000	
Russia	1,100,000	18,700,000
Germany	1,100,000	13,200,000
Belgium	910,000	15,000,000
Italy	590,000	1,360,000
United States	289,000	17,000,000
Japan	114,000	19,000,000

By 1914, all the Great European Powers had secured large slices of Africa. In China, Italy only had failed to gain something for herself. In the matter of railway construction, which was one of the most important forms of economic imperialism because it involved political as well as economic interests, one sees the English building the Cape-to-Cairo railway, the Russians, the Trans-Siberian, and the Germans the Bagdad Railway. The first of these came into conflict with German, Belgian and French ambitions; the second was partly responsible for the Russo-

Japanese War; the third caused endless suspicions and frictions between Germany and the Triple Entente.

Imperialism is the root and *raison d'être* of world politics today. If from this viewpoint one reviews the more recent history of international relations, all the alliances, ententes, crises and wars, reveal a new meaning. Almost without exception, they were but surface manifestations of the swift deep current of imperialism. "When France and England trembled on the verge of war in 1898, during the Fashoda crisis, imperialist rivalry for a million or so square miles of the African Sudan was the cause. The German emperor's celebrated telegram to President Kruger, congratulating him on having repulsed a British invasion, was much more than a breach of international etiquette; it was a revelation of tense imperialist competition in South Africa, and as such it both alarmed and angered British statesmen. The Moroccan 'crises' of 1905 and 1911, which so nearly embroiled all Europe in war, were not unique results of some peculiarly German—or peculiarly French—aggressiveness; rather, they were two of the innumerable explosions which have been caused whenever the aims of imperialist nations happened to cross. The South African war would never have been fought had English imperialism not been active in South Africa; nor would the Spanish-American war have occurred if there had been no American interests in Cuba. The greatest war the twentieth century had witnessed before 1914 was the purely imperialist Russo-Japanese struggle for Korea and Manchuria. And in the greatest of all wars, imperialism was a prime, if not the chief single, factor. The very alignment of the European

powers was dictated by imperialism, not by race, or democracy or kinship of culture. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey were allied by Teutonic domination of the Near East. Republican France and Monarchist England were bound together by the far-reaching imperialist bargain of 1904; liberal England and Tsarist Russia, by an agreement of 1907 regarding imperialist interests in Persia, Afghanistan, Thibet."[1]

"Contrary to a quite general impression, the War did not put an end to economic imperialism when it resulted in dividing up the German colonies. The climax has not yet been reached, and the solution of the problems involved in still uncertain. Never was imperialist rivalry so keen as since 1918. We are now entering upon a period of intensified international economic competition, in which the problem of imperialism is becoming all the more acute because most of the backward areas available for colonies have already been appropriated. There are no longer vast unclaimed reaches of Africa to sate the appetites of rising powers. Moreover, tariff barriers are being raised in hitherto open colonies; governments are taking a more vital interest, and sometimes officially participating in the international scramble for oil, rubber, railway and mining concessions; the tide of immigrant 'surplus population' from Europe and Asia is being turned back upon itself by American restrictions, to seek elsewhere new outlets; backward peoples are fast becoming educated to the point of providing a really important, and rapidly increasing market for manufactures; and with the steady expansion of industrial-

[1] Parker Moon: op. cit., p. 3, 4.

ism, raw materials are becoming more and more the stakes of diplomacy." [1]

Before proceeding to the problems economic imperialism presents to a twentieth century that is setting its face more or less vaguely toward a world unity, it is necessary to consider briefly the chief motives that have led to this unprecedented expansion of the Great Powers during the last seventy-five years. In its modern form, imperialism represents a historical process, and as such, it is futile to debate the right and wrong of the process. Historically, imperialism has proceeded from certain definite causes, and in its development it has resulted today in certain grave and menacing problems that must be frankly faced. It is clear that imperialism as it has been practiced has been a disintegrating and disunifying force in the life of the world; it has aroused suspicion, created distrust, intensified rivalries and jealousies, bred bitterness and hatred, and led directly to war. But we must understand the causes that led to this sudden and rapid imperialistic development, and the motives that lay behind its manifold activities, if we are to analyze the problems involved.

Strictly speaking, modern imperialism dates from the time of the Industrial Revolution. In the decade before the French Revolution, Watt and Boulton began the manufacture of steam engines in Birmingham. This meant eventually the creation of the factory, the factory town, and ultimately, machine production on a gigantic scale. Adoption of the new device for industry, however, did not begin radically to affect production until steam power was employed in transportation. The use of steam-driven ships

[1] Parker Moon: op. cit., p. 5.

began in the second decade, and of steam engines on railways, in the third decade of the nineteenth century. The development of railways in Europe between 1835 and 1850 made possible the rise of industry on a large scale. For the railways brought coal and raw materials to the factory centers and distributed the manufactured articles throughout all the countries of Europe. Steamships brought the outlying world into touch with Europe as railways brought the countries of Europe into touch with one another.

Out of these two factors—the machine in industry, and the new means of transportation—there arose inevitably, as has already been pointed out, three new and imperative demands: (1) the demand for new markets, (2) the demand for raw materials, and (3) the demand for new fields for investments. Let us consider these new demands in turn.

(1) New Markets. As machine production became possible on a large scale through the multiplication of factories and the development of factory towns, it was only a short time before manufacturers realized that they could produce commodities of various kinds much more rapidly than their home country could absorb them. With the constant invention of new forms of machinery and the further perfecting of old forms, it became evident that the field of machine production was practically limitless. And as new factories steadily multiplied there came to be a constantly increasing surplus of production which the home markets could not take care of. This inevitably forced the manufacturer to seek new markets outside his own country.

(2) Raw Materials. In like manner the demand for raw materials to keep these new factories going was tremend-

ously increased. Coal and iron were the two indispensable means of production on any large scale. But besides these, with the variety of commodities constantly multiplying, there were any number of raw materials, many of which could be found only in tropical regions, that must be secured, and in ever larger quantities, if the new demands for machine-manufactured articles were to be met. Thus the increased production necessitated not only the discovery of new markets, but the hunting out and eventual securing of raw materials on a steadily increasing scale.

(3) Investments. This unprecedented increase of production together with the opening up of new markets for the manufactured goods, also placed inevitably a large surplus of capital in the hands of those who were in a position to profit from the new industry. And as time went on and there came to be combinations, small at first but steadily growing larger, until the modern gigantic Trust came into being, this surplus capital in the hands of the comparatively few piled up into amounts hitherto undreamed of. Like the surplus production, this surplus capital began to seek new fields for investment, and especially, fields where the returns on the investment might be much larger than any that could be secured at home.

Along with these economic causes, growing directly out of the rise and rapid expansion of industrialism, it has also been customary to ascribe the development of modern imperialism to other causes, such as moral, sentimental, and military. The conception of the moral nature and duty of imperialism grows out of the idea that the rule of Asiatics, Africans and the inhabitants of the islands of the seas, together with the acquisition of their territory by the West-

ern powers, is morally justifiable and necessary. This doctrine has been summed up in a single phrase, "the white man's burden" of which Rudyard Kipling was the great exponent. According to this philosophy the white is regarded as superior to all other races in heart and brain, above all, in his political and social institutions, his morality and religion; he is in fact one more of God's "chosen peoples." And if these "inferior" races obstinately refuse to acknowledge their inferiority and are unwilling to be coerced into accepting the proffered blessings, then they must, unfortunately, be conquered and slain until they do accept, however unwillingly, the law of God which is always identified with the will of the conquerers.

While these moral arguments have found full expression in the imperialistic writings of the immediate past, it is no exaggeration to say that moral ideas have never been the motive power in any imperialistic adventure of the nineteenth century, and there are few intelligent people who would dare to adduce them as such today. No Western state ever conquered or acquired control over any territory or people in order to confer upon that people the blessings of Western civilization. When territory has been acquired the arguments for the adventure, before the acquisition, have always been either (1) to punish someone for not being civilized (military punitive expeditions), (2) to protect someone already conquered from the bad example of uncivilized and unconquered neighbors (military punitive expeditions), (3) to avenge an insult to the flag (sentimental prestige), (4) to protect or to further the economic interests of the subjects of the imperialistic state.

Sentiment and sentimentality have always played some

part in imperialism. The passion for adventure in some romantic soldier or colonial governor has often furnished a convenient excuse and starting point for a policy of expansion. In France, Britain, Germany, and Italy, the speeches of responsible and irresponsible statesmen and the writings of historians and publicists reveal a wide and firmly held belief that the acquisition and retention of imperial possessions outside of Europe reflect great glory on the European state. According to this philosophy, the prestige of a state is very seriously affected by whether it has, or has not, conquered savages somewhere on this planet. And by a natural psychology, the glory of a European nation is not only increased by the acquisition of territory outside of Europe, but it appears to be also diminished by the mere fact of such acquisition by some other nation. We have the statement of a Premier of France that the seizure of Cyprus by England was a blow at the prestige of France, and that the glory of France could only recover its brightness through the French seizure of some other territory in Tonkin or Tunis, or preferably in both.

It is clear, however, that as causes in the complex phenomena of modern imperialism, sentimental beliefs hold the same declining position as moral. The idea that empire is glory and enhances a nation's prestige is used as an argument, not for acquiring empire, but for retaining it when acquired. There is always a party in all imperialistic countries that is opposed to such acquisitions, and when these anti-imperialists wake up some day to find that another territory has been acquired, all they can do is to demand evacuation or abandonment. It is at this moment that the imperialists find the sentimental and moral arguments most

useful. If the empire is glorious as such, there is an obvious relation between imperialism and patriotism, and it becomes unpatriotic to say a word against imperialism or to urge the abandonment of any imperial acquisition. Thus patriotism and morality combine, not to cause imperialism, but to suppress discussion of, or opposition to, empire.

Military or strategic needs as causes of European expansion are frequently misunderstood. In certain limited areas like the Mediterranean, strategic reasons have had some effect on the creation of imperialistic policy in states like France and Italy. The acquisition of Algeria, Tunis and Morocco by France, and of Tripoli by Italy, has been defended on the grounds of military necessity. The argument here has been: "Unless we seize this territory, some other country may seize it and use it as the base of military operations against us." But this applies to a very limited stretch of territory facing the coasts of France and Italy. No imperialist has every pretended that the acquisition of empire on the East or West coasts of Africa, or in Asia, was necessary for the military or naval safety of the mother country.

But as soon as a new acquisition is made, the whole position changes. The imperial state now must afford military protection not only to its home territory, but to its colonial possessions as well. It becomes at once possible to argue that more territory must be acquired in order to secure the military protection of territory already acquired, and so a *hinterland* is annexed. For this reason England holds Egypt, not because Egypt protects England strategically, but because if she did not hold Egypt her hold on India would be weakened. Military reasons are, therefore, not to any

great extent a cause of imperialism, but they are a reason for making an empire large, and a large empire still larger.

Though these three kinds of causes—moral, sentimental, strategic—all affect men's ideas and ideals of empire to some extent, they are hardly fundamental. They would not of themselves, either collectively or singly, have been sufficient to set in motion the mighty forces of modern imperialism which have led to the subjection of Asia, Africa and the islands of the sea. At every step in the modern imperialistic expansion of Europe and America, the impulse of economic causes is clearly apparent. The absolute necessity of obtaining raw materials with which to run the factories, and new markets where the surplus production might be sold, and the opportunities for investing the surplus capital where it would bring the largest returns, were the direct results of the new expanding industrial civilization. It is only when we turn to economic beliefs, desires and causes, that we find ourselves approaching the real roots of economic imperialism.

With machine production and the insistent demand for new markets and fresh supplies of raw materials, the commerce with other countries ouside of Europe increased by leaps and bounds, and as one state after another became industrialized, the rivalry in securing these economic ends steadily increased until it has now reached the acute stage. Agents and salesmen of every class and description were sent into the farthest sections of every country on the globe with instructions to develop old markets and create new ones. The islands of the sea, hitherto entirely unnoticed, were now visited and ransacked with a view of selling goods to the natives, or of exchanging commodities with

them for their raw materials. The trading vessel was to be found in every port, and the trail of the trader could be traced in the most out-of-the-way places.

The thing to note is that this commerce which the last century has made possible between Western nations and all other parts of the world is in itself, apart from other phases of imperialism, a good thing; always excepting the trade in rum, opium, firearms and other things of like nature, which have served only to enrich the pockets of men at home at the cost of debasing physically and morally these more "backward" peoples. The fair interchange of goods, providing they are not harmful in themselves, is always a good thing for all concerned. These other peoples need our products and we need their raw materials. And where commerce and trade is honestly carried on, it is to the advantage of both parties concerned. If England and France and all the other imperialistic powers were to withdraw from their colonies and possessions and dependencies, commerce and trade would have to go on between these countries just the same, so closely is the world knit together today. The commercial phase of modern imperialism, taken by itself, is here and here to stay. The problem of imperialism in its most serious aspects has to do with its political phases.

Mr. J. A. Hobson, one of the leading economists of England, in his scientific study of British Imperialism makes out a strong case against the advantages of political imperialism. "The evidence leads to the following conclusions bearing upon the economics of the new Imperialism. First, the external trade of Great Britain bears a small and diminishing proportion to its internal industry and trade. Secondly, of the external trade, that with British possessions bears a di-

minishing proportion to that with foreign countries. Thirdly, of the trade with British possessions, the tropical trade, and especially the trade with the new tropical possessions, is the smallest, least progressive and most fluctuating in quantity, while it is lowest in the character of the goods which it embraces." These conclusions, it should be noted, are based on the figures of British trade for a period of fifty years, from 1850 to 1900, during the last half of which England made her great imperialistic expansion.

To quote from Charles A. Beard's "Cross Currents in Europe Today," "In 1913, England's business with Germany, counting exports and imports, was equal to more than one-third her entire business with all her colonies, possessions and dependencies. In other words, on the eve of the war, Great Britain's business with Germany—her bitterest rival—was a vital part of her economic life. There is another fact worth remembering, namely, that Great Britain in 1913, did five hundred million pounds worth of business with her imperial possessions, and a billion pounds worth of business with the lands she did not rule—the free nations of the earth. When we recall that the World War cost Great Britain about ten billion pounds, and that the annual interest and other charges on her debt in 1921 amounted to 350 million pounds, we may be permitted to raise a question as to whether commercial warfare by arms, 'pays' in any sense of the word."

Inasmuch as the political imperialism of Great Britain for the last fifty years is clearly condemned as a business policy, in that at enormous expense it has procured a small, bad, unsafe increase of markets, and has jeopardized the entire wealth of the nation in rousing the strong resentment of

other nations, we may well ask, why is the British government induced to embark upon such an unsound business policy? The only possible answer is that the business interests of the nation as a whole are subordinated to those of certain sectional interests that usurp control of the national resources and use them for their private gain. This is the commonest disease of all forms of government. The famous words of Sir Thomas Moore are as true now as when he wrote them: "Everywhere do I perceive a certain conspiracy of rich men seeking their own advantage under the name and pretext of the commonwealth."

This brings us very close to the economic tap-root of imperialism, for what is true of British imperialism is likewise true of every other national imperialism. It has always been bad business for the nation as a whole, but it has been good business for certain classes and certain trades within the nation. The vast expenditures upon armaments, the costly wars, the grave risks and embarrassments of foreign policy, the stoppage of political and social reforms within an imperialistic nation, while fraught with incalculable injury to the nation itself, have served well the present business interests of certain industries and professions.

A careful analysis, like that of Mr. Hobson, proves clearly that aggressive imperialism as practiced by modern nations is utterly unsound and irrational from the viewpoint of the nation as a whole. A completely socialized state which kept good books and presented regular balance-sheets of expenditures and assets would soon discard imperialism in the sense of political domination; an intelligent democracy which gave due proportionate weight to all economic interests alike would also do the same. "But a state in which

certain well organized business interests are able to outweigh the weak, diffused interests of the community, is bound to pursue a policy which accords with the pressure of the former interests." From the viewpoint of these business interests, imperialism is far more rational than at first appears.

We must also bear in mind that the general method pursued in the expansion of political imperialism during the last century has been the exploitation of weaker peoples by stronger. Sometimes it has manifested itself in the actual annexation of territory, often, in the establishment of a protectorate, or again, in the marking off of spheres of influence, or more recently, in what is known as economic penetration. The new historian who tells the story of the development of imperialism since 1850 gives little space to praising the policy of "benevolent assimilation" as practiced by the Great Powers; but running through the whole story occur again and again the ugly words, "hypocrisy, chicanery, falsehood, deceit, double-dealing, sophistry, etc." It is not strange that the seeds of bitterness and hatred sown by these methods of exploitation are today bearing their tragic harvest, when we remember the organized ill-treatment, the atrocities, the cruel injustices, the utter absence of any humane spirit, that have all too often accompanied these imperialistic conquests—invasion of another's territory, bombardments of coast ports, excesses of punitive measures, seizure of land, forced labor, or labor under oppressive conditions, humiliation of native governments, subversion of local authority, political domination and economic exploitation in every form—all the concomitants of power exercised without check. It is useless to pass moral judgment. From

the horrors of the earliest Portuguese settlements in India which appalled St. Francis Xavier to the imprisonment of editors in Haiti, it has always been the same. The conquest of weaker peoples by stronger inevitably involves such atrocities. But, as Leonard Woolf has said, it was not the atrocities that made the system but the system that made the atrocities.

It must also be remembered that when the Western nations began their policy of political expansion under the urge of the new economic demands, the peoples of Asia, of Africa, and of the islands of the sea had not as yet awakened to national self-consciousness; they were not strongly organized politically, and they were not adequately armed in the military sense. They were thus the helpless victims of the Western powers with their intense nationalisms, their strong governments and their highly developed armies and navies. Lacking the sense of any clear guiding moral principles in their relations to these backward and undeveloped peoples, the conquerors were influenced by an unrestrained sense of their power, and followed their primitive instincts of cupidity, selfishness and greed.

It may surprise the reader to learn that the idea that it is the function of the political state to protect private investors in strange lands is a comparatively new idea. Up to about fifty years ago the new economic and industrial system in Europe had caused a certain amount of penetration (and occasionally of subjection) of Asia and Africa by Europeans. But this movement was spasmodic, largely unconscious, and rarely influenced the policy of European States. The relations between the three continents were almost entirely economic; they were maintained by private

commercial undertakings and adventures. They sometimes led to the acquisition of large areas of territory by commercial companies, or to serious difficulties between the traders and the native governments; and these events, again, occasionally led to the intervention of European governments. But European governments did not acknowledge, and were not expected to acknowledge, any responsibility for pushing, or for protecting, the economic interests of their European subjects outside of Europe. The world had not heard as yet of that idea which is now the first principle of national policy—that the organized power of the state should be consciously and ruthlessly applied to the furthering of those private interests.

But during the last fifty years all this was altered. A profound change came over the political and economic outlook of Europe and, as we have seen, gradually extended its influence across the seas to the American republic. The outbreak of economic imperialism seemed as sudden as the outburst of leaves in the springtime, but the causes had been working beneath the surface of things for nearly a century. The industrial revolution had produced an industrialized society. In the great changes that had been taking place in the relation of nations, economic interests and the complex of beliefs and desires that gathered round them became more and more insistent, and the springs of human action were no longer to be found in religious, moral or social beliefs, but in the principle of individual profit-making. Every instrument that could possibly be used to further the economic interests of the nation, class or individual, was quickly seized upon; and among such instruments, obviously, one of the most powerful was the organized power of

the modern state. Politics became another name for economics, and the relation of the state to the economic interests of private citizens, according to this new philosophy, is shown by Chamberlain's belief, universally accepted and acted upon, that "commerce is the greatest of all political interests."

In further application of this new doctrine, there appeared both the theory and practice of protectionism, which established themselves in Europe and the United States between 1870 and 1880, implying that the organization of the state be used not only to protect the private interests of its subjects by force of arms if need be, but also as a weapon against the industrial and commercial interests of the citizens of other states. A fence of tariffs and barriers of all kinds of administrative regulations were to be erected around the territory under the control of the state, in order to preserve a strict monopoly for its own citizens of the markets and stores of raw materials available. This purely selfish and extremely short-sighted policy inevitably aroused in the capitalist in the industrial and commercial circles of every imperialistically inclined nation mingled emotions of cupidity and fear. The cupidity lay in the desire for ever greater profits resulting from success in shutting out your foreign rivals; the fear was that you would be shut out of the profitable markets of the world and kept from getting your share of the raw materials and food supplies.

I cannot better sum up the fundamental causes of economic imperialism than to quote once again the sober yet startling statement of Mr. Hobson: "In view of the part which the non-economic factors of patriotism, adventure, military enterprise, political ambition and philanthropy play

in imperial expansion, it may appear that to impute to financiers so much power is to take a too-narrowly economic view of history. It is true that the motor-power of imperialism is not chiefly financial; finance is rather the governor of the imperial engine, directing the energy and determining its work. Finance manipulates the patriotic forces which politicians, soldiers, philanthropists and traders generate; the enthusiasm for expansion which issues from these sources, though strong and genuine, is irregular and blind; the financial interests has those qualities of concentration and clear-sighted calculation which are needed to set imperialism to work. An ambitious statesman, a frontier soldier, an over-zealous missionary, a pushing trader, may suggest or even initiate a step of imperial expansion, but the final determination rests with the financial power. The direct influence exercised by great financial houses in 'high politics' is supported by the control which they exercise over public opinion through the Press, which in every civilized country, is becoming more and more their obedient instrument."

The foregoing brief and imperfect survey of modern imperialism may serve to prove that while it is indeed the most impressive achievement of the nineteenth century, it has led directly to the most momentous world-problem of the twentieth. The one thing that stands out clearly is that imperialism as it has been practiced—as a system of ruthless exploitation—has had its day. The coming to self-consciousness of the hitherto "backward peoples" of the earth, the rapid spread of nationalism to all parts of the globe, resulting gradually in the development of strong, unified governments in one people after another, the building up of trained armies, the adoption of Western science and scientific meth-

ods, together with the fact that there remain no unappropriated territories on the planet—these facts are forcing upon the nations a change in the methods of nineteenth century imperialism. With the wide dissemination since the war of the facts about economic imperialism, it is to be doubted whether public opinion in any country would tolerate longer the exploiting methods of the past. There are still many who voice approval of imperialism in terms of Mid-Victorian opinions, apparently unmindful that those opinions are forever swept away by the new world into which we have come. The twentieth century could not, if it would, follow the imperial practices of the nineteenth; perhaps we may even say, it would not, if it could, because of the new ideal that is at last emerging of a world-community.

The most challenging evidence of the approaching climax of imperialism as it has been, is the widespread uneasy stirring of non-European races which have been subjected to enough of European rule to become restive. During the last few years a spirit of rebellious self-determination has seized upon hitherto inert subject peoples: Nationalist Turkey has thrown off the yoke of European exploitation; Nationalist Egypt has won at least a partial independence; Indian Nationalism has assumed monumental proportions; Nationalist Persia and Afghanistan have cast off British shackles; the Filipinos have become more insistent in their pleas for independence. Whether this movement of the non-European peoples for self-government will reach a peaceful maturity is the gravest question before the civilized world today. "Steadily and surely, and far more rapidly than most casual observers believe, the so-called backward nations are borrowing not only superficial traits of Euro-

pean civilization, but European methods of industry, of war, of government, of education. The day is rapidly dawning when the deficiencies which made these peoples 'backward' and impotent in the face of European imperialism will no longer exist; and like Japan, such countries as China, India, Persia, Egypt, Turkey, Siam, and eventually, many parts of Africa, will employ the machines and weapons, and respond to the nationalistic and democratic sentiments which have given Europe her seemingly impregnable world-mastery in the past. The imperialist Great Powers of today are but pygmies prodding giants into activity. Who knows which will be the Great Powers of tomorrow?"[1] It is the part of wisdom from every viewpoint to cultivate, by all just and honest means before it is too late, the friendship of these peoples rapidly coming to self-conscious power.

We have reached the point where the experiences of the last fifteen years have made startlingly plain that the policy of "every nation for itself and the devil take the hindmost" is no longer possible, simply because the world has become an economic unit. To continue such a policy of ruthless national rivalry and cutthroat economic competition in a world that has become one closely-knit community, in which we are all interdependent one upon the other, will be utterly ruinous to all that is worth while in the organized life of mankind. Common sense, to say nothing of moral ideals, would demand that we find some other principle on which to base world politics than that of blind selfishness and brutal greed. The conditions necessary for a genuine world-community have been created for the first

[1] Parker Moon: op. cit., p. 7.

time in human history, if we can but exercise the intelligence, the insight, the will and the spirit demanded today.

The problem of securing and distributing the raw materials demanded by an industrial civilization will have to be solved, the new world markets must be increasingly created, the backward countries must obtain the capital needed for developing their economic resources, and this foreign capital is entitled to a fair return on an investment that should be properly safeguarded. But it is safe to assert that these basic demands of the new civilization will have to be met in the future by methods that are more in harmony with justice, honesty, square-dealing and fair-play than the methods employed in the past by economic imperialism. In a subsequent chapter we shall attempt to suggest in outline the form the solution of these problems may take, and also point out the evidences that we are already moving in the direction of a real coöperation in the ecomonic life of the world.

In the last act of the powerful play given in New York a few years ago, entitled "The World We Live In," the leading character philosophizes in substance as follows: Here we all are in this world—races, nations, classes and creeds; we are all struggling for the same end; we are all reaching out for the richer, fuller, happier life; it is the struggle for existence with every one of us. But is it not strange that while we are all struggling for the same great end, we are struggling *against* each other; we are hurting each other, robbing each other, maiming each other, killing each other? Then he muses in silence for a few minutes; finally he continues: Why cannot we in a world like this, as races, nations and men everywhere, stand shoulder to shoulder and

hand to hand, and *together* struggle for that richer, fuller, happier life, not for ourselves alone but for all humanity? Why can we not struggle *together,* against death in every form—physical death from disease and epidemic and plague, mental death from ignorance and superstition and bigotry, moral death from sin and crime—why can we not struggle *together* for that richer life for all mankind? This must be the great ideal of the future. The slogan of the twentieth century must be that little but tremendous word—*together.* It is only *together* that we can ever hope to solve our tremendous problems and build a world at length in which the life of each is known to be essential to the fullest life of all.

VII

WAR AND COMPETITIVE ARMAMENTS

PERHAPS the best thinking on the problem of war and peace that is being done today is British; and Gilbert Murray's recent book, "The Ordeal of this Generation," is an excellent example of it. No other writer has said so logically, so convincingly or so readably that the supreme ordeal of this generation *is* the problem of war. It seems curious that a century so humane and so liberal as the nineteenth should have fallen into the grip of a brutal, reactionary and de-civilizing military system, which in due season produced the most horrible of wars. But as Professor Murray points out, the Victorian era, which seems to have been "in the main a cosmos, an ordered entity," broke down because it contained the seed of its own destruction—"the belief in the independent sovereign state." This belief seemed liberal and democratic as late as the Peace Conference of 1919, but in effect it was violently antipathetic to liberalism and democracy. We are passing now, Professor Murray believes, through the after-war chaos to a new cosmos.

"The war which is formally renounced in the Pact of Paris and practically guarded against in the Covenant of the League is not an instinct, it is a form of State action. It is not an element in human nature, it is a part of a political program. It is no more an element in human na-

ture than the adoption of an income tax, or State-owned railways, or a protective tariff on wheat. And further, it is a form of State action which may at one time have been profitable to one of the parties engaged, but under modern conditions it is indubitably disastrous to both. . . . Governments find themselves at war, not because they like war, but because they go on doing the things that lead to war." The war-guilt controversy and the revelations of pre-war diplomacy point to this irresistible conclusion. Not the will to fight, but the will to empire building, to irredentism, to imperialist concessionist-hunting, to diplomatic bluffing, to competitive armaments and alliances, is the real cause of war.

In July of 1929, in the East Room of the White House in Washington, there assembled the representatives of forty-six leading nations to listen to President Hoover proclaim as now effective the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War. The same day the papers announced that Mr. McDonald, speaking as Prime Minister of England in the House of Commons, had stated that inasmuch as "the Pact had an important bearing on national security and therefore conduced to reduction of armaments, and also, because the United States and England had been carrying on conversations which, based on the principle of parity, had marked an advance toward agreement between the two largest naval powers, England herewith announced suspension of work on two cruisers, one submarine depot ship and two contract submarines, and the slowing down of dockyard work on other naval construction." The same papers also announced President Hoover's immediate response to the statement of England's Prime Minister: "It

is the desire of the United States to show equal good-will in our approach to the problem." He then stated that work on three new cruisers in this year's construction program would be suspended "until there has been an opportunity for full consideration of their effect upon the final agreement for parity which we expect to reach."

More significant by far than the impressive promulgation of the Pact were the accompanying statements by the Prime Minister of England and the President of the United States as to the suspension of naval construction programs in their respective countries. These are the first definite official acts of any nation to indicate that their political leaders regarded the Pact as anything more than "a gesture of peace." This action on the part of President Hoover and Mr. MacDonald reveals how seriously they take the Pact, and it also gives promise for the successful issue of the forthcoming conference on naval disarmament. The acid test of the real value of the Pact for the renunciation of war as a national policy lies in whether the nations who have thus solemnly agreed to renounce war are now ready seriously to take steps looking in the direction of gradual disarmament. If they are to continue to pile up armaments after they have not only renounced war but also solemnly agreed to settle all disputes that may arise in the future by pacific means, then their actions will certainly belie their words and professions, and the people in all lands will have neither faith in, nor respect for, the governments which have thus betrayed them.

It is obvious that the old problem of war is closely bound up with the problems of both nationalism and imperialism, and that no solution for any one of these particular prob-

lems can be found that is not also closely involved with the solution of all of them. Nationalism in its narrow sense, and imperialism in all its methods of unjust exploitation, are dependent for their very existence on armed force and are among the prime causes that lead to war inevitably. If these are to continue to dominate the life and practices of nations, then there is no possibility of a genuine disarmament, no hope of achieving a world order; and the establishment of world peace, in spite of its many advocates, is only a beautiful dream. On the other hand, if the nations are to continue to place their supreme faith in armies and navies, in force and violence, then international anarchy is bound to prevail, and selfish nationalisms and greedy imperialisms will hold sway as of old, forever thwarting the coming of a world-community.

Even at the risk of repetition let it be said again that the old world, with its ruling ideas and ideals, its pet formulas and methods, its whole attitude and outlook, is no longer the real world in which we live. The problems we confront in this new world that has been born can never be solved by the old ideas and methods proved hopelessly inadequate. It is the failure to realize this fact that has let to the halting and abortive attempts at solution that have thus far been made since 1918. It is utterly futile to imagine that we can successfully solve any one of these problems taken by itself, apart from all the others. It is the consciousness of a new world that must first be gained —a world that demands of us a new outlook, a new attitude, a new temper of mind, a new spirit. As we have already said, the difficulties reside not in the things as they are but in our conception of them; they are not material

obstacles but psychological. It is our mental outlook, the legacy of an age that is gone, and wholly inadequate to cope with modern conditions, which is paralyzing our good intentions and making our efforts so ineffective. Nationalism, imperialism, war, and all our other vexed problems are inextricably bound up with one another; they belong to a world that has become obsolete; they are the outgrowth of conditions that have passed away; in their present forms they are anachronisms in the life of today. And yet for the most part when we think of them at all, we approach them from the viewpoint of the nineteenth century, and talk about them in terms of a Mid-Victorian age.

When we remember that there has been a steady increase in the money spent and the amount of armaments built by the Great Powers from 1913 down to the present time, we must realize the gravity of the situation. Here are the official figures compiled by the League showing the increase in expenditures:

	Spent in 1913	*Spent in 1926*
Great Britain	$374,000,000	$584,000,000
France	239,000,000	384,000,000
Italy	142,000,000	164,000,000
Japan	104,000,000	207,000,000
United States	491,000,000	592,000,000

A brief survey of the more outstanding professed attempts to do something in the direction of disarmament is, to say the least, not encouraging. When the Council of the League came to organize its first commission on disarmament it did so by adopting a report prepared by

Leon Bourgeois of France, proposing a commission made up entirely of military, naval and air men. It was as foolish to expect a disarament convention from such a commission as a declaration of atheism from a commission of clergymen.

The Washington conference did indeed refrain from starting a ruinous armament race, but can it be said in all honesty that it was "as rich in true international wealth as it was in five national savings? While much Christian feeling was aired—indeed a trifle too much for the French delegation—politically at least, the undercurrents of mistrust, resentment and ill-feeling were strong and intense. . . . The construction of the Singapore base was an admirable illustration of the ultimate inanity of these half-measures for premature disarmament," and also, a demonstration of the inadequacy of the direct method of approach.

The famous Geneva Protocol was the nearest approach to triumph which the indirect method has been allowed to make in the history of the League. Nevertheless, while the Protocol was the "masterpiece whereby the patient constructive genius of France obtains security for her Europe in exchange for disarmament to satisfy British Liberal opinion, that very virtue killed the Protocol in England. France insisted upon sanctions; England dodged arbitration; the claims could not be reconciled and the Protocol was born dead."

A careful appraisal of all the political measures and efforts of the ten-year period since the War fails to assure anyone that an effective bulwark against war has as yet been erected. Up to the coming of the Kellogg Pact,

the whole disarmament situation was one of anarchy and seeming hopelessness. And when the deficiencies of the old methods employed are pointed out, it is easy to see why.

In the first place, the constant emphasis on the *prevention* of war instead of the supreme necessity of coöperative building for peace, is a futile and wasteful folly; for one is merely negative, the other is positive. This negative effort is apt to ignore, or at least minimize, the deep underlying causes of war, while the positive method seeks the removal of the causes that inevitably breed war. The one tends to exhaust itself in sentimentality and vague generalities, while the other faces realistically all the grim facts involved. The one is inclined to think of peace as the mere absence of war, while the other regards peace as a mighty achievement whose helpful, healing influences are to be operative constantly in the life and relations of nations. Those who are content to prevent war are inclined to employ old ideas and familiar formulas in new situations, while the builders of peace are searching diligently for a new technique in international dealings that shall more adequately meet the new situations, and thus make war obsolete.

A second deficiency lies in the old-fashioned, out-of-date political negotiations between official representatives of the nations—whether it be the secret diplomacy of the past or the "new diplomacy" pretending with an hyprocrisy now almost blatant to be a democratic meeting of political representatives, when everyone knows that these political representatives are habituated to thinking in terms of an age that is gone, and are rarely even conscious of the new

world into which we have come. Why should such negotiations, dealing with so humanly vital a problem as War, be left to politicians, dominated by their respective nationalisms and controlled by the imperialistic motives of their own countries? Why should not the intelligent nations call upon the social engineers, the scientific experts, the trained economists, yes, and the intelligent international banker and big business man, for all the light they may be able to throw on such problems—men who realize at least the new conditions that confront the world?

Thirdly, the attempt to settle differences in advance of any known facts or conditions, instead of seeking a settlement by sensible and scientific negotiation, followed if unsuccessful, by references to the World Court or arbitration decision.

Fourthly, the failure to audit or appraise the current sources of international sore spots so that international technique may become one of preventive medicine, rather than attempted, and often, disastrous emergency surgery.

Fifthly, the almost utter failure to recognize that political values and political boundaries and political nationalisms will be, and largely have been, superseded by the inevitable economic development growing out of our new civilization; that old customs of thought no longer apply to this world of realities; and that the idea of cutthroat competition must give way in international affairs, exactly as it has given way in the internal life of nations, to a cooperative willingness to produce a greater good for all by yielding something to all.

In spite of the "war waged to end war," the manifold activities of peace organizations of every description, and

the unquestioned widespread diffusion of the sentiment for world peace, the first real hopes for the establishment of peace since 1918 were not kindled until August 27, 1928—ten years after the War. On that day a historic event took place in the hall of the Foreign Office in Paris. The governments of fifteen nations signed on that day a treaty by which they renounced the right to use war as an instrument of their national policies, and invited all the other nations of the world to give their adherence to the same great act of renunciation.

Up until this time, during the decade following the Great War, preparations for coming wars went merrily on in the governments of all civilized nations, armaments increased in the leading nations, army, navy and air-force leaders vied with one another in predicting the inevitability of the next war, and the large number of those who profit from war together with the one-hundred percenters in every country laughed to scorn all efforts directed toward peace. "Pacifist" was applied by the great majority as a term of opprobrium to all workers for peace. Ten years after the great conflagration, in spite of a succession of international conferences called professedly to prevent war, in spite of the League of Nations in its honest efforts to secure peace, in spite of Arbitration Treaties, Pacts of Non-Aggression, Great Ententes, Little Ententes, the Treaty of Locarno and all the rest, the force of war was still the recognized and acknowledged means of attempting to solve the insoluble, and the threat of war still hung more menacing than ever over the life of nations.

If this be questioned, then why did England insist on the so-called one-power standard for her navy? Why did

the United States in her turn insist on a navy equal to that of any other nation? Why did France in spite of her straitened finances continue to maintain the largest air force in the world and the most powerful army? Why did she reinsure her position by a system of alliances and subsidize the armies of her protégés? Why did England again in her turn demand an air force of such strength as to make any other nation hesitate before attacking her? Why did Japan, in spite of her financial troubles, maintain so powerful an army, navy and air force? Why did the Germans chafe and agitate because while all the nations that had signed the Treaty of Versailles, agreeing to take steps towards disarmament, were steadily increasing armaments, Germany alone was by the Treaty strictly limited in her army and navy, and forbidden airplanes and submarines? Why did Italy and Serbia count so carefully the rifles, bayonets and machine-guns in their opposing armies, and why did France and Italy, unable to afford battleships, cling so desperately to the submarine for so-called defence purposes? And why have all the attempts at the limitation of armaments to which the nations were pledged, including the farcical "Coolidge" Naval Conference of 1927, failed so signally, with the single partial exception of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921? Why, in the laboratories of all the Great Powers, has science been pressed into the feverish service of discovering still more deadly weapons of destructive warfare? Why, in spite of the growing sentiment for peace in the United States, has one of the leading American magazines issued a special number devoted to "The Next War," consisting of articles written by well-known army and navy men,

and dealing with the place, methods, line-up of the nations, and probable results, of the next war, which is regarded by all the writers as inevitable in the not distant future?

The answer to these questions is not simple but complex. In large part, the mad race in armaments has thus gone steadily on with no attempts at limitation, much less reduction, because of the natural psychological aftermath of the Great War. The wide prevalence of the war-mind in governments and peoples, the realization of the many sore spots left by the Treaty of Versailles, the fear and suspicion, more lasting than the hatred and bitterness, always left in the wake of war, and the opportunity that this affords the big army and navy men to push their case, the vested interests of those who profit directly from war seeking to combat the movements for peace; in the governments, the preponderance of aggressive nationalism and selfish imperialism over the new spirit of internationalism, and in large masses of the people the lingering honest but mistaken notion that war must always be, because "you can never change human nature"—all these, and others that might be mentioned, have been among the chief contributory causes to the widespread preparations for war.

Back of these influences, however, lay the real cause—the strong feeling, amounting among the most intelligent to a clear conviction, that in spite of all that had been done for the cause of world peace, the problem of war had not yet been solved, that the machinery created to prevent war was all too inadequate, and that as long as the United States held aloof from the League of Nations, World Court, etc., even this machinery lacked a sound foundation; and above all, that as long as war was recognized as

a legal institution and nations were granted the right to wage war as they pleased without the loss of prestige, or the respect of other nations, the issue of peace or war still hung trembling in the balance, and in the crisis of strain or emergency between nations it was war, not peace, that would win the day.

It is not necessary in this connection to repeat the story of the negotiations that led at length to the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and its final promulgation by President Hoover in Washington in July of 1929. That the Peace Pact has awakened new hopes is evident, and that it may lead to the first definite steps in the direction of disarmament now seems probable, in the light of the attitude of both President Hoover and Mr. MacDonald, and the action they have both taken in suspending navy construction programs already in operation in England and the United States. But what real basis is there for these new hopes? Can the Peace Pact, taken by itself alone, lead to the establishment of world peace? If not, what further is needed to supplement it and make it truly effective?

The signing of the Pact of Paris has awakened widely divergent reactions in the minds of thoughtful students of international affairs, both in this and other countries. By some it has been denounced as the most dangerous endorsement of war the world has ever seen. Professor Borchard of Yale took this position in his analysis of the Pact at the Williamstown Institute of Politics. To some it has appeared as a meaningless piece of hypocritical demagoguery. Some have gratefully accepted it, but have doubted both its practical effectiveness and its exact meaning. Many have seen in it the definite turning of the

world from darkness to light. Who of these are right? Only the future will reveal. The simple fact is that the Pact *may* prove to mean much or little; it may indeed prove to be a turning-point in human history, or it may prove to be merely another pious gesture toward peace. Whatever of blessing it may yield in the future depends upon the governments who have signed the Pact, and the people behind those governments. This much is clear.

Professor James T. Shotwell of Columbia University, is the private American who has been most closely associated with the whole plan to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. He has recently published his own account of the steps leading to the adoption of the Pact of Paris, and his interpretation of its meaning and limitations. Here we have an authoritative statement of what the Pact was intended to accomplish, in the minds of its American formulators at least. And what strikes the reader most of all is the critical sense of international realities displayed on every page.

Professor Shotwell gives it as his sober judgment that it was the rising tide of public opinion that was directly responsible for the negotiations that led to the Pact. But what created this public opinion? In a word, the growing realization that modern war is a colossal loss as revealed by the results of the Great War. Let us enumerate briefly some of the losses:

(1) War is a social loss. The death of combatants and non-combatants checks the natural increase in population, and in the case of combatants, it means the loss of those best equipped, both physically and mentally. By the tests of conscription the most unfit are left at home to perpetuate

the race. The maimed and disabled return to become a heavy social charge against the state. Able-bodied men come back from war and find it difficult to take their places again in society. The non-combatants also are swept into the maelstrom of social bankruptcy, and many lose their lives through the extension of warfare to the civilian population. The most innocent are thus forced to suffer. Pillage and the use of chemicals bring women and children, once immune from the ravages of this dread social disease, within its grasp. Social problems are increased, social reforms are checked and social suffering results, which cannot be eradicated by any temporary prosperity. The Great War, according to the official figures, cost the Western Allies 7,146,040 dead, 3,437,740 seriously wounded, 8,945,041 wounded, 4,653,519 missing. It cost Germany and her Allies 3,651,090 dead, and 8,544,-428 wounded.

(2) War is also an economic loss. There can be no doubt that certain interests prosper—the war-profiteers are flourishing in all countries today—but most of society loses. War can only mean dislocation of the economic and business relationships which have been built up during peace times through steady, normal growth. The productive powers of a nation are released from their usual functions and turned to military purposes; in it all there is waste and destruction. War brings high taxes and high prices. The currency is inflated. Wages may increase, but they buy less food and goods. War debts are incurred which future generations must pay. The state becomes a great industrial machine for the production of things which destroy rather than create. The reserves of capital are used

up. The history of peace has ever been that of restoring the economic losses of war. We are witnessing it today—inflated currencies, unbalanced budgets, deranged business relations, debts, indemnities, etc., all most difficult to adjust. The total direct expenditure of all the combatants in the Great War has been estimated as over $280,000,000,000, and the property losses of the Allies alone has been caculated at $25,142,000,000.

(3) War is a political loss. The normal business of the state is to promote the good and the welfare of its citizens. In war it must forget this and promote its own interests and strength, fancied or real, at the expense of theirs. War involves the restriction of political and civil liberty, the suspension of basic rights, and the adoption of a policy of intolerance. Differences of opinion as to the acts of government in prosecuting the war may be interpreted as interfering with the war, and therefore as treasonable acts. The administration of justice, the preservation of liberty, the guaranty of equality, the protection of life and property, and other conventional but fundamental duties of the state, go by the board. The derangement of the state in its international relations must follow. A war, inevitably based on force, will lead to a peace based on force and conquest, as witness the Versailles Treaty.

(4) War is an intellectual loss. It means a colossal waste of thought. Universities and colleges are turned from their usual business of education and research to train men for the conflict. The social thinking of the people not only is deranged but may indeed be destroyed. Thought is repressed. The teacher under ordinary conditions giving himself to an understanding of neighboring peoples, must

see his country's enemies in the worst possible light. Propaganda is let loose in the name of truth. Prejudice, suspicion and distrust never furnish a proper foundation for the discovery of truth. Scientists—though not all—ordinarily engaged in discoveries for the benefit of mankind, direct their energies toward the discovery of great engines of destruction. International intellectual coöperation, the most objective and least political thing in the world, is checkmated, only to become the slave of some nationalist cause or point of view. After a war is over, it takes a generation for sanity and truth to displace illusions and falsehoods in the thinking of a nation.

(5) War is, finally, a great moral and spiritual loss. Settlements which have been made by the sword have, if history teaches any one lesson, been ended by the sword. Supervised and organized hatred and falsehood displace cordial coöperation and good-will. From this hatred, there follows a warping and coloring of moral judgments of one's neighbors. All ethical considerations are swept aside for expediency. Secret plans and the use of force place a premium on fraud and deceit. The great spiritual elements which are the pride of our civilization have not come from war, but from peace; not from subjugation but from persuasion. Even just cause for war does not remove the spiritual loss which is entailed. Some one must be good enough to forgive another's evil, love enough to overcome another's hate, if the vicious cycle of conflict is ever to be brought to an end. Each belligerent invokes the help of God and claims His divine appointment and leading. Religion, with its lofty teachings of divine Fatherhood and

human brotherhood, appears to thoughtful minds mere hypocrisy.[1]

No men who reflect or read, as they look back over the last ten years, can fail to realize how serious are these losses, defying language to express. There are no gains perceptible from the grim tragedy of 1914-1918, unless, possibly, the nations may learn the supreme lesson of those years and discover the better way that leads to coöperation and peace. That war has ceased to be an effective means of achieving any policy was the supreme lesson of the World War. Thoughtful men everywhere have come to realize that "war has become a futile instrument incapable of direction and, therefore, criminal in use. In modern warfare, there is no keeping events within bounds. War is today as uncertain in its direction as in its intensity, or its spread. It is no longer a safe instrument for statesmanship under any circumstances; it is too dangerous to employ. Victor and victim may suffer a common disaster. Its effects reach even into the unformed future, and rob the savings of generations yet unborn. In short, war which was once a directable instrument of policy has now changed its nature with the nature of modern society, and ceases to be controllable and directable in the hands of statesmen. By reason of its all-embracing needs, it becomes a contagion among the nations; and one cannot safely use a contagion as an instrument."

Professor Shotwell emphasizes the immemorial hold of the method of warfare in the dealings of sovereign states, and the theory implicit in all international law that both in declaring war and in conducting it the state is the sole

[1] Charles E. Martin: "The Politics of Peace," p. 340.

judge of its own actions. He makes it plain how deeply European nations have felt the necessity of employing this implement, and how hard it has been for Americans in their isolation to comprehend the European needs. At the same time he points out how modern scientific and technological advances have made it necessary to discover another method of international policy. Just as slavery was abolished when humanitarian sentiment was reinforced by the needs of industrial society, so war will be renounced when the peace sentiment is reinforced by the realization that war is no longer an effective instrument in a scientific and industrial world-community.

"The movement for international peace owes its validity, which is real, to the fact that a new civilization has arisen which rests upon the interdependence of nations, and that the prosperity of the present depends upon the buying power of the future. The world of credit is essentially a world of peace. The activities of business now decide most of the major relationships within and between societies which formerly were left in the last resort to the instrument of war. If we are to have world peace, it is because the world has turned that corner in history when civilized societies need peace for their continued existence and find the instrument of war no longer pertinent. . . . A new attitude is forcing its way in international politics, as it is also revealing itself in the world of business and internal economics—one which seeks to substitute for ruthless competition some measure of coöperation, so that each member of the community of nations may have a larger share in an increasing common good. This change in attitude is itself a fact of history. This means that a

world-community is emerging, based upon the solid ground of joint and common interests. But it is only just emerging, and is still in the early stages of development." [1]

The significance of the Pact must not be exaggerated, for as Professor Shotwell says, "Even if it be all that can be claimed for it, it still remains far short of a complete embodiment of reform. The instruments of international justice are not yet perfected, and the Pact of Paris since it provides for no machinery for settling disputes by pacific means, leaves this problem unsolved. But although the Pact is in itself only the embodiment of a single phase of the movement to eliminate international war, it has so challenged the imagination of the world as to become—for the day at least—a sort of symbol of the larger and more perfected movement." If Professor Shotwell is correct in his diagnosis of the situation, then "there is all but universal agreement on the need for war-renunciation by the civilized Powers. The question is not therefore any longer a moral issue, since there is practical agreement as to what should be done; it is almost wholly a matter of ways and means. The Pact must be judged, not merely as an expression of international morals, as some of its friends have tried to interpret it, but as the effective embodiment of political realities; unless it has some practical value, it has little value at all." [2]

It is his opinion that the reservations with which some of the nations accompanied their adherence to the Pact, notably France and England, and upon which Professor Borchard based his rather pessimistic view, were not real

[1] James T. Shotwell: "The Renunciation of War," p. 63.

[2] James T. Shotwell: op. cit., p. 124.

reservations striking at the Pact, but merely explanations and interpretations. He insists that the only real reservation lies in the Pact's recognition of the right of self-defense, and in its statement that each nation "is alone competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense." It is in this connection that one sees how much less of a guarantee of peace lies in the Pact than in the Covenant of the League, which provides a machinery of investigation for the hour of crisis, and by recalling the obligation to employ it, instead of arms, for the settlement of disputes forces an application of the test of aggression then and there. "As a practical measure, therefore, the Pact is by no means so well implemented for effective action as is the Covenant of the League."

It may be thought that Professor Shotwell is inclined to take a more sanguine view than the situation warrants. Nevertheless, it is our contention, to state it once again, that whether the Pact is to mean much or little, in the securing of world peace depends not upon its particular phraseology, or on its failure to provide the machinery necessary, or even upon the reservations that accompany it, but upon whether there is in the governments and the people behind them, the honest will to peace. The machinery needed can be created if more is required than that already furnished by the Covenant of the League, the reservations made today can be swept aside tomorrow if public opinion so decrees; whatever is now lacking in the Pact as it stands can be supplied. What we have in the Pact today, as it has now been proclaimed effective, is a first real step toward world peace, but only the first step. The next steps that must be taken without delay involve

the great task of the organization of the world for peace, even as it has always been organized for war. If the Paris Pact can now be followed by the successive steps looking toward the coöperative building of a world in which peace is as much at home as is now war, then the Pact will indeed prove a turning point in human history. The great need now is for a practical program of peace in which all nations can join in genuine coöperation.

President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University, one of the foremost leaders in the movement for world peace in America, has suggested such a program of peace which is worth quoting: "The Pact of Paris opens the gate to international peace. To enter at that gate and to travel the path to peace there are several things which the responsible leaders of civilization should quickly do. These constitute a veritable Program of Peace. They are:

"(1) To substitute for Departments or Ministries of War, Navy and Aviation, a single Department or Ministry of National Defense, with sub-divisions for the Army, the Navy and the Air Forces. The Irish Free State has already led the way in substituting a Minister of Defense for the conventional Minister of War; and in France, M. Painlevé, Minister of War, has suggested that the same step be taken. The economic gain in taking such action would be considerable, the administrative gain would be still greater, and the psychological gain would be the greatest of all. There is no longer room for the word War in the permanent organization of any government signatory to the Pact of Paris or giving its adherence thereto.

"(2) To abolish compulsory military service and to reduce the armies of the world to police forces and skeletons

of an emergency organizations as is now the case in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. The last word on army organization and use in a peace-loving democracy was spoken by Elihu Root in his five classic reports as Secretary of War, followed in like spirit by the late Viscount Haldane when Secretary of State for War in Great Britain. These statesmen have pointed the way.

"(3) To get rid of battleships, destroyers, submarines, and like instruments for the destruction of life and property, and to maintain navies of peace. These will doubtless consist of cruisers of an agreed number, tonnage and equipment for purposes of police and relief work, and for sea patrol. Competitive navy building is a provocative scandal.

"(4) To develop speedily a controlling body of international law and a code of international conduct. The more closely these follow the evolution of the common law of England, doubtless the sounder and safer they will be; but much material is now ready to be cast in code or statutory form.

"(5) To strengthen the authority of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, as well as that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration there, and to build up other institutions for conciliation and arbitration as needed, for use when the ordinary processes of diplomacy halt or fail.

"(6) To increase the prestige and uphold the authority of the League of Nations.

"(7) To move toward the quick carrying out of the plan projected by Secretary Blaine nearly half a century ago, and to bring the governments of the American con-

tinent into stated and formal coöperation, without dictation or overlordship on the part of anyone of them.

"(8) To develop, in coöperation with the League of Nations or otherwise, a plan for safeguarding the peoples of the Orient (and all other backward peoples) and for protecting them from exploitation by any people, government, or private interest.

"(9) To maintain and multiply those contacts, intellectual, moral and spiritual, which so greatly promote international sympathy and understanding and which at the same time advance national pride and satisfaction. Science, literature, the fine arts, together with visits by representatives and guiding personalities, are the most potent instruments with which to develop and to safeguard the International Mind.

"All this the Pact of Paris suggests and makes possible. It is a Program of Peace for the constructive statesmanship of today and tomorrow."

While other steps may, and will be, added to the suggestions of President Butler, it is along the line of some such constructive program in the building of peace that the nations must coöperate if the Pact of Paris is to fulfill the high hopes of those responsible for it.

At the tenth meeting of the League Assembly in September, 1929, Mr. MacDonald announced that the British Labor government had set aside Sir Austin Chamberlain's special reservations, in which he enunciated what has been called the "British Monroe Doctrine." Preliminary action was also taken to link the two articles of the Kellogg Pact with the League's Covenant, and also to revise the Covenant so as to bring it into harmony with both the

letter and the spirit of the Pact. Renunciation, without being made in so many words, would thus be an inherent consequence of this linking of the two instruments, so far as the adherents of both of them are concerned. If such action should eventually be taken it would go a long ways toward validating the Peace Pact, as it would furnish, through the Covenant, the machinery for adjusting disputes, which the Pact now lacks.

It is the opinion of G. Lowes Dickinson that the way of salvation from war is through the development of the League of Nations into a true international organ to control in the interests of peace the policies of all states. To this end all states must enter the League. The legal openings at present left for war must be closed. There must be a complete apparatus for peaceable settlement of all disputes. There must be a genuine application by states with discontented minorities of the rules laid down by the League. There must be arrangements for an equitable distribution of important raw materials and the abandonment of protective policies. There must be all-around disarmament. Whatever difficulties may stand in the way of achieving these ends, there is great gain in realizing the direction that the development of the future must take if the present international anarchy is to give way to a world order.

The most discouraging fact we face at present is the inert state of public opinion in this and other countries on the whole subject of war and peace, even in the presence of the noisy jingoism of the blatant 100 percenters and the professional mouthpieces for war. It is a strange kind of muddled thinking, or something worse, that leads

the United States Senate to ratify the Paris Pact with but one dissenting vote, and then proceed on the following day to pass the new cruiser bill. One cannot escape the conviction that while there is in the United States considerable sentiment for world peace, it is as yet largely unorganized and by no means as effective as it might be in bringing pressure to bear upon the government. It is also quite clear that with few exceptions, our members of Congress and those who stand in high places have not as yet taken the Paris Pact very seriously, and seem to feel that the United States has nothing directly to do with world peace—which grows naturally out of our blinding policy of isolation.

The most encouraging fact, on the other hand, lies in the present attitude of President Hoover and Mr. MacDonald toward the Pact, to which Mr. MacDonald's visit to this country gave such clear and emphatic expression. If these two official representatives of England and America continue seriously to accept the Pact to renounce war as binding on the nations, and are ready to join hands in now taking the next steps not merely toward limitation, but reduction of armaments, as President Hoover explicitly stated, it is safe to assume that the other nations will at least not be uninfluenced by their example. It is not the words merely, but the definite actions of these great leaders that give ground for hope that progress is to be made toward the solution of the whole problem. In addition to the action of both leaders in suspending the navy construction programs, already referred to, President Hoover issued a statement on the eve of proclaiming the Paris Pact in force in which he declared that the expenses of the

United States Army constituted the "largest military budget of any nation in the world," and this at a time when there is less real danger of war for the United States than at any time in the past fifty years. He further stated that in the Pact and the probable limitation of naval armaments in the near future through international agreement, he saw a condition that permitted the reduction of the military establishment without injury to adequate preparedness. Accordingly he moved to check this country's steadily increasing military costs through a revision of the army budget after a study by a commission of the General Staff, in the hope of curtailing expenditures for the army.

This action on the part of the leaders of England and the United States, the two most influential nations in the world, is profoundly significant. If their present attitude is maintained, and if in both countries their leadership can be reinforced by a strong and intelligent public opinion sufficient to neutralize the opposition of big army and navy men, of war-profiteers, and of a certain section of the American Legion, then indeed it may be possible for the nations to enter upon the task of organizing this world for peace even as it is now organized for war, to begin to translate into reality a veritable program of peace.

The agreement reached, on the occasion of Ramsay MacDonald's visit to President Hoover in October, 1929, as to naval parity between England and the United States has paved the way for the Five Power Naval Conference to be held in January. This conference between these two leaders of England and the United States, carried on in the spirit of perfect friendliness and good-will, may prove to be the first definite steps that shall lead at length not

only to the limitation but the gradual reduction of naval, and eventually, of land and air armaments.

Meantime, whatever obstacles may be encountered, whatever delays or opposition, whatever discouragements or defeats, let us keep our hopes bright and our courage undismayed as we remember these heartening words of Charles Evans Hughes: "The building of the institutions of peace is the most distinctive enterprise of our time. We are still in the preliminary stages, engaged in the study of architectural drawings and blue prints, with much disagreement. We are contriving to live in a partial and frail structure with incomplete and inadequate facilities while we seek to perfect our plans. We are troubled about the foundations of our edifice, as borings show pockets of quicksand, in national policies, age-long antagonisms, and developing rivalries. Even the materials at our command are fragile and hard to solidify, to such a degree as to give assurance of being able to withstand the fierce storms of passion which are not unlikely to recur. The difficulties do not make the task any the less the supreme task of modern civilization, for, unless we measurably succeed in it, that civilization will destroy itself as it brings the discoveries of science and the improvements of invention to the operations of war in both weapons and methods. We shall have to build and rebuild, and then mayhap build again, but the constructive processes must go on."

VIII

IGNORANCE AND OLD HABITS OF THINKING

When H. G. Wells insisted that it was today "a race between education or catastrophe," he was not thinking of reading, writing and arithmetic. And when James Harvey Robinson says that the great need today is for "more mind," he is not thinking of the ordinary curricula of school or college. It is *a certain kind of education* that these and others have in view when they stress the importance and necessity of education for this age. Perhaps what these leaders mean is best expressed by John Dewey in his recent book, "The Public and Its Problems," when he says, "the greatest need of the world today is not for new organizations or new institutions, but rather, for an awareness of the new relations into which we have come on this planet."

It is here that we face the primary and most fundamental problem of all, confronting the new ideal of a world-community which is now emerging: How can we create the intelligent public opinion that will both demand in the high places of power and authority the men of international mind and world-vision, and at the same time sustain and reinforce them in their leadership, unless there be on the part of people generally a genuine "awareness of these new relations into which we have come?" The particular problems presented by nationalism, imperialism and war, seem

impossible of solution only because they are approached from the viewpoint of the nineteenth century mind. They are interpreted in terms of the Victorian age, and the solutions attempted belong to a period that is hopelessly gone. Until quite recently there has been little "awareness" that a new age had dawned. It is not only that the new relations have created new situations and new world demands—this much has been apparent to many for some time. The thing that so many fail to see is that these new situations and new world demands require basically new conceptions of the state, and of the relations of nations to one another, the recognition of new functions and untried opportunities, the release of new energies that refuse to be confined to old channels, the discovery of new formulas, the championing of new ideals, the creating of new patterns for the world's life.

From the time of the formulation of the Versailles Treaty down to today, whenever the representatives of the nations have come together for international conference on the new situations and problems which the War had forced into the very foreground of consideration, they have been ruled by old ideas, antiquated formulas and obsolete methods. Their failures to solve the new problems by these means are apparent to all the world. At the close of the War, as never before in human history, there was presented the opportunity for laying new foundations, adopting new principles, descrying new horizons, and thus opening a new chapter in the life of the world. But the time was not ripe, the psychological legacy of the War was too dominant, and those who gathered at the Versailles Conference were too completely unaware of the new relations into which the world

had come, to win the glory of ushering in the new day for humanity.

It is futile, however, to waste time in vain regrets for these failures. Because they failed to realize the dream of a different kind of a world, that for those few weeks preceding the Versailles Conference had burned in countless hearts and minds in all lands, is no reason why those who come after should likewise fail. The great lesson of their failure stands clearly revealed today. They failed because, as the political leaders of the nations there assembled, they were living in the old world that the War had swept away in fire and blood—habituated to the old ways of thinking and dominated by the old ways of doing things; they had scarcely glimpsed the new world that had been born, much less did they understand or appreciate its profound significance for the future relations of nations and men. They failed, also, because we, the people back at home in the respective countries which they represented, were totally unaware at that time of the meaning of the great changes that had come into the world's life and what they portended; we did not perceive that the hour had struck that was to usher in at length a world-community.

The number of those now interested in true internationalism and aware of the new economic relations of the twentieth century is still so small in comparison with the masses of people responsible for political decisions, that when the present "pacifism of exhaustion" has spent its force, a real test of public policy is bound to come. There is undoubtedly a very real will for peace throughout the world today, and many statesmen since 1919 have done much to give popular sanction to this popular will. During the im-

mediate future, pacifism of exhaustion if not of conviction will probably continue to prevail. The real test of the present peace sentiment—the final struggle between nationalism and internationalism—will come in the next generation. It will be the sons, possibly the grandsons of the World War veterans who will have to make the crucial decision.

We must begin now to prepare the way, however, for the crucial test whenever that may come. The basic difficulty facing those who believe that humanity not only needs but can evolve a genuine world order through the spirit of co-operation, is that only a comparatively small number of people in any country are really interested in international affairs and well informed about them. The masses are not only oblivious of international problems; as the result of the Soviet experiment and propaganda, they are intensely suspicious of any "internationalism," even though it be advocated as political, economic, and moral coöperation. The situation we face today is that the inertia represented by the nationalistic education spread during the nineteenth century among the masses throughout the West, may lead toward an even worse World War that no agency can check. The one hope of the world lies in education in internationalism, and in all that this implies.

At the time that the League of Nations came into existence, Jacob Schiff, the New York banker, was reported to have said, "the League of Nations is good, but it will never solve the problems; it does not go far enough; the real problem is not political but economic." A little later, Alfred Zimmern, a member of the Secretariat of the League, said in a public address, "the problems are political, in a deeper sense they are economic, but these do not go far enough;

the real difficulty lies in *the thinking* on both sides of the Atlantic."

This but echoes the convictions of the leaders already quoted above—that we cannot expect to make much progress in the building of the world-community until there takes place such a re-education of the thinking of people in all countries as shall make it possible for them to visualize the new world that has been born, and enter into a true appreciation of its new demands. As Paul Richard has said, "How can you change men if things remain the same? How can you change things if men remain the same? It is the very nature of both men and things that must be transformed; it is the consciousness of a new world that must be born in all."

The fact is that while our bodies are living in the transformed world of science and industrialism, our minds, and still more significantly our emotional reactions, are still much the same as those of our fathers and even our grandfathers. Physically, we have grown familiar with the countless new inventions of science and we are all employing them every day; but mentally and emotionally, we have not become orientated to the new environment. We are for the most part like aliens living in a strange world that we do not understand; we are like children playing with mighty forces and powers of whose far-reaching influences for good or for evil we have scarcely dreamed. Though the changed conditions of the world call most insistently for the full maturity of man's powers, for constructive thinking, creative imagination and the moral and social consciousness, the vast majority of men and women are still in the adolescent

period of development and are content to muddle through the difficulties and problems as they arise.

To get back to normalcy, to maintain the *status quo,* to keep things as they are, and above all, to increase, or at least continue, the prosperity of the nation, seems to exhaust the possibilities of the minds and imaginations of the great majority, leaving no time to go forward to higher vantage ground through the gradual building and creation of a better world, or to make the honest and persistent attempt to change things-as-they-are for things-as-they-ought-to-be. This is due in large part to the inherent conservatism of human nature, but still more, to ignorance of the facts, the conditions, the imperative demands of the new world.

The complex civilization of the twentieth century offers a strange contrast to the inquiring mind. It equips us, for the satisfaction of our wants, with a large number of very intricate and complex instruments and appliances which are in general usage and upon which we all depend, but whose working and significance remain a mystery to all but a few specialists. Multitudes of people travel every day by electric cars or trains, but how many of them are aware of the law of induced current by which locomotion takes place? To telephone is an easy matter, but how much is generally known about the theory of telephony? Of the millions who enjoy a radio concert, how few have paused to inquire as to the nature of the Hertzian wave? We spend our lives doing simple things with very complicated contrivances which we do not understand.

When we come to consider the vastly more complicated life of society, this paradoxical ignorance is still more striking. Our daily existence is regulated by a whole series of

political, economic, legal, fiscal and other institutions which are continually being investigated, altered, perfected, and run by thousands of experts. Their amazing complexity becomes at once apparent to the lay mind on the first perusal of a law code, a list of rates of exchange, or merely, an income tax sheet. But only the merest fraction of the public shows any desire to penetrate these mysteries. In the case of world politics, with all their complicated international rivalries and economic competitions both on the surface and far beneath, there is an even deeper ignorance and indifference. In spite of the interdependence of all peoples today and the fact that the prosperity of every nation is vitally bound up with the prosperity of all nations, the majority in all lands are so dominated by their own narrow nationalisms, so absorbed in their own interests, so bent upon keeping intact the old barriers and raising new ones, both political and economic, between their country and other countries, as to demonstrate how feebly as yet they have begun to realize that "new occasions teach new duties."

If the re-education of the people in regard to these new world relations is in any measure to be achieved, the first great need is to "humanize the new knowledge," as James Harvey Robinson has aptly phrased it. This is not to be confounded with much so-called "popularization" of knowledge, which is more or less superficial, inaccurate and misleading. But during the last decade real and truly qualified scholars have been publishing books, not technical in form or academic in style, setting forth the new knowledge in philosophy and science, in history and economics, on all questions relating to international politics and world affairs. These books are being read more and more widely by intel-

ligent people, and this is hopeful. But it is amazing how small a fraction of the 120,000,000 population of the United States show any interest whatever in the new knowledge thus made available for the average man.

One of the leading New York publishers when asked recently how many copies of such a book dealing with world politics, which he was just bringing out, he expected to sell, replied, "perhaps 3000, possibly 5000." And who will buy them? he was asked. His reply was, "Chiefly the scholars, who already know the new facts, while the rest of the American public will go on reading the daily papers and the popular magazines." Here is the serious situation: the knowledge has been made available in humanized form; the books have been written and can be had in every bookstore and public library. Librarians and other outstanding leaders are doing their utmost to stimulate interest in the reading of such books. But if the people generally do not, or will not, make the mental effort necessary to avail themselves of this new knowledge, how can they ever become "aware of the new relations into which we have come," and how can an intelligent public opinion looking toward a world-community ever be created?

During the last decade, from many a forum platform and liberal pulpit throughout the country, this same new knowledge has been presented in a more or less effective way to tens of thousands of people; that this has had a tremendous educational value is undeniable. But here again, it is only a fraction of the people that are reached by these means, and far too often they are the people already convinced; while the masses who need most of all this re-education are conspicuous by their absence. A large number of women's

clubs are trying earnestly through current event classes and committees on international affairs to awaken interest in their particular communities in world affairs and problems; but there is the strong feeling on the part of many of their leaders that the women's clubs with their great numerical strength and influence are not beginning to do all they might along these lines.

The movement today for adult education, taking many different forms, has also for its fundamental motive the re-education of men and women in the new knowledge of our changed world. The summer schools in connection with many of our leading universities that attract their tens of thousands of adults, as well as undergraduates, are offering each year many courses bearing directly on world affairs. Special summer institutes like the Williamstown Institute of Politics, the Institute of World Unity at Hyannis on Cape Cod, and others, are offering courses of lectures by accredited scholars and experts in Europe and America, on various phases of world politics, and also furnishing the opportunity for round-table discussions. All these and other agencies are exerting a wide influence in the creation of the international mind and awakening a world-consciousness. But again, such schools and institutions are reaching specialized groups whose members are already interested in world subjects. Holding places of leadership in their respective communities, as most of these do, they are unquestionably fitted by these special studies to exert a wider influence on public opinion on their return home.

But the problem still remains—how to reach the millions of others who do not read the new books or attend summer

schools, how to awaken in them the international mind that lies at the foundation of the public opinion that must be created if the leadership of men like President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald is to be effective. We are not thinking now of the illiterates or morons, but of the leaders in business, in law, in the ministry and other professions, in all the women's groups, and especially, those who run for office in city, state or nation. It is from the rank and file of these, and not from the specialized groups alone, that an effective public opinion must come.

It might be supposed that the public press would exert a genuine educational influence along these lines upon the great numbers whose reading is confined to the daily papers. But with notable exceptions scattered throughout the country, the daily newspapers are strongly nationalistic, or so dependent upon the vested interests that they dare not step out of the rut of conventional opinion. The best that can be said for many of them is that they follow, rather than lead and create, public opinion in international matters. We are fortunate in having such liberal magazines as "Foreign Affairs," "The Nation," "The New Republic," "The World Tomorrow," "World Unity," and a few others devoted to the development of the international mind, but the combined circulation of them all is so small as to indicate again the widespread indifference to such matters.

But even more important than getting the new knowledge to the rank and file of the people by these, and other agencies that might be mentioned, is the necessity of appealing not only to the intellect with these facts, but to the emotions as well. The facts must be presented to the people in such a way that they will understand them and

emotionally accept them, for only then are they ready to act upon them. In this sense emotionalized science has had many victories in the field of medicine and surgery. In astronomy, biology, chemistry, physics and psychology, each succeeding year is bringing a richer supply of knowledge. Whether these riches will bear the fruitage of happiness and well-being for mankind depends not upon the new knowledge itself, but upon the degree in which it can be really grasped and emotionally appropriated and, through the forces of socialization, be brought to bear directly and vitally on the life of humanity.

In the same way, it is not enough just to know the new facts of the world's economic interdependence, and all the other changes wrought by the new civilization. We must accept them not with our heads alone but with our feelings. We must let imagination play about the facts until we come to understand and *feel* their meaning, so that they become real enough to us to drive out our old pet theories and long cherished beliefs and make themselves the basis of new attitudes and motives, the driving power of new activities. This is the supreme problem of all education. No knowledge of any kind is ever really ours until it is thus emotionalized, until it becomes a very part of our deepest self and furnishes a new center from whence all our thoughts and feelings and actions proceed. This is the great need today—that all the knowledge of the new facts and relations into which we have come be made to appeal to the deeper understanding and emotions of men, and thus be translated by them into intelligent action.

If the problem of this re-education of adult minds seems discouraging, we turn in greater hope to the younger gen-

eration—the boys and girls now in our schools and colleges. In every university, and in all colleges of any standing throughout this country, this new knowledge is being taught, and from the modern viewpoint. In addition, the college student is not so habituated to the old ways of thinking and feeling as are his parents, and he is therefore much more receptive to the newer conceptions of world relations. He has been born into the new world, has grown up in it and feels at home in it, and so knows nothing about the many conflicts his father and mother passed through in their transition from the old to the new—a transition that is rarely completed by those of the older generation. There is no question but that the boys and girls educated today in high school, college or university do become familiar with the new facts, do accept the scientific viewpoint, and do come to think of their world in very different terms than those of the previous generation. The old world scarcely exists for them; it certainly has for them little or no reality.

The weakness in our higher education today in respect to this education for the new world, lies in the frequent failure to emotionalize the new facts for the student so that they grip the whole man and energize his entire being. In many instances he goes out into life equipped with the intellectual knowledge of the new facts and relations but without the understanding of their deeper meaning for civilization. At a recent conference of teachers in one of our largest Eastern universities the subject under discussion was this very one of education for world unity. Finally one of those present said, "I begin to see where we fail as teachers; we are all teaching the facts of the changed world, whether in history, science, philosophy, economics, sociology, political science,

etc., but we are teaching them in fragments; we are all specialists. I teach the facts as a historian, you as an economist, someone else as a sociologist, but we all fail to give our students a synthetic view of the Whole, we do not make clear the significance of these facts on the life of the world and whither they are leading. For this reason our students leave us with heads crammed full of the new facts but with no clear vision of a world-community as the supreme task of the twentieth century, and without a clear understanding as to *why* it is the supreme task. In just the degree that this is true, are we failing to create the international mind in our students." This is the serious weakness of specialization, and in this statement our professor laid his finger on the reason why so large a proportion of our college graduates fail to play the influential part they might in building the world-community.

Despite all failures of every kind, however, the college and university in this country today are doing heroic work in breaking down old barriers of ignorance and prejudice, in dispelling obsolete notions and conceptions, and in acquainting those of the younger generation with a realistic view of the world as it is, and increasingly, with a vision of the world as it might be. The older generation is pretty far gone; it was responsible for the hideous breakdown of civilization in 1914-1918, and for the most part it shows little sign as yet of having learned the lessons then written in fire and blood. But the hope for the future lies in the younger generation of today, and in those who come after, for their faces are set toward the future, not toward the past, and they must build the world-community, while we at best can only point the way.

Another hopeful sign is found in the World Federation of Educational Associations, organized after the War, whose founder and President is Augustus O. Thomas, Commissioner of Education for the State of Maine. Already more than half of all the teachers in the world are enrolled as members, local associations have been organized in all the leading countries, and this summer of 1929, more than 2000 delegates from all parts of the globe attended the Federation meeting in Geneva. In all the civilized countries there are special committees under the auspices of the World Federation, that are working on the revision of history textbooks, seeking to minimize the space given to the heroes of war while magnifying that given to the heroes of peace and of all constructive work for humanity, and also seeking to eliminate from these histories of the nations all portions—words, sentences or paragraphs—that speak in any disparaging way of other nations or races. It means nothing less than the educational forces of the world aggressively organized to secure world peace through world unity, and the influence of such a World Federation of the educational forces can not fail to be increasingly felt as time goes on.

Perhaps the fundamental need in the re-education demanded by the new age is the recognition of the immense possibilities that exist for "changing human nature." Whenever it is suggested that ideas, motives and methods now controlling the relations of nations and men must be replaced by higher and nobler ones, one is always met by the defiant or despairing statement, "but you can never change human nature"—the assumption being that war and brutality, exploitation and oppression, and all the many other wrongs and injustices that exist today must forever continue

as they are. This is only another way of saying that the problems that society confronts today are wholly and utterly insoluble, and we might as well throw up our hands in despair. This honest belief on the part of so many otherwise intelligent people stands like a stone wall in the pathway of any progress. That it is, however, a mistaken belief is clearly shown by the accredited psychologists who are throwing a tremendous flood-light upon the possibilities of human nature, and thus furnishing scientific grounds for confidence and hope for the future.

In his book, "Human Nature and Conduct," John Dewey, whose authority in this field is unquestioned, tells us that there is nothing easier to change than human nature; the difficult thing to change is the human institutions that constitute our social habits, many of which have been formed, like war, in the far-distant past. The conception that human nature is a static unchanging thing is utterly disproved both by history and by the findings of our newer psychology. According to the modern view, human nature at birth is simply a bundle of raw materials, instincts, abilities, capacities of various kinds; and what this raw materal of human nature becomes, as the new-born child moves on from infancy through childhood and youth to maturity, depends on the environment and the inevitable reactions it calls forth from the individual. This environment includes, of course, the early atmosphere of the home, the ideas, ideals, convictions, beliefs, opinions, as well as the example, of the parents, the education received in schools, the influence of friends and associates, the atmosphere of the community, the ruling ideas of one's country, the spirit of the age.

In other words, the kind and character of the human

nature our children possess and later come to express, depends not so much upon them as upon us—the parents, the teachers, the social and economic institutions, the church, the community, the country, the age, in which the children are born and where they grow up. The older generation is ever seeking to impose its patterns of every kind upon the raw material of each newer generation; and that it so generally succeeds is evidenced by the slow rate at which social progress proceeds. No one questions the value of this conserving influence of the past; neither can one question the grave dangers that lie in our attempts, regardless of new situations that may arise, or new knowledge that may be acquired, to make the new generation just like ourselves in the whole range of our ideas, ideals, convictions, beliefs, etc.

Fortunately, the older generation never altogether succeeds in keeping things at the *status quo* or in moulding the new generation entirely by the old patterns. Again and again in human history, changes in the political, social or economic environment have called forth from new generations entirely new reactions, or ways of acting, than those formerly habitual. This explains why the world, why civilization, institutions, ideas, ideals, convictions and beliefs, are constantly changing, and why human society is a dynamic and not a static thing. It is the real cause of all growth and progress. The wide cleavage that exists today between the older and the newer generations—a cleavage far deeper than most people realize—is due to the fact that the young people of today are growing up in an environment that is radically different than the one in which their parents grew up, not merely in the material changes that have transformed life, but still more in the whole intellec-

tual, moral and spiritual atmosphere that surrounds them from birth, or at least, from the time they leave the narrow precincts of the home.

The reason we of the older generation so often fail to understand the young people of today is because from kindergarten through college days they are imbibing new ideas, they are breathing a new air, they are looking out upon a new world, they are increasingly catching the spirit of a new age. And the totality of this new environment in which they live is gradually calling forth from them new reactions, and creating in them, in greater or lesser degree, a new kind of human nature. This is one of the most thrillingly hopeful signs of the times. Instead of bemoaning the degenerate times and dwelling on the excesses to which some young people go—excesses for which we, in our ignorance and inadequate training are chiefly to blame—we ought to rejoice that they are responding differently to the new environment, and espousing new ideas and ideals that more adequately meet the new situations and conditions. We might also help to guide them in their new reactions, for they need intelligent guidance, if it were not for our deep-seated and dogmatic belief that they ought to think, believe and act just as their fathers and mothers do. Thus the widespread belief that you can never change human nature, amounts actually to this; we do not want human nature to change, for we see that in just the degree it does change, all our long-cherished beliefs, convictions, and institutions are also bound to alter.

Professor Harry A. Overstreet, in a recent article on "Building Up the International Mind," has illuminated the whole matter of the psychological technique that might, in

a single generation, change our human nature in its entire reaction to present world problems. According to psychology it is the associative linkage of ideas that is responsible for our attitudes toward war, nationalism, imperialism, and everything else. In our education of children we have thus associated the word "war" with something glorious—love for country, great military heroes, glittering parades, bands of stirring music, flags flying, and all the rest. Suppose now as parents and teachers we form a new association in the minds of children by linking up the word "war" with brutal murder, irreparable loss, a relic of barbarism, etc. We should thus build up a new system of associations with the word "war" that would go far toward creating the peace-mind, even as we now deliberately create the war-mind in each fresh generation.

In the same way, he suggests, we might bring about a new associative linkage with the concept "my country." Instead of stressing as we do that it is a place that belongs to *us,* that *we* own it, and all our happiness depends upon its not being taken away from *us,* and that therefore we must pledge our lives and all we possess to defend it against all possible marauders, suppose we linked up in the mind of the child the idea of "my country" with the vitalizing, civilizing idea of "contribution to mankind." Thus the idea constantly evoked from the child by "my country" would be not of his country as primarily a place to defend by force and violence, armies and navies, but rather of his country as a group that can contribute something really great to the ongoing of mankind. If in all our schools and colleges we should study the nations as contributors to each other and to the general advance of civilization, it would help tre-

mendously to purge our present nationalisms of their glaring evils. Then patriotism would be lifted above all narrow selfishness and petty pride to the plane where it would mean the proud joining-in with the contributory functioning of one's people. This illustrates the way in which we should and might teach internationalism—dramatically and thrillingly—as the next step in man's advance toward a fuller rationality. "In this manner we build up the new associative linkages which will make the mind of the future a very different mind from the pathetically misinformed and emotionally distorted mind of the past," and which will mean a human nature changed to meet more adequately and effectively the transformed conditions of the new civilization.

If the problem of the development of a "new education," that shall prepare the young people of today frankly to face and adequately to cope with the new situations more successfully than the past has done, seems stupendous and impossible of realization, it is nonetheless the fundamental problem, for it is indeed today a race between "education or catastrophe." We must find our courage and inspiration, however, in the many new forces at work in this direction, in the many new educational agencies that have been called into being, and especially, in the new light that science is steadily bringing to bear upon the guidance of human nature and the intelligent control of the complex social forces of the twentieth century. Unless all our education, beginning in the home and carried through the university, can tend directly toward creating the international mind and breaking down the barriers of ignorance and prejudice; unless it can foster increasingly the spirit of international

good-will and the sense of our mutual interdependence as nations and races, then our boasted educational systems will fail utterly in that which is the supreme task today, and education will be an anachronism in the twentieth century. This is inconceivable, however, and the awakening in educational circles to the need of this new education, as well as the splendid way in which our leading colleges and universities are already meeting the demands, gives great ground for hope.

Mr. H. G. Wells, in a recent article, states the present situation in these words: "My diagnosis of the essential nature of the stresses of the present time is that while everything else has been changing in scale, our emotion-charged traditional concepts of government and loyalty have not expanded to keep pace with that change of scale. There has been a lag in our political apprehensions and a still greater lag in our educational adaptations. We are facing the second quarter of the twentieth century with the already lagging political ideology of the third quarter of the nineteenth, and therein reside most of the distinctive stresses and dangers of our time.

"It is only slowly that it is dawning upon us today that a change of scale and economic range demands a corresponding change in political forms. That is not an adaptation that will arrive by itself. It is a problem for mankind that has to be consciously faced and solved. Under all sorts of falsifications, the sovereign states of the world have been thrusting out in a blind effort to achieve the new scale. One may hazard the general proposition that the outline of history of the last hundred years can be stated as the more or less lucid attempts of all the main sovereign states of the

world to secure a world-wide control of the raw materials necessary for the mechanical civilization upon which we have entered. All our modern imperialisms are this: the more or less conscious efforts of once national states to become world-wide. And since at one time there can be only one complete world-wide state upon our planet, enormous pressures and rivalries and conflicts exist and intensify. And it seems to me that only two alternatives about the human future can be considered. Either these jostling and mutually incompatible independent sovereign states, which the great change of scale in the economic processes of life is continually forcing toward world-dimensions, must fight among themselves until only one survives, or else mankind generally must be made to understand the nature of the present process, to substitute for the time-honored but now out-of-date traditions of the independent national sovereignty a new idea of world organization and to determine political efforts in that direction.

"The former alternative opens out before us the prospect of a long series of probably more and more destructive wars which may lead to the exhaustion and degeneration of our species; the latter demands mental and moral adjustments of the most complex, difficult and laborious sort. It means a tremendous break with tradition and a fundamental reconstruction of education throughout the world. But to me, plainly, it is the only sane course for human effort."

It has been said that the man who makes two blades of grass grow where there was but one before is a benefactor to mankind. Alfred Zimmern has suggested that this was a nineteenth century apothegm characteristic of an age which gloried in material production. "We of the twentieth

century have a more difficult problem before us, not the increase of the world's resources but the inter-communication of its wisdom, the interpretation of its rich diversities of national inheritance and achievement. So let us rather say, 'blessed is the man who has added one link to the chain of understanding wherewith we are girdling the world.'

"For the world of our vision is no single field of waving grain, every ear like its fellow and blown the same way by the same breeze, but an infinitely diversified landscape, seen as an airman would see it, from above—land and sea, city and country, cornland and pasture, orchard and forest —all placed at the service of man, of a humanity united in one great community of mutual understanding." [1]

[1] Alfred Zimmern: "America and Europe," p. 64.

Part III

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 20TH CENTURY

IX

TOWARD POLITICAL INTERNATIONALISM

As we turn the pages of history we find that men commonly pass imperceptibly from one period of historical development to another, with a lagging self-consciousness that awakens only after the frontiers have been long left behind. The revolutionary change through which England passed during the rapid rise of the industrial age, left scarcely a trace in contemporary literature. One might suppose that the novelists and poets of that time had never heard of a factory or a steam-engine. A philosopher like Godwin could discuss at length the structure of society, without a mention of the new ruling power of industrial capital. Even Cobbett, who was painfuly aware of what was happening around him, imagined that a well-directed agitation would avail to reverse the new tendencies and bring the agricultural England back again. When Robert Owen, some years after the return of peace, compiled for the benefit of the bewildered philanthropic world of London a statistical estimate of the growth of machine production in the unknown North, it came as a staggering revelation to the ablest and most influential men of the day. The social change was already a settled and accomplished fact, before the country was ready to make the modifications in its constitutional form which corresponded to the

shifting of economic power from the landed to the industrial masters of England.

It may be that the past generation was stumbling into the period of world-government with as little consciousness of its direction, but this can hardly be said of our own. We may still be unconscious of the means and methods required, but that there is a palpable drift among things toward political internationalism is unmistakably clear. Blind economic forces drive us into ever closer association. Governments feel constrained to concern themselves, now by blunt speech, and again by active intervention, with what happens on the territories of their neighbors. We attempt in a constant succession of consultative conferences to achieve by negotiation and consent what eventually will have to be imposed by legislation. We grope after methods of settling our disputes by arbitration, shutting our eyes all the while to the need for creating a central authority which can organize for the world a solution of the problems that give rise to these disputes. We know at every turn of our economic life, as the world's needs and the world's crops determine a world price for cotton or wheat, that frontier boundaries have almost ceased to concern us. And yet the hard fact stands out, that a multitude of sovereign states, some effectively self-moving and independent, others mere satellites which must revolve in the orbits of the Greater Powers, are still attempting to maintain their tradition of a defiant independence.[1]

As has been pointed out, the evidence of this drift toward internationalism is found in the world of culture where the new knowledge is fast breaking down old barriers, in

[1] H. K. Brailsford, "Olives of Endless Age," p. 279.

the development and improvement of communications which annihilate distance, and in the expansion of industrialism with the growing complexity of world-commerce it creates. "In the last resort one might say that the advance of machinery is itself a sufficient driving force towards internationalism. The almost unlimited potentialities of modern machinery, its costliness and the consequent pressure upon its owners to keep it working at its full capacity—these technical considerations drive industry to seek for ever-widening markets. Mass-production may in its earlier stages foster imperialism, as the readiest means of ensuring a market as safe as it is wide. But as the pressure continues even the greatest empire becomes too narrow. The United States finds Canada a more valuable outlet than its own colonial possessions; as little can Great Britain neglect Europe or South America. An advanced modern industry must take the world for its market. In this sense then, frontiers tend to lose their importance. At the same time, the investments of foreign capital are breaking down the barriers between national states and limiting their sovereignty. The process has already gone so far that one may say that the national sovereign state is undergoing a slow process of decay."[1]

There opens now before us the possibilities of the future, if the reader is willing to enter that unexplored territory. The atmosphere may seem hazy and distant objectives rather indistinct, for we are peering into a region of speculation and hypothesis where every statement must be made suggestively rather than dogmatically. The future we are to imagine, however, is not a future divorced

[1] Manley Hudson: "Internationalism," p. 64.

from the past or present, but one that grows directly out of present drifts and tendencies in the world's life. The Great Society, which is all humanity bound together by a thousand and one new ties and relationships, has indeed come into existence; it is the most veritable fact of the twentieth century. To transform the Great Society into a World-Community is the supreme task of our age. And yet in the most reassuring of senses, the World-Community already exists. It exists because humanity in its finer moments has become conscious of a sympathy and unity that is world-wide.

Most of us have long outlived the limitation of sympathy which confined fellow-feeling to family or clan, to race or nation, and even in the strange features of Negro or Mongolian we recognize a reflection of ourselves. "When our grandfathers fought the vested interests of high society to destroy the slave trade on the African coasts, when the English nation gave to Japan a library to replace the rare books which the recent earthquake destroyed, when Americans build hospitals and endow schools and colleges in China, when white women organize to end the degradation to which Indian girls must submit for the pleasure of white soldiers, when the peoples of all lands join hands in replacing the Louvain library in Belgium destroyed in the Great War, above all, when the nations unite in appointing doctors in Geneva to work out remedies for African sleeping-sickness and Indian malaria—the World-Community has shaped itself already in their consciousness even though they know it not as such."[1]

"When London pays wages to Shanghai, and New York

[1] H. K. Brailsford: "Olives of Endless Age," p. 306.

draws dividends from the Ruhr, even if the wages should mean starvation and the dividends usury, they testify to our inextricable connections with one another. When our moving films carry our laughter and our pathos, our vulgarities and our romance, to Eskimos and Zulus, we act on the discovery that with all our divergencies of taste and custom, manners and morals, to most of the stimulations of perception our emotions respond in the same way. It matters to Stockholm and to Melbourne to what heights the mountain of gold has risen in the vaults of the American Federal Reserve Bank, and men bidding in their Yorkshire accents at wool auctions in England bring fortune or penury to the pampas of the Argentine. When civilization has reached this stage of development, when its cultural life and its economic existence have both over-flowed national frontiers, the building of the visible and legal structure of the Great Society is no more than a problem of organization. The emotional change has been wrought in us. We have answered from within, as men must while they live, to the outward change in our economic environment. The pace and ease of our advance will now depend solely on the skill and the resolution which the more progressive among the nations display, in overcoming within ourselves and in the minds of our more backward fellows, the atavism which still clings to the jealousies and narrownesses of nationalism."[1]

In order to recognize the real significance of the present drift toward internationalism and its implications for the future, it is necessary to hold clearly in mind the beginnings of this movement in the early part of the nineteenth

[1] H. N. Brailsford: "Olives of Endless Age," p. 307.

century. The world had then practically no international organization. The Grotian system of international law was a great cementing force, though Grotius' distinction between good and bad wars was never really accepted. Even after the beginning of the industrial revolution, and long after the changes in transportation and communication were well under way, politicians continued to think of states as sovereignties wholly independent of each other, whose relations knew no restraints except those which had grown up out of the diplomatic traditions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The large international congresses of the earlier half of the century, assembled in each instance to deal with acute political exigencies, did attempt some international legislation—the Congress of Vienna in 1815 promulgated legislation as to international rivers, and the Congress of Paris in 1856 laid it down as a rule that "free ships make free goods" in time of war. But no machinery existed for periodical legislation with reference to the common interests of the various states, and it was long after scientists and merchants had begun to build the modern unity before lawyers and politicians began any corresponding activity.

As international contacts multiplied, however, and the new Great Society began to emerge more clearly, new needs made themselves felt more and more insistently, and soon after the middle of the nineteenth century various international organizations began to make their appearance. Very naturally, they had to do at the outset with contacts that might be called non-contentious, or that did not affect in any serious way the traditional view of national independence. The recognized method of trans-

acting international business had been through a special department of state, the Foreign Office, or Ministry of External Affairs, with its staff of ambassadors, ministers, and consuls abroad, in regular communication with it. The Foreign Office as an institution dates back to the middle of the seventeenth century, and permanent legations, adopted by Britain, France, Spain and Germany as early as the end of the fifteenth century, became regular among the civilized states in the seventeenth century. Not only the routine business in normal times, but the conferences and congresses which supervened in times of crisis were left in the hands of Foreign Secretaries and their personnel.

But in the last half of the nineteenth century, an important if little noticed change occurred in the conduct of international relations. A number of routine matters belonging to the non-contentious class were withdrawn from the management and, in some cases, from the control of Foreign Offices, and handed over to special bodies created by treaty for that purpose. This process was a direct and inevitable result of the nineteenth-century inventions and the immense increase in international contacts which they created. The most important of these new agencies may be briefly mentioned again: the International Telegraph Office of the International Telegraph Union was established in 1868; the International Post Office of the Universal Postal Union was established in Berne in 1874; the International Office of Weights and Measures for states using the metric system was established in Paris in 1875; the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, with its office in Brussels, dates from 1890; the

Central Office of International Transports at Berne, also from 1890; the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome from 1905, and the International Health Office in Paris from 1907.

It is obvious that the subjects covered by this list are not only non-contentious but of a kind to invite uniformity —in other words, management by an international authority, since they clearly deal with what may be described as international material. The material, for example, of the International Health Office is material from which every drop of the bitter waters of nationalism has been squeezed out. It is, therefore, material which can be studied impersonally, disinterestedly, supernationally, scientifically, in the sole interests and under the auspices of mankind as a whole. And what is true of health, is true, if in a lesser degree, of most of the other material for which international unions and offices had been created before the war.

So far, we have been dealing with international relations prior to the World War. But in this, as in other spheres of international organization, the war by creating new problems forced men to take stock of the progress already achieved along international lines. For the contacts between the Allied states in the war were not exclusively military, naval and diplomatic as in previous wars, but extended along the whole line of governmental activity. There was hardly a department which was not required to contribute from its expert service to the Allied collaboration. By the autumn of 1918 the Interallied organization had reached a point of development far beyond the wildest dreams of pre-war administrative internation-

alism. Never before in human history has the world been so regimented in its activities, from Iceland to Australia, and from tonnage to tobacco, as in the closing months of the war. This amazing achievement of collaboration disappeared with the disappearance of the common purpose which had sustained it; but its administrative experience remained. The lessons to be drawn from the experiment have been ably and lucidly summarized by Sir Arthur Salter, one of the men closely concerned in it, in his volume on the Allied Shipping Control.

The great volume of international coöperation between 1850 and 1914 has been described as "a nascent international government of the new world-community." From 1864 to 1914 two hundred and twenty-eight multipartite treaties and conventions dealing with the common interests of mankind, had come into existence. While it is true that they did not directly touch upon the more delicate and contentious questions arising between nations, it is also true that by developing an experience in international coöperation they indirectly suggested and pointed the way to the possibilities of closer coöperation in the whole field of the more delicate and vital matters.

But there were such wide gaps in the political organization of the world before the war, contests over markets and territories had become so sharp, such intense rivalries and bitter hostilities had been nourished, that in the more important relations between states there was nothing that could by any stretch of the imagination be called world-government, or even a tendency toward such government. An "international anarchy" as G. Lowes Dickinson has aptly phrased it, prevailed throughout the world, in which

each state declared its freedom to act as it pleased, and recognized no outside restraint. With plenty of facilities at hand for pursuing common action, the world of states was without any political machinery for beginning it in 1914. The early years of the twentieth century, therefore, were years of recurring crises, leading at last to the supreme crisis of 1914.

The League of Nations was born of sheer necessity. It was not the product of President Wilson's idealism, though he became its chief exponent. If the War had not brought it into existence, sooner or later it would have come by other means. If this League should fail, some other league is inevitable. The League at Geneva sprang from that definite sense of the interdependence of modern nations, which was rapidly growing before the war and which was sharpened into keen anxiety by that tragic experience. It is the logical outcome of the effect of the scientific and industrial development of the nineteenth century upon political relations; it is, therefore, the natural and inevitable next step in the political evolution of our time. It must not be forgotten, however, that the way had been paved for the coming of the League by the experience of all the various international unions for important forms of coöperation that had come into existence since 1850. All of these unions had grown up along much the same lines of organization. Periodical international conferences meeting at stated intervals exercised a general legislative power, and in many instances, departures began to be made from the requirement that unanimity should exist before such legislation could become effective.

Before 1914, many voices had been raised on behalf of a

law-and-order organization of the new world-community. Such hopes had been greatly quickened by the assembling of the two Hague Conferences; and they were especially fastened, immediately before the War, upon the assembling of a third Hague Conference in 1916. Perhaps the idea of world organization was as prevalent in the United States as anywhere else, and two prominent Americans, Mr. Andrew Carnegie and Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, persistently urged the formation of a League of Peace. It was the easier, therefore, for American opinion to develop during the years of America's neutrality in the War, to a point where President Woodrow Wilson could make it America's chief insistence, at the Versailles Conference in 1919, that a league of nations should be formed to maintain the peace that he hoped was being ushered in. Ignorance of the significance of changed world conditions, the old policy of American isolation, and chiefly, the bitter political partisanship then running rampant, kept the United States from joining the League that was then created.

Opinion in this country is still widely divided as to the advisability of the United States entering the League. It is not necessary in this connection to argue this much mooted question. The fact is that while not formally a member of the League, the United States is nevertheless closely associated with many of its activities, and is unofficially represented at many of its more important conferences. Whether eventually we join the League or not will depend not nearly so much on arguments as upon the sheer logic of events, and also upon the growing realization of the close interdependence of all nations, including our own. The question may become, not, Shall we join? but, Can we af-

ford not to join? It is obvious that from the viewpoint of the League, so long as the United States and Russia remain outside, it will be shorn of much of its power. Regardless, however, of any personal opinions as to the wisdom of our entering the League, it ought to be possible to approach the subject of the League today with the disinterested desire to understand its purpose and justly appraise its achievements up to date. Ten years ago when the first Assembly of the League met in Geneva, only four European foreign ministers deigned to attend it. When the tenth Assembly convened in September 1929, all but four of the European Foreign Ministers were present at Geneva. So gradually has the "Geneva habit" created by the League of Nations grown. For a phenomenon without parallel in history to become such a matter of course in a single decade is, perhaps, a phenomenon in itself.

It was, perhaps, inevitable that as soon as the League was organized it should be invested in popular opinion with a distinct personality. "People at once began to think of it as a political entity comparable in a larger way with the states which were its members. In some parts of the world there were those who condemned it as a super-state threatening to undermine the prized sovereignty and independence of national states, while others welcomed it as a super-state which might in time be guided by a world opinion which would organize itself independently of the prevailing nationalisms. As soon as the activities of the League got under way, it was easy for the former group to blame the League for many of the throes through which the post-war world had to pass; and the temptation was great for people in the latter group to claim credit for the League for any

successful efforts to alleviate the difficulties of post-war reconstruction."

The inflated idealism and the immoderate hopes which the War psychology fostered, during the period of the War, led many people to look forward to a new international order which was to be entirely dissociated from the past, and particularly, from the difficulties which had thwarted progress in the more recent years. It is vain to try to imagine what might have been. History is what it is, not what we would like to have it. If the new League had been organized *de novo,* like a firm starting in a new business, things might have gone very differently. But the fact is that the new League inherited a bankrupt business, in which every department (the member nations) was under the necessity of reorganizing itself and under circumstances that involved stepping on someone else's toes. It was born in an atmosphere surcharged with hatred and bitterness, with fear and suspicion, and it was forced to begin its life in the face of open hostility, profound cynicism, or utter indifference. As we look back to those days, the wonder grows that even the beginnings of a League of Nations saw the light of day. The fact remains, however, that the organization was accomplished. The League of Nations was formed, and regardless of all weaknesses and defects, a visible organization whose chief purpose was to secure the coöperation of the political states of the world, in all possible ways, thus came into being.

There are those who stand close to the League and know much about its workings from within, who contend that it must be regarded not as a new political entity created in a world of states, not as having a political personality of

its own, not as a state in itself, but as a new method adopted by the existing states for coöperating to meet those needs of the world society which cannot be met by national action. "The League is not a new power erected to see that righteousness prevails throughout the world; it is not an independent state which goes behind the governments of national states to their peoples for its constituency; it is not a governmental agency with an unlimited mandate to maintain the world's peace. It is merely a device by which certain nations have undertaken to coöperate in their efforts to solve some of the problems which they have in common, and to protect the interests of the larger world-community as they are viewed by peoples each of whom would jealously guard its own national existence."[1] It is in a word, a method of coöperation, a way of living together, that looks toward replacing the present international anarchy with a genuine world order in harmony with economic realities.

"The institution of the League of Nations, with its principles of publicity and open diplomacy," writes Sir Arthur Salter, "is an attempt to take public policy away from the few overstrained centers of excessive power, and to base it boldly and broadly on the general wishes and will of the peoples of the world. It is morally a great effort of faith. It is, in one sense, administratively, a great effort of decentralization. It replaces centralization by coördination."

The League is by no means as yet a perfected organization; it is easy to point out its defects and weaknesses, to emphasize its failures as well as those things in which it has scored success. But the League with all its imperfections is an honest attempt to think and act internationally.

[1] Manley Hudson: "Internationalism," p. 83.

Its imperfections are merely the evidence of its failure to do so. They are the defects of the civilization it reflects. It must constantly be remembered that just because it is not an independent political entity, but an association of the nations—and of the nations as they are today, with all their narrow nationalisms, their rivalries and jealousies, their fears and suspicions—it can deal only with the materials at hand; it must work with the nations that are as yet far from being socialized in their outlook, their motives, or their spirit. If the League is to advance toward its goal, if it is to realize eventually its possibilities, which are now only suggested, it will be only as public opinion in the several nations becomes intelligent enough to demand of its rulers and representatives a broader outlook, more unselfish motives and a new spirit. The historian of the future will record as the chief work of the League during the first decade of its existence, the gradual creation of a new technique whereby the nations may learn how to coöperate together in the interests of the common good, and also the education of public opinion as to the wisdom and feasibility of such coöperation.

The League has often been condemned on the ground that it is a league of governments and not a league of peoples, and this is undoubtedly the most serious criticism that can be made of the present organization. But in making this criticism we need to take into account the present possibilities of international action. The future may hold in store some sort of world government which does not depend upon national governments; many of our ablest students of human affairs hold that this must be the logical outcome of present tendencies. But if we take a realistic

view of things it is difficult to discover any indication of it now. The War intensified rather than diminished the spirit of nationalism, and at present it would seem that progress in organizing the world society must depend upon the collaboration of national governments rather than in erecting a super-state, however desirable that might seem to be. If it should eventually prove to be impossible to democratize any further the control of the League, so that it should one day become a league of peoples rather than of governments, then the League would certainly fail in its possibilities. Or if it should turn out that the League was only new machinery whereby the Great Powers were able to maintain the *status quo,* and impose their will on the rest of the world, then indeed we should have to look elsewhere for the world-community.

Without blinking in any sense these patent weaknesses and dangers, what are the facts about the League as it exists at present? Today fifty-six nations representing seven-eighths of the civilized world are meeting together around the table to see how far coöperation and mutual agreement can be substituted for suspicion and force. Here for the first time in human history we have a parliament of nations, a confederation of the world, in which, however timid and faulty may be the beginnings, the common interests of humanity are the subject of common counsel. Here we have an international clearing-house for problems that cannot be confined within national boundaries, and centralized machinery for undertaking responsibilities which no single nation can assume. With all its defects, it is a frank recognition on the part of the nations that we are today

living in a world that has at last become one, and in which the interests of all mankind are mutually concerned.

The Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat represent a method of continuous international conference on any problem that may arise as opposed to occasional conferences that may be called to consider specific matters. This alone is an advantage of no small importance. What has been done is to establish the conference method as an international habit. The principle of periodic meetings has been definitely accepted. In each of the years since 1920, an international conference has assembled at Geneva with more nations represented than were gathered together at either of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. In each of these years too, the Council of the League, consisting of fifteen nations, has met at least every three months and sometimes oftener. "In this brief period, too, a steady succession of international bodies and committees has met under the auspices of the League, dealing with many kinds of human problems. A passport conference, attended by twenty-two nations, was called by the League in 1920 to promote the expedition of international travel. Forty-three nations met in Barcelona in 1921 to discuss problems relating to communications and transit, and to clear the channels of international business. Thirty-five nations came together in Brussels in 1920 to consider the international financial situation. In Geneva in 1921 thirty nations conferred on methods of suppressing the international traffic in women and girls. In Warsaw in 1922 twenty-seven nations considered ways and means of dealing with the international menace of the typhus epidemic. In 1923 thirty-two nations took part in a conference at Geneva to simplify the

formalities of customs procedure. In the same year forty-one nations met in Geneva to discuss the complex problems of international communications and transit, with particular reference to railways, maritime ports, the transmission of electric power, and the utilization of hydraulic power in frontier water courses. In 1924 sixteen powers participated in a conference called by the League of Rome to discuss the extension of the principles of the Washington disarmament treaty to states not signatory to that treaty, whether members of the League or not. In 1925 forty-four nations were represented in the conference on the control of traffic in arms and ammunitions. The years 1926 and 1927 exceeded in the number of these conferences the five years that had gone before." [1]

In addition to these more formal gatherings, the League has promoted a steady succession of conferences and committee meetings to deal with a great variety of problems, such as the standardization of international statistics, the suppression of the international traffic in opium, the unification of standards of anitoxic serums, the feeding of Russian refugees, the return of prisoners of war, the reduction of armaments, the private manufacture of arms, the deportation of women and children in Asia Minor, the abuses of double taxation, and a score of other topics which represent the legitimate concern not of one nation but of the family of nations. In the decade since 1918, one hundred and sixty-six treaties and conventions, dealing with the common interests of mankind, have been enacted, chiefly through the League of Nations.

[1] Raymond Fosdick: "The Old Savage in the New Civilization," p. 208, 9.

One of the most important steps in the process of world-integration is indicated in Article XXIV of the Covenant of the League of Nations which lays it down that "there shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaux already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties shall consent;" and adds that "all such international bureaux and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League." It is by virtue of this article that the Secretariat at Geneva does so large and expanding part of its day-by-day work.

The work of the Secretariat is not, as is commonly supposed, a work of centralization, but rather of coördination. Its significance lies, not in the importance of the material with which it is dealing, nor in the number and authority of the governments which allow part of their domestic concerns to pass through its hands, but in the fact that it is engaged in working out a satisfactory technique for the collaboration of governments in the handling of problems which are at once too intricate and domestic to be centralized, and too international in their ramifications to be solved, by individual governments acting in isolation. We are a long way yet from the full possibilities of administrative internationalism. There are a host of thorny problems which are not ripe for the sober Geneva technique. But the mould is there ready to hand when the public opinion of the world is prepared for the experiment; the machinery is already created, and is being increasingly developed, through which a world-community may one day function smoothly and effectively.

It can truly be claimed that the work thus far accom-

plished by the League in international coöperation lies for the most part in the field of the non-contentious, or perhaps, the least contentious problems. This was to be expected in the years following the war, with the intensification of nationalism throughout the world. But without claiming too much, the League has also exerted a wise and restraining influence in particular times of crisis that might easily have led to war. One of the first outstanding cases was that of the Aaland Islands, which was handled in such a way as to cease to agitate the politics of the countries concerned, Sweden and Finland. It was followed by the prolonged difficulty between Poland and Lithuania over the territory of Vilna, and while the matter in dispute is not finally settled, at least it has not led to open hostilities. The frontier disputes between Albania and Jugo-Slavia grew very threatening at one time; but they have passed without causing war. The difficult question of the boundary between Germany and Poland in Upper Silesia was successfully handled for the time being by the Powers acting through the League of Nations. The occupation of Corfu by Italian forces created a very tense situation which was certainly alleviated by the conferences held in Geneva. The inability of Great Britain and Turkey to agree upon the allocation of the villayet of Mosul as between Irak and Turkey, created a situation which might easily have led to war, but which was settled by an award which all parties have now accepted. In 1925, the border trouble between Bulgaria and Greece again threatened war if there had been no recognized forum in which Bulgaria could seek redress for hostile incursions. More recently, the outbreak

between Bolivia and Paraguay demonstrated the influence of the League in averting a serious crisis.

The provisions of the Covenant of the League dealing with War have given rise to great differences of opinion. When the Peace Conference met in Paris in 1919, the representatives of the victorious countries found themselves dealing with a powerful public opinion, chiefly of their own creation, that led people to think of the struggle as due to the deliberate purpose of a single nation. In view of the many authoritative books since then that have dealt with the causes of the War, I imagine few intelligent people hold this view today. It was inevitable, however, that as the League of Nations was founded at the end of the War, and partly as the result of it, its Covenant should express that view. Article ten of the Covenant pledges the Members of the League in a general way to protect each other against external aggression. Article eleven declares any war or any threat of war to be a matter of general concern to all the Members of the League. Article sixteen declares any resort to war in disregard of the procedure laid down for preventing hostilities, an act of war against all other Members of the League, which are committed at once to an application of certain economic sanctions and which may be advised by the Council as to their employment of force itself.

Perhaps enough time has now elapsed since the Peace Conference at Paris for one to see how these efforts to enforce peace were influenced by the hysteria and excesses of the time. There have been grave doubts whether the provisions laid down at Paris to enforce peace will succeed when the test comes. The view seems to be widely held

that the practical difficulties of enforcing economic sanctions are such as to render that provision of Article sixteen of little value. The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, however, has introduced a new influence into the problem of securing world peace. If the nations take this Peace Pact seriously, if they really mean that they have renounced war, and have honestly pledged themselves to seek the settlement of any disputes that may arise by pacific methods, then the necessary machinery must be created as speedily as possible for such peaceful settlements, or if it already exists in the World Court, it must be clearly indicated. For it is quite obvious that the provisions of the League Covenant which countenance war under certain conditions and which seek to enforce peace by force are strangely inconsistent with the Pact which renounces war utterly.

But this new technique makes possible bringing to bear on international difficulties the trained expert in a way that the old method could never have done. Scholarship and statesmanship necessarily dwell in different worlds as Plato told us long ago; but in this at least, Geneva has brought his Republic to life, in that it has provided, and will increasingly provide, for their meeting and collaboration. Diplomacy is still necessarily diplomacy, and rash attempts to impose solutions by pressure and propaganda may have broken down; but the social philosophers and the engineers, the economists and sociologists, the chemists and the geologists, the doctors and the lawyers, have been enticed down from their ivory towers to the consulting room, to their own advantage and to that of mankind. For international life has reached a stage where

its technical problems can be met only by scientific study. Questions like the transportation of hydro-electric power across boundary lines, or the financial rehabilitation of Austria and Hungary, or the double taxation of foreigners, or the reparation problem, cannot be settled by politicians or the amiable resolutions of diplomatic representatives. They require the best expert brains obtainable, and it is in its ability to mobilize these brains on difficult and complex technical international problems that the League has made a distinct contribution to the better ordering of modern life.

"For example, when the League undertook to study the question of the double taxation of foreigners in both their country of origin and of residence, it created a committee consisting of such men as Professor Seligman of Columbia University, Sir Joseph Stamp, Dr. Bruins and Professor Einaudi. The technical committees on communication and transit include men like Bignami, the Italian engineer, Lankas, the director of railways in Czecho-Slovakia, and Tsang Ou, the director of the Chinese state railways. On the Committee on Intellectual Coöperation have been such well-known men and women as Henri Bergson, Mme. Curie, Albert Einstein, Gilbert Murray, and Robert Andrews Millikan. Charles P. Howland of New York was brought over to head the work which the League is doing to settle a million refugees on Greek soil; associated with him was a small group of the ablest engineers and bankers of Europe. Men like Ciraola of Italy, ter Meulen of Holland, Rappard of Switzerland, Nansen of Norway—and scores of others who in justice should be mentioned in the same list—are working on a dozen different problems

which relate in many of their aspects, not to Spaniards or Englishmen or Swedes, but to human beings, occupying the same planet, fighting the same enemies of hunger and disease, desperately trying to maintain for themselves and their children an ordered life."[1]

Geneva is developing new ways of thinking, new attitudes, and new habits of acting on the part of the nations. It is digging new channels of thought and establishing a fresh method of approach to old problems. In a hundred different ways, through the consideration of all sorts of unrelated but common problems, the nations in the League are learning the technique of teamwork. Through practice with less important issues, they are beginning slowly to see that when men get together around the table, thorny historic situations and pressing international difficulties often yield more fairly and more sensibly to conciliation and to compromise than to nationalistic or obscurantist claims. Nations are thus gradually becoming internationally-minded; they are coming to think of themselves as the different members of a living Whole; and when they begin to think in this way, sooner or later they will learn to act in the same way.

What is most important, let it be repeated, is not what has already been achieved by the League, nor yet, the imperfections that it still reveals, "but the testing of the soundness of this new method of procedure on the part of the nations. We know now that it is possible, when public opinion is ripe for it, to take a problem 'out of politics,' or to be more accurate, out of the old methods of di-

[1] Raymond Fosdick: "The Old Savage in the New Civilization," p. 221.

plomacy, and to entrust it to a body of men drawn from many nations who have the expert training and the outlook, not of the negotiator and old-time politician, but of the scientist and the social engineer. This is what is meant when it is said that Geneva has given the world for the first time an international civil service, an organized body of servants of mankind. This surely marks one of the greatest advances ever made in the art of directing human affairs."[1] The League Secretariat is made up of a splendid body of internationally-minded and forward-looking men, gathered from all the nations, who are ready to move forward just as rapidly as the public sentiment of the peoples of the nations warrants it, and this, without doing violence to existing principles and ideals. It does not reject democracy and substitute the tyranny of the expert, nor does it invalidate national sovereignty by the imposition of a centralized oligarchy. It merely enables the free self-governing peoples of the world, if and so long as they desire it, to employ the best men and the best means for collaboration in problems which no government however powerful can solve for itself alone.

No new experiment like the League of Nations can be expected to fulfill the entire promise of its possibilities in the first years of its growth. For the League has no body of tradition behind it, no precedents to guide it. It must feel its way along from case to case, adapting itself to new conditions and new problems. This is the history of all great social and political experiments. None of them has ever sprung full-armed and powerful into a waiting and friendly world. None has ever been born to its maximum

[1] Alfred Zimmern: "America and Europe," p. 148.

strength or able immediately to measure up to its full responsibility.

"It would of course be idle to pretend that the League is out of the danger zone, or that it has certain power to control the forces that are working toward violence and war. In attempting to correct age-long international practices its task is indeed gigantic. It necessarily partakes in large measure of the defects of the old order; except as the spirit and fact of coöperation may raise the ethical level, the League in reality can be no better than the individual governments that compose it. . . . The League of Nations must inevitably go through the same process attendant upon every real social advance. Step by step it must win its way forward to a surer footing, adapting its machinery and its methods to the ever changing conditions. There will be moments of discouragement and despair. People will jeer at its errors and condemn its faltering progress. But with courage and patience to sustain it, the idea upon which it is based will steadily grow in strength and prestige. Upon it depends perhaps the whole destiny of Western civilization. For what else is there to take its place? What substitutes, what alternative, has been proposed? If this technique for international coöperation fails, what chance or hope is there of rationalizing international relations in a world in which the necessities of the race pull one way, while human passion and prejudice pull the other?"[1]

The future lies on the knees of the gods; no one can predict with any certainty what the twentieth century will bring forth. One side of the picture is bright with promise

[1] H. N. Brailsford: "Olives of Endless Age," p. 353.

when we think of the possibilities for an ordered world; the other side is dark with menace when we remember the blinding power of traditional ideas, and the many destructive forces still alive and operative in the life of nations. There are just two alternatives facing mankind: If the nations will not learn the way of coöperation, then they must continue in the fatal state of international anarchy. If they cannot be induced to subordinate nationalistic aims and desires to the common good of all peoples, then they must continue to be dominated by selfishness and greed. If they will not disarm, then clearly they must continue to arm increasingly, and the end of that way is death. If they cannot be awakened to a consciousness of their mutual interdependence and the new principles involved in that one fact, then the future of civilization is hopelessly doomed.

When we remember, however, that the beginnings of the new way of coöperation on the part of nations have already been made, when we realize how much the League of Nations has accomplished in these few years, and against every obstacle, when we see the numbers of those who are internationally-minded increasing steadily, when we think of the new education that the younger generation is receiving in school and college, and the many agencies that are fostering the new knowledge among the adult members of every community; above all, when we take into account the logic of events that is forcing us into ever closer relationships on this planet, we dare not but hope that the increasing application of intelligence to these problems of international relations will lead gradually to a further extension of the method and the spirit of

coöperation from the field of matters of lesser importance to the region of those problems that now seem most difficult and contentious.

If the new education can succeed in creating an international public opinion, if the people can be awakened to an intelligent world-consciousness, then the implications for the twentieth century are for a slow but sure development of a genuine internationalism in the political life of the nations, in which coöperation shall gradually replace the ruthless competition of the past, and ultimately bring peace, prosperity and happiness to all mankind.

As we contemplate the possibilities of a coming true internationalism, it is clear that the assertion of the absolute sovereignty of the political state has become in our time the supreme anarchy. The old doctrine of the absolute rights of nations is seen today to thwart the fullest growth of human welfare. It may have been a desirable expedient in the past, but ultimately it must pass away. There can be no absolute sovereignty except the whole of humanity acting as a unit through World Government. We may question the present constitution of the League of Nations, but to see the accidental boundaries and present status of nations as conferring absolute sovereignty is to be blind to what is both inevitable and good.

The flux of human affairs develops differences of pressure between peoples; and these differences tend to be equalized by the flow of populations or of goods. The manner in which such inequalities of pressure are relieved, resisted or regulated largely determines the issues of peace or war, and the direction of events toward the increase or the decrease of human well-being. International law and

foreign policy, instead of being a mass of expedients for mitigating or prosecuting the conflicts of nationalism that result from inequalities of pressure, may develop into an increasingly intelligent and orderly process for the promotion of human welfare on this planet. Whether this orderly development is to take place depends upon the deepening realization of certain aims as imperative for human society in the twentieth century, which have been briefly summarized as follows:

The recognition of world interests as paramount to national interests.

The increase of the best elements of populations and of cultures.

Regulation of the flow of goods to promote the greatest general increase of human welfare.

The development of domestic and foreign policies to prevent or relieve excessive differences of economic or population pressures.

The coöperation in all undertakings of international value.

Prevention of unsanitary conditions, either physical or psychological, which may infect other peoples.

Elimination of untruths concerning peoples, conditions, and international relations.

Maintenance of open-minded, experimental attitudes which will stimulate continued evolution of human government and society, and protect it from inhibitions and arbitrary restrictions upon free change and evolution.

The greatest local and national autonomy consistent with international well-being.

We need to develop and secure general understanding

and appreciation of those national aspirations and purposes which can be presented to the world with the authority of right and reasonableness, and we must discipline our own policies by those standards.

To quote from Professor Frank H. Hankins of Smith College, "All the conditions are now working among Western nations to bring about a more complete political unification. When one studies the rise of nationalism and notes the long slow process whereby previously disparate and contentious political units were at length welded into a genuine political unity, he need scarcely doubt that like conditions will ultimately produce a superstate above the present world powers. The United States was a genuine League of independent states in 1789. The process of unification was slow, largely because communication and transportation were slow and permitted, or even necessitated, the maintenance of local patriotisms and jealousies. Moreover these same conditions permitted the development of different and exclusive economic systems in North and South. Consequently, it was not until 1865, or seventy-six years after its establishment, that the United States turned out to be not a League, but a Union of states."

"What the present League of Nations needs above all, if its possibilities are to see development, is the allegiance of the United States and the added prestige which would be acquired thereby. It has begun weakly but has grown rapidly in respect and power. If it can maintain peace in Europe for a generation it will have thrown a powerful weight of both economic development and of fresh tradition into the balance for permanent peace——Meanwhile,

international investments, the growth of trade, the modification of tariffs, the development of international trusts and combines, the increasing speed of transportation and communication, and the perfection of international news services, all work powerfully for the cultivation of the international mind. We shall see increased attention to educational devices for visualizing the new internationalism in the minds of the younger generation. Finally, we shall see the development of symbols, songs, ceremonials, and even myth and folklore, whereby the League of Nations will become enshrined in the hearts of millions as the supreme object of earthly devotion." [1]

We are told repeatedly that the United States will eventually enter the League by some sort of back-door entrance, or be made to glide into it in a sort of absent-minded way. How vastly better it would be for the American people to face the issue frankly and squarely, and dare to join hands with the other nations of the world in the coöperative efforts of the League for a genuine internationalism. That such action on the part of the United States will be taken eventually seems inevitable, just as soon as there is developed sufficient international-mindedness, and the imagination of the people is caught by the possibilities of the League for achieving a true world order. As long as the United States is held in bondage by her fundamentalist belief in the two theological mysteries—the devilish character of the League, and the heavenly character of the Monroe Doctrine—as long as she demands absolute and unconditioned sovereignty for herself, while denying that attribute to other nations, as long as she persists in pur-

[1] Alfred Zimmern: "America and Europe," p. 121.

suing her old-time policy of isolation and, blind to the significance of the changed conditions, refuses to enter into coöperation with other nations in the effort to build a world-community, just so long will she be debarred from participation in the moral world leadership that might be her glorious portion.

There is a profound significance in Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's opening address at the Assembly of the League of Nations in September, 1929. That it made a great impression upon the Assembly is frankly admitted by the press generally. Even when his hearers did not agree with him, as they obviously did not at several points, they felt the significance of his presence and the power of the new Labor Government in England, in the name of which he spoke. In him they must have perceived a close approach to Burke's definition of the most useful type of statesman—one who adds to his ability to improve the world, a resolute determination to preserve whatever of good the past has won. For Ramsay MacDonald, in his address, revealed himself not only as an idealist, in the sense that he is looking forward hopefully toward the coming of an ordered world, but also as an intense realist conscious of the problems that exist, and yet seeing clearly the new world conditions with their new demands upon nations. In his reference to the rapidly growing power and influence of the League and what it may accomplish in the future for world relations, in his demand that "with undivided mind, this League must bend itself to solve this problem of disarmament," a disarmament that must mean more than limitation—an actual reduction of existing standards of armament, in his confident assertion of the

hopeful outlook for the discussions that had been in progress between England and the United States on the question of naval disarmament, and especially, in his statement as to the future of imperialism, he voiced more clearly and frankly than any official representative of the Great Powers has yet done, the ideal and spirit of the new internationalism that one day must exist.

To quote but one of his significant statements expressing this world viewpoint, he said, "Outside of Europe there is an old world, old in civilization, old in philosophy, old in religion, old in culture, that hitherto has been weak in those material powers that have characterized the Western peoples. But that old world, wrapped in slumber as we thought, has now become awake and is now beginning to understand that national self-respect which is taught and tutored very largely by ourselves. It is bringing our own ideas home to us, borne by its hands, and is asking us to honor the effects of our own action and grant it, not by charity but because our own hearts are enlightened by the freedom we have been nourishing and nurturing for ourselves for so many generations.

"The great danger of war, then, is this—that we may be too long in performing this act of recognition; that we, by our delays, by our half-heartedness, by our lack of courage, may accumulate forces in the political life of those nations that will present to us not a request but an ultimatum, that will make its request in such a way that if obstacles can be placed in the way of granting them, they will be placed in the way of granting them. We say, 'make peace while there is still time to do it with honor and self-respect.' In that way peace will come not as a result of

war, not as a result of a challenge, but peace will come with all the glowing beneficence of a new day supplanting the old night. . . . We want to give these other nations full confidence in negotiations and in reason. Never ought we to put the Great East into a position where it says, 'Our only chance of becoming free from undertakings that are too old to be observed now is to tear them up in the faces of those with whom we made them.' That is the danger of war between one side of the world and the other, and by meeting that problem in time we shall extend the realm of peaceful negotiation, resulting in the liberties of the peoples of the earth. We will make allies instead of enemies when these peoples secure their freedom."

Thus he spoke as one willing to take great risks for the sake of world peace, and to indicate policies which he admitted will require time to execute but which must now be announced and visualized as the goals of endeavor. No less significant was the address of M. Briand, speaking as Prime Minister of France, before the Assembly on the following day. In his praise for the work of the League, in his stressing the need to enforce peace, and in his setting forth of his plan for a United States of Europe, both economic and political, he, like Ramsay MacDonald, voiced the ideals of the new internationalism. It is not strange that the more conservative press on both sides the Atlantic has been inclined to belittle the importance of these addresses as the expressions of mere idealism, and we must expect that the forces of reaction will oppose most strenuously in all countries the putting into execution of any of the forward-looking policies suggested. As realists, we know that the pathway to a world order and to world

peace is not an easy one; it is beset by many dangers and complex difficulties. In view of all the world conditions, however, we maintain that these utterances coming from the official spokesmen of England and France just now, augur well for the future development of the League and are profoundly significant as presaging the coming of a new internationalism that shall eventually bind all nations together in the spirit of coöperation of each for all.

The internationalism we seek, however, cannot be created through a belittling or a disregard of our nationalisms, but only by building upon these nationalisms the higher and more inclusive internationalism. Mazzini was a great internationalist. Yet at the same time he was a great Italian nationalist. He believed that the road to permanent peace and real international understanding lay through the self-expression of the nations of which Humanity is composed. Humanity was for him an orchestra, in which each nation had its own appropriate instrument to play, its own distinctive contribution to make to the harmony of the Whole.

"Internationalism, properly understood, is not contact between states; nor is it contact between super-nationalists and cosmopolitans who have torn themselves loose from affiliation with their nation. True internationalism is contact between nations in their highest and best and most distinctive representatives and manifestations. It is through a deeper exploration and enjoyment of the infinite treasures of the world's nationalities, by men and women whose vision has been trained and sensibilities refined because they themselves are intimately bound up with a nation of their own, that an enduring network of internationalism

will some day be knit, and a harmony of understanding established in a world of unassailable diversity."[1] It is this moral internationalism that must precede the coming of any closer *rapprochement* in the political relations of nations.

[1] Alfred Zimmern: "America and Europe," p. 80.

X

TOWARDS WORLD ECONOMIC COÖPERATION

THE world is suffering from too much national government in international business. The economic causes of war will grow more perilous as we continue the anachronistic attempt to apply to the modern business world the political ideas of Queen Elizabeth and Louis XIV. In the world of today economics and politics are at odds. Politically we are living in a divided world made up of almost seventy different sovereign states. By political and legal dogma each of these states is sovereign and independent; all are equal in the eyes of international law. When we look beneath the political surface, however, to the economic facts, we find little sovereignty or independence and no equality. But if public opinion can be awakened to the importance of making political theory and foreign policies fit the economic realities, economics will become the ally of politics in making coöperation among the nations a matter of enlightened self-interest and in banishing the economic absurdity of war.

The League of Nations, with all its defects and present limitations of power and authority, does stand as a symbol of the possibility of an ever increasing coöperation in the political life of nations. As the previous chapter indicates, it has also gone a long ways in bringing the nations into active coöperation in a large number of matters that are of

vital human concern, chiefly in the non-contentious class of problems. More important still, the League has been steadily creating the machinery through which the nations will be able to function internationally in the field of the more delicate and contentious problems, just as rapidly as an enlightened public opinion demands it. It is obvious that to a large degree the progress toward a political internationalism must go hand in hand with progress towards economic internationalism, if for no other reason because the chief duty of the national state is held today to be the furthering and protection of the business interests of its people.

Meantime, it is the steadily increasing pressure of the economic facts and demands of a world that has already become interdependent throughout that is forcing the nations, very slowly to be sure, to modify their notions of sovereignty and independence, and to bring their ideas of the political relations of nations more into harmony with the realities of the twentieth century. In this sense, it may be said that it is the economic facts that are leading, or more accurately, are forcing the nations in the direction both of a political and an economic coöperation.

It is by no means implied that the activities of the League have been confined to the field of political coöperation. Life is making good to the League what theory failed to provide. The original gaps in its structure no longer yawn so wide. If the statesmen who were its architects seemed to ignore economics, experience is driving the nations which compose it to realize its immense possibilities in this field. It can hardly be said that it has even begun to think of itself as an authority which will one day make law for the world in its economic dealings, but it has taken the first steps

which may lead it in this direction. It had from the first as an autonomous part of its organization its International Labor Office, which aims at protecting labor the world over, and lays down general standards which its member states should observe. It defined at the Brussels Conference, during the worst period of monetary instability in Europe, the principles which should guide banking in the effort to reach stability. The Barcelona Conference arrived at conclusions of the first importance for the regulation of international transport.

But the League carried through with marked success a still more significant undertaking in May 1927, when it held its World Economic Conference in Geneva. The delegates were representatives of governments, though no government was bound by their votes, and among them were not only the members, nominees of the League States, but also those of States which remain outside it, notably Russia. Finance was excluded, as were the problems of raw materials, reparations and inter-allied debts. A vast field remained, however, including tariffs, modern methods of "rationalization" in trade, and the whole subject of cartels and combines. The Conference showed a marked and consistent tendency throughout. It had before it the admirable reports of the Secretariat which drew, from a comprehensive survey of statistics, the conclusion that the relative poverty of the post-war world is due not to any decline in the production of foodstuffs and raw materials, nor to any inadequacy in man's power to exploit them, but to one form or another of *maladjustment*. "The main hindrances to economic revival have been the obstacles opposed to the free flow of labor, capital and goods." The realization that

such maladjustments exist is the first step toward any readjustment. The Conference condemned every form of economic nationalism. It argued in favor of the highest development of the division of labor throughout the world. It was favorable to "rationalization" and combination. It spent much of its time in sapping the barriers to trade, erected by the mania for self-sufficiency which afflicted Europe during and after the war. It stressed the "interdependence" of nations, and sought to secure it by greater "liberty of trading." The President in summing up its resolutions declared that "international exchange of products best and most economically produced in different countries should be regarded as the normal rule."

In its resolutions dealing with tariffs and kindred topics, the Conference declared that "the time has come to put an end to the increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite direction." It asked for a return to the system of long-term commercial treaties, which must be based on "the mutual grant of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment." It called for the stabilization and simplification of tariffs, and with some reservations condemned export taxes, especially when they involve discrimination. Finally it threw overboard the doctrine that tariffs can be regarded as "falling exclusively within the domain of national sovereignty," and urged that "concerted action among different nations is possible and desirable." It looked to the League, in this and every other field, as the natural center from which "concerted action" should originate, though when it came to details it rarely asked for more than inquiry and the collection of statistics. Its final resolution was timidly vague, but it seems to hint that the preparatory committee

which organized the Geneva Conference would be a suitable model for the permanent economic organization with which the League should be endowed.

The important thing to remember is why it has become essential that the world should take "concerted action" in the economic field. The resolutions passed by this Conference were not the expression of pure idealism; these delegates who voted unanimously were realists facing the tremendous changes which science and industrialism have brought about in the relations of nations; they knew the facts of this new world, and they understood, in part at least, the deep significance of these facts. They realized that by the organization of the world's work on the basis of the utmost division of labor, we are making of all humanity a coöperative society, which confesses that the good of its various parts can be realized only through the good of the whole. Whenever the national state attempts, by tariffs or other arbitrary devices, to foster the production of goods which other peoples, by reason of advantages in climate, situation, native aptitude or the abundance and proximity of raw material, are better fitted to produce, this state is causing a maladjustment in the organization of the world's work. It is adding moreover, to the sum of the world's unnecessary toil. These are the grounds which stamp economic nationalism as an offence against peace; for peace must mean the highest development of the coöperative ideal.

This World Economic Conference, and the conclusions which it reached, reveal the possibilities of the League in the field of economic coöperation, but only in the measure that public opinion in the respective countries warrants

progress in this direction. As an illustration of how far the United States is from realizing the new conditions and their new demands, and how far we are as a nation from real economic coöperation with other nations, we have witnessed in the present session of Congress the struggle for higher tariffs proposed in the Hawley bill. In spite of the fact that we were present and participated in the World Economic Conference, the proposed tariff bill takes no cognizance whatever of the conclusions reached by that conference. There is no longer a serious debate between Democrats and Republicans over the desirability of a protective tariff for American products. A protective tariff, however, need not imply a cessation of business intercourse with the outside world. Yet proposals are seriously considered at Washington to impose duties so high that the importation of many commodities will be effectively prohibited. This is not protection. It is an embargo, and an embargo is an instrument not of peace but of war. It is only another evidence of muddled thinking and the lack of the international mind on the part of legislators and politicians.

We cannot continue to enjoy the benefits of our high material civilization if we thus cut off intercourse with other nations. Every one of us depends upon all the world for the continuance of the prosperity we enjoy. We cannot ruin the sugar growers of Cuba without striking a heavy blow at every American manufacturer who sells a part of his product in the Cuban market. We cannot lay an embargo on the produce of the Argentine unless we want to abandon the Argentinian market to our European competitors. We cannot put an end to various imports from Canada and from European countries unless we are willing to

accept retaliation in kind. We cannot continue at our present level of prosperity unless we are willing to consider the needs of other peoples as well as our own ambitions. If we give full rein to the demands of every little group of selfish Americans, we shall not only injure our own common national prosperity, but delay the coming of world economic coöperation that shall mean prosperity for all. We cannot have legislation designed to facilitate the dumping of our excess products in foreign lands and at the same time have other laws excluding the commodities which our customers would offer in exchange. Life is not one-sided. We have to give if we would take. We must recognize the rights of others if we expect a friendly recognition of our own rights.

After reviewing the efforts being made to carry out the recommendations of the World Economic Conference to lower the barriers which hamper world trade, a recent number of the London "Economist" argues that if every country pursued a tariff policy similar to that of the United States, world trade would all but halt. "The United States is setting an example in the wrong direction in the new tariff bill. During the past few decades America has taught the world numberless lessons in the economic sphere which are fraught with great benefit to humanity. She has given a remarkable object lesson of the fact that a high standard of living is compatible with cheap production. But when it comes to external commercial relations and those economic matters which fall into the political sphere, her policies and the doctrines by which they have been supported have been in certain instances deplorably crude. It is obvious that the economic well-being of the United States,

which has shown so marvelous a development in recent decades both in low-tariff periods and high, does not depend upon or require protection from almost the highest tariff in the world. . . . It is not to be expected that American politicians—will attach much weight to the effect of their legislation on foreign countries. But nevertheless their effect is *that so great a country as America cannot live to herself alone.*"

At the Williamstown Institute of Politics this summer, Professor T. E. Gregory, London banking and economic expert, said that the United States would "put a nail in the coffin of European reconstruction" if she raised her tariff as high "as recent developments would indicate." "If the United States raises her tariff rates, every other nation must raise its tariff too. The result is obvious. It is ridiculous to expect that European nations are to pay their debts if everything coming from Europe is included in the high tariff. . . . The moral reaction will be a most unhappy one. European nations will feel that America is setting a bad example to the rest of the world, but there is little they can do to prevent it."

At the meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce in Amsterdam this last July, the results of the informal conversations on the American tariff was to convey to the American delegates the firm conviction of Europeans that the new American tariff bill is designed absolutely to exclude most of the limited amount of products still flowing from European to American markets. As one of the European delegates put it, "So far as we can see the Americans are going to try simply to put us out of business." Is it worth while, these men asked the American delegation, for

the American Congress, in order to gain very trifling advantages for a few isolated American manufacturers, to bring heavy losses upon European manufacturers? America, it was admitted on all sides, has every right to handle her tariff matters as she deems best, but is it wise for America to arouse a feeling that, if not allayed, is likely to result in Europeans generally making every effort to buy automobiles and other things from other than American sources? There is a deeper question than this involved, however. What will it mean for the moral leadership of America if its business interests show so little real understanding of the changed relations that have taken place in the world's economic life, and express so little willingness to coöperate with other nations for the common good and highest prosperity of all?

The more hopeful side of the matter lies in the storm of complaints that almost immediately on the presentation of the new tariff bill began to come in from all parts of the country. The farmers were dissatisfied and angry; consumers took note of what was likely to happen to them and filed their protests; most threateningly of all, the housekeepers banded together in resentment at an expected rise in the cost of living. There was a general feeling of disgust at the greedy way in which various prosperous industries sought added favors from the government. Most remarkable of all has been the reversal of our traditional attitude toward the protests from foreign nations that multiplied steadily. In the older and more robust days of tariff protection these would have been treated with a kind of gleeful contempt. It would have been said that if the people in Europe did not like what we proposed to do, this

only proved it the right course for us. First find out what the foreigners don't want, and then do it. The proud cry used to be: "What have we to do with other nations? Nothing except to legislate against foreign interests as often as we get the chance."

But a great light has dawned. The statements filed at Washington by European and other nations in protest against some of the rates in the House tariff bill are treated with the utmost respect. Even Senators speak of them in a deferential tone. Republican leaders have been most outspoken against the bill. Republican newspapers have condemned it. It is as if an entirely new factor had entered into our tariff-making which we are bound to consider, since to neglect it would result in a menace to our own export trade.

This surprising change, which everybody must have noticed, has nothing moral or political about it. The usual economic arguments against high protective tariffs have not operated with new effect. What has really happened has been an irruption of hard business sense into the whole tariff controversy. People have come to feel that a high tariff has become an obvious misfit for a country in the position the United States has attained. We neither need it today nor can we profit from it. On the contrary it threatens injury to one great branch of American life—our foreign trade. The very real danger of a Europe economically organized against the United States is more potent than moral ideals to make us see that no nation today liveth unto itself alone. And unless all signs mislead, at the present writing, the bill that President Hoover will finally sign will be very materially altered downwards from the bill

as originally introduced. It is thus that the complex interrelations of the economic life of nations are forcing all peoples into an economic coöperation to which otherwise they would have been averse.

There is a rapidly growing conviction throughout the country that, first, under existing conditions, the principle of protection is economically unsound, politically disastrous, and morally indefensible. Second, even if we admit protection to be defensible in economic theory, no one can maintain that the present hodge-podge of unrelated special rates constitutes a system consistent with any such theory. Third, if we abandon all rational theory and agree that the tariff shall be simply a system of plundering all the people for the benefit of part of them, which is about all the present American tariff "ideas" really amount to, the present bill before Congress is not what it pretends to be and what the President asked for, namely, an instrument that equalizes conditions between manufacturers on the one hand, and farmers on the other. The world's great need today is the chance to work and trade; the Economic Conference of the League of Nations in 1927 categorically declared: "The time has come to move in the direction of lower tariffs." Tariff students point out that the proposed American action is likely to make European reductions more difficult, not to say impossible. In spite of all our protestations of good-will and desire for peace, if we continue our present policy we are in this matter of the tariff alone making impossible the coming of good-will and peace.

Another striking fact has been the tendency since 1919 to take the problems of finance and other economic questions out of the hands of the politicians and put them into

the hands of experts—economists, financiers, business men. The whole reparation problem was simply a football among the nations concerned until the Dawes Commission approached it from a non-political viewpoint and brought expert economic knowledge and experience to bear upon the whole matter. The more recent revision of the Dawes plan by what will be known as the Young Commission, though Owen D. Young had no legal authority at Paris and was not even an official delegate from the United States, illustrates how even the thorniest problem can be settled if only it can be lifted out of the rivalries and jealousies of the political atmosphere and entrusted to trained experts whose governing motive is that of honest good-will. International affairs are barbarous and uncivilized to the extent that we rely upon force rather than upon persuasion. Owen D. Young succeeded where others had failed because he had the energy to learn, and the patience to understand, and the good-will to help other men reach an understanding. Through fifteen long weeks in Paris he never lost courage. If one proposal were rejected, he would consider something else. He had no pride of opinion. He was willing to take suggestions wherever he found them. If one form of statement did not win approval, he would try another. When other men were at the end of their resources and when failure had all but been proclaimed, he was still undaunted and still willing to make fresh attempts. All the time, however, he was driving towards the great goal—a voluntary agreement concerning the terms of a permanent peace.

Persuasion worked because the facts were on his side. When the Conference temporarily broke down men had

the chance to consider the results of failure. The prospect was not pleasant. Agreement seemed better. Owen D. Young induced the statesmen of nations, traditionally hostile, to come to a voluntary agreement because he understood their difficulties. The final decision left no stings of disappointment. Everyone felt that the best had been made of a situation intrinsically bad. Consequently, while no one claims that Utopia is in sight, peace is now on a surer basis than at any time during the last seventy-five years. We have begun to rely on the power of persuasion in these international problems instead of on force; and as time goes on, if we can only bring the same expert knowledge, the same patience and insight, the same powers of persuasion and good-will to bear upon every such problem, however knotty it may appear to be, we shall find our way at length to a genuine coöperation in our life as nations. Owen D. Young showed on a magnificent scale that clear thinking, broad sympathy, and infinite patience coupled with zeal to serve, can persuade men to agree when the force of arms is impotent.

One of the profoundly significant features looking towards world economic coöperation contained in the Young plan is the establishment of an International Bank. The plans for such a Bank were elaborated by the Experts Committee in Paris and are as significant in the organization of a world order as were those that established the League of Nations. Henri Berenger, a former French Ambassador, says of the proposed Bank: "It is as necessary now as national banks were a century ago, for nations have become mere provinces. If bankruptcies and ruin, which have followed the years 1914 to 1918, are to be avoided, if a new

war even more atrocious than the last is to be escaped, there must be financial understanding between nations, between continents. The day when this *entente* is realized will be a day of world confidence and world credit. And from that day there will be real association among the nations." These are strong words, but they do not exaggerate the possibilities of such an International Bank for helping towards a world-community.

Although Owen D. Young deserves the credit for the inauguration of the scheme, the plan is by no means entirely his. For a number of years there has been more or less constant communication between the heads of the central banks of the larger nations; they have conferred in the elaboration of their plans. Mr. Morgan and other American financiers have frequently been called into consultation in matters affecting international finance, and most of the other members of the Experts Committee have at one time or other advised regarding reparations, debt payments and foreign loans. These conferences have accustomed the leaders in the financial world to work together. There has gradually been developed the idea that has engaged the minds of dreamers and a few practical statesmen for generations—the establishment of an international bank that will relate and direct the financial affairs of the nations, and will make them serve as an agency for peace rather than for war. The proposed bank will not be in any sense an inter-governmental organization. Its capital will be privately subscribed and its only formal relation to governments will be through their banks of issue. So far as possible, it will be kept free from political influence. Particularly will it act in the present situation to liquidate the

financial obligations resulting from the war, and to transform them into securities that can be sold on the open market, as well as to aid in the restoration of normal relations between the nations. Obviously the organization of an institution so complex and of such far-reaching importance as this is a task of great delicacy and difficulty, and the plans thus far made are purely tentative. The plan itself, however, is a frank recognition of the fact that the economic life of the world today is *one life,* and that henceforth, it must be increasingly treated as such.

Apparently, a World Bank is as much anathema here in the United States as is the League of Nations or the World Court. Out of the political situation came Secretary Stimson's emphatic declaration that the Government would "not permit any officials of the Federal Reserve System either themselves to serve or to select any American representatives as members of the proposed international bank." To this Thomas W. Lamont, one of the members of the Experts Committee quietly replied that if any central bank refused to take part officially, alternative arrangements had been provided whereby "the same end is intended to be attained." Then he carried the war into the enemies' country by his statement in "World Trade," the official organ of the International Chamber of Commerce, that the Bank in its natural course of development "may become an organization not simply or even predominantly concerned with the handling of reparations, but also of furnishing to the world of international commerce and finance important facilities hitherto lacking." He suggests that it will provide a common meeting ground for the governors of the various central banks, thus making possible the coöperation that

has proved essential to the stability of credit. "If in years to come," he says, "it takes on broader functions it will be because and only because there is a practical and specific use for it in branches of economic life that are not now served." Here is economic reality unpretendingly set forth by one who is in the midst of financial affairs. What he says is this: actually, no matter what happens politically, there will be an international bank, because economically there must be. If the Government at Washington chooses for political reasons to ignore it and pretend it is not there, the bank will still exist, but our government will have no control over it, which is in consistent harmony with our policy of isolation.

Speaking on the subject of the proposed International Bank at the Williamstown Institute of Politics this summer, Professor Viner of the University of Chicago said: "Not only would such a bank substitute non-political machinery for political agencies in the administration of reparations, but it would remove the whole question from the realm of international controversy and diplomatic bickerings." Professor Viner further said that the most important obstacle to the prospects foreshadowed in the Young Plan was "the petty nationalistic jealousies and unwillingness to recognize the necessarily international character of the world's financial structure, especially the exaggerated parochialism of the United States which would raise the cry that the Bank would serve as an instrument of British domination and of subordination of the interests of the Middle West to the international capitalists of Wall Street, London and Paris." He pointed out, however, that there was no

ground for such a fear as the Bank would have no means of coercing the national banks of any country.

Dr. Gregory, a leading economist from London, at the same session of the Institute, stated that there had been strong personal coöperation between the head of the Bank of England and the head of the American Federal Reserve Bank, but that it was more or less spasmodic, and in times of crisis, there was grave danger that the nationalistic spirit might destroy the coöperative spirit that had existed between the personal heads of these two institutions. With an International Bank once formed, however, there would be no such danger. He also stated that in his opinion, such an institution afforded only another opportunity to try new methods of coöperation, which in itself was extremely valuable. It is such experiments, if it be an experiment, that will lead the nations into ever closer coöperation in all that belongs to their mutual interests.

As indicative of the trend of thought toward economic coöperation in Europe, M. Briand has recently brought to the attention of the public, his long-nurtured plan for an economic United States of Europe. It is said that M. Briand conceived an economic union of Europe during the reparations discussion last September, as the next logical step after his policy of general liquidation of war questions had been completed. The action of the Reparation Conference at the Hague recently finished the most important elements of that liquidation, so that M. Briand's plan to call a European economic conference after the League Assembly in 1929 would be an opportune moment to indicate at least what direction Europe's next step should take. One view is that M. Briand wants to strike for an economic union when the

widespread anxiety in Europe over the American tariff bill is likely to assure a more favorable response to his project. At any rate it is clear that M. Briand's reading of the public's pulse has served to convince him that the moment is ripe for such a proposal. Those who have followed the development of M. Briand's plan most closely insist that however much the American tariff policy may stimulate Europe toward a union, M. Briand has taken special pains to show that the project is not directed against the United States, and that any such measure, intended to promote the peace and economic prosperity of Europe, is as much to the interest of America as of any other country. The immediate aim of M. Briand, is quite evidently to send up a trial balloon publicly and to arouse a discussion, which all agree is necessary before any concrete steps toward such a union can be taken. That there are great difficulties in the way all admit; but once again it is the reality of the economic situation that is forcing the idea in spite of all political barriers.

As everyone knows, M. Briand is more interested in politics than in trade. But those who know best are inclined to feel that with shrewd insight he sees in the project for economic unity in Europe something still deeper—an economic unity on which a degree of political unity might later on be built. It is perfectly plain that the American program of trying to extend the sale of its products in all the markets of the world, while keeping the products of other countries out of its markets, though condemned as an international policy, has served to bring other countries to see some advantages in that system if it can be established and adhered to. And so the world, at the present writing, sees the contradictory development that while the expert econo-

mists are preaching the tearing down of customs barriers, almost everyone is studying how to erect them, chiefly due to the example of the United States. If this should result in putting into effect the projects for a British Empire trade unity, and an economic union of the European states, the feeling seems to be that it would only hasten the breaking down of all such barriers, permitting the free movement of commodities between all countries. It will not be theories or idealism that will bring this about but the sheer logic of the world's economic life as it is today.

In his Commencement Day address in June 1929 President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University, for many years a leader in the Republican party, uses these words in speaking of the tariff: "It is this pharisaical nationalism which frames public policies as if there were no other members of the human family but ourselves. It acclaims international trade and international financial interdependence, and then proceeds to build tariff walls so high as to make both as difficult as possible. It permits private interest to insinuate itself into public policies which should be controlled solely and entirely by the larger interests of the whole people, and it thinks of a nation not as a moral personality with duties and ideals, but simply as an economic unit intent upon exalting itself in all possible ways no matter at whose cost or at what damage to the general welfare. It is unintelligent selfishness personified. Just now we may see all this in full sway at the national capital. The sagacious and constructive economic policy which, as expounded by Hamilton and Clay and Lincoln and Blaine and Garfield and McKinley, had come to be generally accepted as characteristic of our nation's public life, has now

been quietly superseded by the doctrine that the government must assure a profitable domestic market to every producer with political influence enough to insist upon having it provided for him, regardless of anything else." It is only the developed international mind together with an enlightened self-interest that will gradually put an end to such narrowly selfish nationalistic policies.

The international cartel movement and the other business combinations which are spreading so rapidly are only other indications of the growth of economic coöperation which disregards all national boundaries and nationalistic prejudices under the pressure of economic realities. In Europe the government encourages combinations and supports them. The cartel is a deliberate device to limit competition. It is not a merger but a combination of independent concerns to restrict competition among themselves and to act together. In this sense Europe has moved farther in the direction of economic coöperation than have we in this country where we still insist on the private character of business. There are innumerable cartels in Germany, France, Italy and every European country. But there are now developing international cartels, for example, the Franco-German Steel Cartel. And in many of these we find France and Germany—these ancient enemies—acting together, frequently against American rivals. The latest suggestion, that British industrialists join with the continental cartels for the marketing of essential staples, is to say the least, symptomatic of the trend of thought in the direction of coöperation across national boundaries. One of the probable advantages of the cartel movement, it is believed, will be to hasten the lowering of tariff barriers in

Europe. At first glance this would seem to be harmful to American interests. For a time a number of American industries might suffer—although even this is questionable. But the resulting benefits to European prosperity would be certain in the long run to help the United States as well.

There are few in this country who realize the extent to which, in spite of our professed policy of isolation, business enterprises of all kinds have already gone in aiding Europe in building up a great industrial machine whose financial basis lies on both sides of the Atlantic. The American tourist in London smiles at the many apothecary shops with the sign, "Boots the Cash Chemist," that greet him in his wanderings; he is amazed to learn that there are eight hundred of these shops, almost twice as many as Liggett has in this country. But he is even more astonished when he discovers that this Boots the Cash Chemist belongs to the United Drug Company that owns Liggett's and which also supplies through a kind of voluntary chain the Rexall Drug Company.

If he is disposed to look at the signs of American business enterprises in Europe he will see much besides American bars, American movies, and American jazz bands. He will hardly guess that the business bearing the sign, *Compagnie Industrielle des Petroles,* is none other than Harry Sinclair; that the *Compagnie Internationale des Machines Agricoles* is the International Harvester Company, or that the *Twoarystavs Noftowe Olejskolny Spolka Akcyna* is the Standard Oil. Everywhere he will see *Gesellschaften* and *Sociétés Anonymes* and *Aktiengesellschaften* which mark but do not disclose the working quarters of Americans in Europe.

Foremost among the great American interests which have established their plants in Europe is the automobile industry. In 1923 our motor makers had six assembly plants abroad; now we have twenty-nine, with more in course of construction. Henry Ford is now building at Dagenham, not far from London, a giant plant costing $25,000,000. When he formed this company, he offered two-fifths of the stock to Englishmen, which was over-subscribed twenty times. When he organized his new companies in Germany, France, Belgium, Holland and Italy, where great plants are to be built, Mr. Ford took especial pains to guard against shares getting out of the hands of the native investors. The New York Times prints a dispatch that the whole of the German issue has been purchased by the great German Dye Trust. This reveals a powerful alliance between the Fords and the German Chemical Trust.

The General Motors Company has not been behind Ford in these moves into the European field, where it now has twenty-one assembling plants. It has just taken over the business of Adam Opel at Rüdesheim, which last year made half of all the cars manufactured in Germany. Rumors persist that negotiations are under way between General Motors Company and Citroën, the Ford of France. The American automobile manufacturer in Europe uses American machinery, but he also employs native workers and seeks to adapt his operations to the character and mood of the people he works with and to whom he sells; and now to an increasing extent he is using raw materials and parts from the countries where he assembles his cars.

The American oil industry is steadily increasing its operations in Europe and throughout the world, with its re-

fineries, its factories, its tank wagons and pumps, its drills, its engineers and experts. The electrical manufacturing companies—General Electric, Westinghouse, and Western Electric—have vast interests and powerful alliances in Europe. The moving picture industry last year sent $222,000,000 worth of films abroad, and most of them went to Europe where an immense distributing machine must be maintained. The sign, "Kodak, Ltd.," seen in all the leading cities and towns of Europe is the sign of Eastman, who has factories in various places. And if in London you make a pilgrimage to that shrine of the pipe devotee, Dunhill and Company, you will be buying in a shop that is owned by the David Schulte Company of New York.

What is true of these larger industries is true of a great number of others. The crowd coming out of a bull fight in Barcelona is importuned to buy coco-cola, made in a Spanish factory. You can bathe with Palmolive soap made in Europe, shave with an American razor blade, manufactured in Europe, lock your hotel-room door with a Yale and Towne key made in Europe, go down to breakfast in an Otis elevator made in Europe, order a dish of Quaker Oats made in Europe, and see the price of it rung up on a National Cash Register, made in Europe, and so on throughout the day.

This illustrates how rapidly business interests and economic considerations are cutting across all boundary lines and disregarding national political barriers and thus becoming international in character. In this way, in the very presence of the existing nationalisms, we are establishing trade relations of extreme delicacy; we are inspiring trade reprisals out of which some perplexing problems are grow-

ing; it is probable for a time at least that this tendency in the expansion of economic interests to other countries will lead to a more intense rivalry amounting to economic warfare. But eventually we shall see that we, and others with us, are weaving around ourselves as nations an intricate network of industrial interests where ruthless competition is seen to be suicidal, and that the only sane and sensible policy is that of an increasing coöperation in the common economic life of all concerned. If the war spirit should lift its ugly head again and beckon the nations to slaughter, we may find ourselves hopelessly entrapped in peace through the growing up of these mutual economic interests.

It will be seen that all these new devices represent points of irritation which develop where the traders and manufacturers of different nations cross each other's paths. They call for indefinite tact on the part of our new industrial leaders and our statesmen. Who could have predicted when the early tariff makers went to work that this would be one of the results of their strategy—this spreading out of the machinery of business over national boundaries, thus building up in every country vast industries owned by the people of other countries—German industries in France employing thousands of Frenchmen, French industries in Germany and England, employing thousands of Germans and Englishmen, European industries in America giving work to millions of Americans, American factories in Europe employing millions of Germans and Frenchmen, Englishmen and Italians?

Who can foresee what is to be the effect of all this upon the minds of these millions of workers whose interests are thus caught up in this intricate international mesh of

business? Sousa once wrote a march which he called "Hands across the Sea," to signalize the extension across the ocean of the spirit of understanding between two great nations. Can it be, after all, that this understanding is to be forced by these other hands across the sea—these hired hands across the sea—who will teach their employers and their rulers through the unification of economic interests, and compel them too, to live together and work together in peace?

If the first problem in the way of building a world community is that of establishing security from war, then the next central problem is that of imperialism in all its forms. Assuming that the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact, together with the serious attitude taken toward it by present leaders, like President Hoover, Prime Minister MacDonald, M. Briand, and, until his recent and lamented death, Foreign Secretary Gustav Stresemann, marks the beginning of the establishment of world peace, then what suggestions can we make for solving the complex difficulties presented by imperialism to world economic coöperation?

It has been suggested that we try to abolish imperialism itself. This might be accomplished in one of two different ways: (1) By abolishing political, but retaining economic imperialism. This was the policy of the so-called "Little Englanders" of the middle of the nineteenth century, of which Gladstone, Bright and Cobden were the leading exponents. They advocated the "letting go" of the British colonies on the ground that they did not pay financially, and that they were being held in violation of England's traditional principles of freedom and democracy. This policy was also suggested by President Wilson prior to the

World War, when he advocated the principle that no state should be expected to protect or further the interests of foreign investors, either by its political or military resources.

(2) A second method of abolishing imperialism would be by abolishing *both* political and economic imperialism. There is no question but that either of these methods, if they could be put into execution, would alleviate many of the abuses and dangers that exist today. But the thing to be noted is that neither of them would prove an adequate solution of *all the problems* involved in economic imperialism; and besides, in the realistic world we are considering, both methods are impossible.

The first method, the abolition of political imperialism, is open to two serious objections: (1) If we could abolish political while retaining economic imperialism, it would leave many of these outlying territories without any governmental control whatever, and the native populations would be at the mercy of grasping private investors and unscrupulous adventurers, as well as of their own unrestrained passions. Bad as conditions may be under the control of a foreign government, the most disinterested verdict seems to be that they would be much worse if there were no governmental control from without. This of course applies to backward and undeveloped peoples and not necessarily to countries like China and India.

(2) But another serious objection to abolishing political while retaining economic imperialism lies in the fact that this is practically impossible under our present economic system, for the simple reason that the moneyed power, as represented by the foreign investor, is the real, though often

the invisible power behind the governments of all industrial states. And there is little likelihood that he will deliberately destroy his largest means of profit from foreign territories by surrendering the backing of his home government. Heretofore he has frequently called upon the military resources of his government to protect his interests, but if the Peace Pact becomes truly effective, he will have to rely upon the more subtle forms of political influence and persuasion.

The second method is the abolition of both political and economic imperialism. Even if this were possible there are reasons why it would not be an adequate solution: (1) Because the needs of all industrialized nations for foreign markets and raw materials must still remain if they are to maintain their economic life. (2) Because of the fundamental need of undeveloped peoples for Western capital, Western science, and technical skill in the development of their natural resources.

A completely socialized state, if we can conceive of such, would still need raw materials with which to run its factories, even if it were no longer seeking foreign markets because it was able to consume its entire product. And if a state were highly industrialized, like England and Belgium, it would still need foreign markets for at least a certain amount of its product. On the other hand, the non-industrialized states, once touched by the industrial revolution, would be the first to demand Western skill and capital for the development of their new industries. To abolish both political and economic imperialism would mean that the West would refuse to other people the best, as well as the worst, that it has to offer. And unless some

means were devised for giving our best which other people need, it would result in vainly trying to live our lives as nations, separately and apart, in a world which has already become an economic unit, where we are all inextricably bound together.

This brings us to the conclusion that the problem of imperialism is not a question of whether we shall have political and economic relations with these other peoples of the earth, but rather, of what kind of relations we shall have. History has decreed that we cannot shut ourselves away from one another in isolation and self-sufficiency but must live our lives in the closest of relations physically, and in the most complex interdependence economically. If our relations in the past have been chiefly those of exploitation and greed, if we have supported our claims with the force of army and navy, these relations need not continue in the future; and with the Peace Pact now in force, pledging the nations to settle all disputes by pacific methods, with the League of Nations and the World Court to which all such disputes can be referred, the way is opened at last for the replacing of exploitation and force by coöperation, honest-dealing and good-will. This is the only solution of the problem.

The undeveloped peoples of the world are in possession of vast natural resources that the whole world needs. To whom do they belong? Do they belong to these undeveloped people, as in the tropical regions, who do not know their value or the uses to which they may be put, and who do not have the money or the skill to develop them? In part, yes, but not wholly. Do they belong to the Western exploiter who happens to be first on the field? In part,

perhaps, but not wholly. From the social viewpoint they belong to all the world, to be developed and made available for all mankind.

On the other hand, the Western world possesses scientific and technical knowledge and also surplus funds of capital. Do these things belong to Western nations or individuals alone? Do they not also belong to all the world to be used for the benefit of all mankind? And does not the ultimate solution of the problem lie in some form of coöperation whereby Western science and capital can be used in developing the natural resources of the world for the benefit of all humanity, without the unjust exploitation of the weak by the strong?

The principles laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations give expression to just this ideal. In Article XXII of the Covenant it is expressly stated that the stronger and more highly-developed nations are to act as trustees for the weaker and less highly developed peoples of the earth, and as such trustees, to act in all respects for the best and highest interests of the peoples themselves, and also to secure just and fair relations with all other peoples. Alas, as yet the machinery and the will to put into execution these high ideals are woefully lacking. But it is along these lines that we must demand a higher sense of responsibility and the obligations which trusteeship imposes upon the stronger nations.

The way of progress in economic coöperation would seem to be to lay down the principle that the regulation of trade, investment and credit, when the subjects of one state operate within the territory of another, belongs in the last resort to the League of Nations. The duty of pro-

moting and protecting these interests would on this suggestion be taken entirely out of the hands of the imperial or national state to which the traders and financiers belong. Normally, jurisdiction would belong to the state in which they traded or invested. But an appeal would lie to the Courts of the League which it might set up, for the convenience of all parties, at two or three different centers in the Near, Middle and Far East, as well as at the Hague.

H. N. Brailsford in his book, "Olives of Endless Age," has given the following summary of suggestions as to the next steps to be taken in working our way out toward world economic coöperation:

(1) It is essential that the League's supervision of all mandated areas should become more effective; and that all non-self governing colonies in Africa and the Pacific should come under this system, with its rule of the Open Door and the absence of all discrimination in trade.

(2) The National state must cease to be the protector and promoter of the trade and investments of its citizens beyond the frontiers. The League's courts must replace it in performing these functions.

(3) The world must build up its international organization to regulate the distribution and, if possible, also to stabilize the prices of raw materials and staple foodstuffs.

(4) The League should organize such financial aid and administrative guidance as weak and backward states may require.

(5) The League should extend its protection to all national minorities in Europe, and draft a charter which should define their rights.

(6) If the problems of imperialism and nationality have

so far been solved, regional groupings or federations on a continental basis may become possible within the League.

These are but a few of the suggestions that might be made, and the reader may feel that they are altogether "impractical" and visionary. It is true that they presuppose the decay of national sovereignty. They require an international morality far beyond our present stage of evolution. They demand an intelligence and a spirit of which there is all too little today. It may be that centuries will be required for their adoption, rather than a generation. This much is true, the way of progress lies in this direction, and the society that cannot promptly adapt itself to the rapid changes of its environment, is doomed to perish. The coöperation of the nations for the common good is no longer a lofty ideal; in this modern world, it is the one condition of our survival.

To the oft repeated statement that nations cannot change their policy of greed and exploitation, there is but one reply: they have already changed. Witness China. During the nineteenth century, China was an exploiting ground for the Western Powers. In 1900 when the Boxer uprising took place against the foreigner, the Western Powers did not hesitate. They marched their troops to the gates of Pekin and demanded indemnities which were paid. In 1925, however, when the more recent uprising against the foreigners arose there was no such action on the part of the Western nations. Sir Austin Chamberlain, speaking for Great Britain, issued a public statement in which he said: "The time has come when the nations of the West must treat China as an equal." And this last year the new Treaty was signed with Nationalist China, the United

States and England leading the way, in which for the first time in her history China is treated as an equal, is granted tariff autonomy and other things for which she asked. One of the first acts of the new Labor Government in England has been to draft a new treaty with Egypt in which the British occupation of Egypt is to be ended. What has been done in the case of China and Egypt can be done in the relations of Western Powers with all other peoples, just as soon as the self-consciousness of the subject people becomes sufficiently strong and self-assertive, and the public opinion in the governing nation demands it.

Up to this time nations have been thought of not merely as self-centered, independent systems, but as in some degree, mutually repellent systems. This notion is largely the result of the false patriotic teachings of our schools and press, which seek to feed our sense of national unity more upon exclusive than upon inclusive sentiments. Nations are represented as rivals and competitors in some struggle for power or greatness or prestige, instead of as coöperators in the general advance of civilization. This presumption is naturally more strongly marked in the presentation of commercial relations than in any other. Putting the issue roughly, the generally accepted image of international trade is one in which a number of trading communities, the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, etc., are engaged in striving, each to win for itself, and at the expense of the others, the largest possible share of a strictly limited objective—the world market.

Let us face frankly the dangerous truth. A very few great empires and nations today control the whole available supplies of many of the foods, fabrics and metals, the

shipping and finance, that are essential to the livelihood and progress of every civilized people. Are Britain, America, France and Japan—and especially the two greatest of these powers—going to absorb or monopolize for their exclusive purposes of trade or consumption these supplies which every country needs, or are they going to let the rest of the world have fair access to them? It is here that we see the most pressing of the many urgent issues that confront us in present-day imperialism. For if close nationalism, or imperialism, should continue to prevail, the less fortunate nations could not acquiesce. Close economic nationalism is not for them a possibility. They must win access to the world's supplies, peacefully if possible, or else by force.

The fatality of the great choice is thus evident. Nations must and will fight for the means of life. Close economic nationalism, or imperialism, as we have known it on the part of the great empires must, therefore, compel the restricted countries to organize force for their economic liberation. This in turn will compel the great empires to maintain strong military and naval defences. In spite of the Paris Pact and all other solemn treaties, disarmament is a foolish dream, and war is eventually inevitable, unless the nations can achieve a degree of economic coöperation never known before. The pre-war policy of contending alliances and of competing armaments, draining more deeply than ever the surplus incomes of each people, would be carried on into the future. And there could never come a sense of security, but only the postponement of inevitable conflicts in which the very roots of Western civilization might perish.

In view of this perilous situation, the challenge to the stronger nations today is imperative: Shall we continue our old economic rivalries, or shall we join hands in carrying on together the commerce of the world? Shall we continue to fight each other, or shall we determine to live our lives on this planet together in harmony and peace? Shall we continue to prey upon weaker peoples, or shall we coöperate with them for our mutual benefit? Shall the strong nations continue to be the big bandits, or will they learn to be the big brother to all who need their help? This is the momentous choice confronting the nations today, and upon the decision that the nations make will hang the civilization of tomorrow.

XI

A RELIGION FOR A WORLD COMMUNITY

WHAT part can organized religion be expected to play in establishing a world community? When we remember the ideals of good-will and brotherly love that have been taught by all the great prophets of religion, regardless of age or clime, and the spirit of universality that has found expression in their lives and characters, it would seem as if religion should lead the way, enunciate the clear and all-compelling ideals, and create the dynamic spirit needed for the coming of a world-community.

The chief function of religion has always been twofold: to create unity and direction in the inner life of the individual and to establish unity and coöperation in the collective life of man, in the life of society as a whole. The great prophets of religion have tried to show men how they might achieve unity in their personal lives through the subordination of all the other forces of their beings to the supreme principle of good-will and love. But every great prophet has also dreamed his dream of a kingdom of God on earth, a universal human brotherhood, a coming world unity, in which society throughout should be governed and directed by the same principle of good-will and brotherly love. And while every religion has to some degree succeeded in achieving the first great end of religion, that is, has created beautiful, noble, and unselfish

individual lives, through its teachings, its disciplines, and its organizations, no religion as yet, nor all of them put together, have succeeded in achieving the second great end of religion—the establishment of unity and good-will in the life of society as a whole.

As we have already pointed out, the failure of religion thus far to achieve this second great end has not been the fault of religion as such; it has been due rather to the absence of certain pre-requisite conditions which were absolutely essential to the coming of anything even approximating world unity, or human brotherhood, or a Kingdom of God on earth. The new civilization through science and industrialism has at last brought these necessary conditions into existence. We are living today in a world where all the peoples of the earth are in easy communication with one another, where we have come into a community of interests through the interdependence of all peoples, and where our new knowledge of one another is fast breaking down the old barriers of ignorance and prejudice that have separated peoples in the past. Taken by themselves alone, these conditions would never bring in a world-community; they might easily lead to the utter downfall and ruin of civilization through an ever increasing clash of nationalistic and imperialistic rivalries and jealousies. On the other hand, the existence of these conditions furnish today, as never before, the opportunity for the gradual building of a world-community if we can but command the intelligence, the will and the spirit demanded for this supreme task.

In view of these facts, it would seem as if we had the right to look to religion and its leaders for the vision, the

inspiration, the moral guidance, and the spiritual dynamic, that would send men forth to the task of building a world-community, conquering and to conquer. The disappointing fact is, however, that the present religious situation, not only in Christendom but throughout the world, leaves us in grave doubt as to whether organized religion as it exists today can furnish any real light or moral guidance or spiritual power for that which is pre-eminently the supreme task of the twentieth century. For religion as it is today is divided against itself by a selfish and ruinous sectarianism, is absorbed by theological controversies and wranglings, is for the most part utterly oblivious that a new world with new demands has come into existence, is far more concerned in preserving the past than in building the future, and is, therefore, shorn of power and influence in this modern world. The result is that few of the really intelligent people today, regardless of their personal feelings as to religion, take the church very seriously. There is a tacit assumption that whatever progress may be made toward a world-community, little help is to be expected from organized religion; and it is the present condition of organized religion that has created the assumption.

The picture, however, may not be so dark as it is painted. A deeper study of the religious situation, in the light of history, reveals the fact that religion today is passing through an experience similar to many it has known in the past. The kind of religious revolution in which we are participating is by no means new. The history of religions, in fact, is the record of one great readjustment after another. Whenever a society has faced novel conditions, whenever its experience has been fundamentally altered,

by migration, by contact with other cultures and ideas, by internal growth and development, its religious life has undergone just such transformations. The history of our own religious traditions in particular, of Judaism and Christianity, has been unusually rich in examples of adaptation to changed situations. Hardly a generation has gone by, save when Western society was fairly stable in the Dark Ages, that did not feel its faith disintegrating under the impact of new ideas and new conditions. There has never been a time when the conservatives did not view with alarm the abandonment of essential verities and the assimilation of alien ways of life and thought. There has never been a time when earnest leaders were not seeking to incorporate new ideas and new values into a tradition they felt to be out of touch with modern needs. And down to the present, everyone of these crises has been met and successfully faced. The adaptation was made, the reconstruction was carried through. There have been false steps, paths that had to be retraced; but ultimately, each age has managed to mould the materials of its past into a form that expressed its own needs and aspirations. What reason is there to suppose that our own generation will be unable to continue this immemorial process of reconstruction?

It is possible to take the view, as many do, that modern science and industrialism are presenting to man a social experience so totally different from any that man has faced before, that it will inevitably destroy the very bases of the religious life. But it is also possible to take the view, in the light of history, that in time religion will once again re-adapt itself to the new truths and the new experiences,

and we shall have a new expression of religion more in harmony with the modern world. The history of Christianity has been the history of generation after generation of great modernists, of assimilators, who incorporated in religion for their day new ideas and new moral ideals in the face of all the forces of tradition and fundamentalism. All the great theologians and philosophers of Christianity, all her great statesmen, all her moral prophets and leaders, were men who faced the problem of the readaptation of religion to changed intellectual, social and moral experiences.

The most fundamental contribution which modern science has made to religion has come through the social sciences. It is these that have taken religion out of the skies and enthroned it in the essential nature of man, and shown it as an integral part of human life. Thus they have removed the basis of religion from the region of mystery, which until recently has constituted the universe for man, and transferred it to man himself, where it is embedded in the very constitution of human nature. And no further discoveries of the natural sciences can ever again, as during the nineteenth century, disturb the sure foundations of religion.

Thus the historian and the scientist see in our present religious perplexities only another of these recurrent problems of religious reconstruction. The average man, however, has not the knowledge to lift himself above the tensions of our day to a region whence he can view them in proper perspective. He knows far too little of the past of his own religious tradition, to say nothing of the infinite variety of forms in which the religious experience of other

peoples has expressed itself. There is probably no field in which even the educated are quite so provincial in their thinking as in religion. This provincialism today is apt to fall into one of two attitudes. When it does not wish to be disturbed in its serious pursuits, it insists that everybody is mistaken. There is no conflict between religion and science, or religion and industrialism, or religion and the modern age. When it is too deeply concerned with religious forces to emulate the ostrich, it insists that we are facing the turning-point of religious history. Civilization is being undermined by attacks on our fathers' creed; or man is at last free from the weary burden of superstition and priest-craft and vain imaginings.

A wider experience brings release from both these unenlightened attitudes. The knowledge even of our own religious past shows that readaptation to changed conditions has been both normal and continuous. It is in the light of this past that the thoughtful man will face the problems of reconstructing our religious life once more, to meet the demands of scientific industrialism. It is thus that living religions grow. It is thus that our own religious heritage took form. It is thus that it has been remade century after century. There have been new experiences and new beliefs, crises and conflicts and antagonisms. But there has also been a continuity, a continuity that runs back to the days of Jesus and his disciples, and far beyond, to the dim past of the civilizations of the ancient East. Certain values, certain insights have been won. They have persisted for future ages to draw upon when faced by the insistent problems of living under new conditions.

The intelligent man, therefore, refuses to be stampeded

either by the hectic alarm of religious traditionalists or by the noisy opposition of the radicals. He realizes that the religious life of today is undergoing one more of those reconstructions, in the light of new beliefs and new interests, with which the past has made him familiar. For he knows that religions are not immutable deposits, but rather, the growing, living expressions of the developing life of man. When he remembers how the spirit and methods of science have radically transformed not only the traditional religious interpretation of the universe but still more the basic conception of the source and nature of religion itself, when he recalls how in the brief space of a century our new industrial civilization has changed the whole manner in which man gains his livelihood on this planet, and has brought into man's life vast ranges of new experiences, attitudes and relations that have crowded into the background, or even made quite meaningless, many experiences that were formerly dominant, vital and universal, then he realizes that the basic trouble with religion today is that it has not yet found itself in this new world, it is not yet at home in the new atmosphere, it has not yet adapted itself to the new conditions. In this respect, he also sees that religion is no different from politics and economics and international relations and education and everything else. The fundamental problem of religion today is one with that of all other social institutions; if it is to continue to live and grow, it must bring itself into more harmonious adaptation to the ideas and ideals, the values and the spirit, which the new world-conditions have made real.

It is clear from what has preceded that it is no longer

a question of religion, or no religion, in man's life. In a far deeper sense than is sometimes realized, man is "incurably religious." Human nature has always demanded some religious expression; and though old gods crumble, it is incredible that this need should not persist. The vital question is, what kind of a religion shall man have? It is also clear that, from the beginning, religion has constantly been changing, slowly passing from lower to higher forms with new social environments and the gradual widening and deepening of man's mental and moral experience. Generally speaking, the movement has been from crude, irrational, materialistic, unethical and individualistic conceptions and forms, toward more rational, spiritual, ethical and social expressions. What man's religion has been in any particular age or clime has depended in part on his leaders or prophets, but still more, on how far along man himself has come in his mental and moral development. However lofty or universal has been the insight of the great prophet, his message has always been colored by the special needs of a particular people, and interpreted in terms of their more or less limited experience and knowledge. But just because religion is the normal outgrowth of human nature and an integral part of man's life, as an individual and as a member of society, not only will it always exist in some form; it will continue to grow and change as man changes and grows.

Let it be frankly admitted that religion today is passing through a transition period more searching and more deeply unsettling for traditional faiths than any similar period in the past, just because modern science has so completely revolutionized all our conceptions of the uni-

verse, of the nature of man, of human relations, and of religion itself; and also, because our industrial civilization has brought into man's life whole ranges of new experiences and new relations that had no existence whatever a century ago.

Let us not forget, however, that a transition is a movement toward what does not yet exist. No one can predict with any certainty the form religion will take in man's life tomorrow. We know only that great changes are taking place, that still greater changes are yet to come, and that it ill-behooves anyone to be dogmatic or over-confident in any statement as to the future. All we can hope to do, in the present limits of space, is to suggest briefly the trend of the changes that must come if organized religion is to play any real part in the building of a world-community. If religion is to continue to live and grow in this twentieth century, then it must adapt itself to the new world-conditions along the following general lines:

(1) *It must become universal in its outlook and spirit, rather than sectarian.* The sectarianism of present-day Christianity is, in the opinion of many church leaders, the chief "scandal" of our religion, as well as its greatest weakness. What present nationalisms are in international relations, sectarianism is in religion. It is in both instances the spirit of ignorant narrowness, of arrogant self-pride, of unsympathetic aloofness, of refusal to coöperate with others. And just as the separate nationalisms of the various political states are the great obstacles to the coming of any real internationalism, so the sectarianism of the churches is the great barrier to the coming of any real unifying religion. For what part can religion possibly play in a

world that is setting its face more or less clearly in the direction of some kind of unity and coöperation in the life of mankind, unless religion is first of all able to achieve a real unity within itself? Sectarianism in religion, like nationalism in our political life, is an anachronism today. They both belong to a past that is gone. The stream of the world's life has left them both behind. It is our failure to see this that alone makes it possible for them to linger on into this new age that is so rapidly becoming world-conscious.

The modern movement for Christian unity is a little over a generation old. It grew out of a growing sense of the wastefulness and unchristian spirit of sectarianism; but in spite of committees and frequent conferences and beautifully worded resolutions, the movement as yet has achieved very few definite or concrete results, and Christianity still presents the picture of a house tragically divided against itself. The recent Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order, for which such high hopes had been entertained, finally adjourned after doing exactly nothing beyond debating questions of theology and ecclesiastical order that have little vital meaning for this modern age, and appointing various committees to report at some later date. It is not impossible that such general discussions and conferences on the subject of Christian unity may help in creating the sentiment for such unity that will lead eventually to action. Thus far, however, the churches of every name and their leaders, for the most part, are still dominated by their respective denominations and actuated by the spirit of sectarianism.

But, highly desirable as Christian unity would be, like

patriotism, *Christian* unity does not go far enough in a world like ours. At the Lausanne Conference, the strongest appeal made by the leaders for Christian unity was "in order that Christianity might present a united front" to the other religions of the world. In the light of our new knowledge, it is rather late in the day and something of an impertinence thus to proclaim our Christianity as the only true religion to which all others must bow the knee. With the results of the study of comparative religions before us, and on a comparison of so-called Christian civilization with the so-called heathen civilizations, it is certainly open to question whether our religion is so much "better" than those it seeks to supplant. It is at least certain that for intelligent people the old line can no longer be drawn between our religion as the one wholly true, and all other religions as wholly false. Far greater than the need for Christian unity is the need today for a sense of *religious unity* that shall bind together in coöperative service men of all faiths in every land.

Through the translation of the Sacred Books of the East in the last century, and through living communion with the leaders of the great Oriental religions, Westerners have learned how to understand and appreciate those ancient faiths. The Parliament of Religions, held in connection with the Chicago World's Fair, brought to this country representatives of all the world's religions. It was a new experience in the religious life of humanity, an experience that made a profound impression on all who shared it. Since then the study of comparative religions has helped to break down the old barriers of ignorance and prejudice,

and has revealed the close sympathy existing between the higher levels of all religions, past and present.

Men have discovered that while "religions are many, religion is one"—one not in beliefs, not in experiences embodied, not in forms elaborated with loving care, not in spiritual insights attained, not in ideals striven for, but one in deeply feeling and profoundly interpreting the significant moments of human life. We are coming to see that if Christianity has any real contributions to make to these other religions, they also have real contributions—moral values and spiritual insights—to make to Christianity. Thus we are learning to think of all the various faiths of mankind as but the differing languages through which man has been seeking to express, however imperfectly, his faith, his hope, his aspiration—seeking as best he might with the knowledge at his command, to relate himself intelligently to the universe of which he is a part, and to his fellows from whom he is divided.

It is a part of the intellectual challenge to religion today to differentiate between traditional myth and spiritual insight in all religions, that men may preserve the true insight wherever it may be found, and employ it in enriching and ennobling their own religious life. To see all religious beliefs as the metaphors of discourse, as the symbolic renderings of deep human experiences, frees one from the vain attempt to find a core of religious truth common to every historic faith. The experiences of men have varied from age to age and clime to clime, and even in the universal crises of all mankind—birth and love and death—men have felt with subtle but inescapable shades of difference. It is of the very nature of metaphor and poetry

to be literally untranslatable into another tongue. The attempt to find a common prose for all this imaginative symbol leads to the blurring of that which should be kept distinct, the loss of the overtones so fraught with feeling. It is just because every form of the religious life enshrines something uniquely precious, something that could be expressed in no other way, that it is the part of wisdom to strive, so far as possible, to enter into that insight. A true understanding of religious faith makes sympathy and cooperation possible and indispensable, without leading to intellectual flabbiness.

It is as we gain this universal outlook in religion that we lose the spirit of sectarianism; the old arrogance and selfish pride and foolish conceit gradually disappear, and in their places is born a deep consciousness of our moral and spiritual unity with all who strive and aspire toward the highest, regardless of their name or creed. This does not involve the surrender of anything that is precious or meaningful in one's own faith, nor does it mean the giving up of one's own religion; it is, least of all, uniformity either in belief or practice that we seek; it is something that goes far deeper than that. It is a feeling, a consciousness, born of understanding and appreciation, that underlying all differences of belief and organization, there is a real moral and spiritual unity binding all races and nations, all men and women, into one great family on earth.

If our separate religions are to reach the high plane of real religion, then they must gain this universal outlook; they must lose their own littleness for the sake of the larger good; they must be willing to die to themselves in order that true religion may be born; they must be purged of

every form of sectarianism that now keeps them from their fellows. Religion will play but a small part in the supreme task of the twentieth century unless it can leave all its old sectarianisms behind and adapt itself to the new world-outlook and catch religiously the universal spirit that is finding increasing expression. If organized religion could become possessed of this spirit and attain this outlook, how wondrously it might lead the way toward a world-community!

(2) *In its intellectual expression religion must come into harmony with man's best philosophic and scientific thought of today.*

The inevitable conflict between traditional religion and the new influences of science and industrialism has divided the religious world into two opposing camps: on the one hand it has driven the less daring and more conservatively inclined back to the ramparts of a rigid orthodoxy, while the more adventurous have attempted through various forms of "liberalism" to mediate between the old and the new. But neither of these movements has proved satisfactory to the modern mind. Orthodoxy has turned its back deliberately upon the new knowledge and the new experience in the desperate attempt to preserve the traditional religion at any cost. The various forms of "liberalism" have refused to face all the facts frankly and to follow them to their logical conclusions. These attempts to "reinterpret" traditional religion have been nothing more or less than half-way positions between the old and the new, mere compromises that might satisfy the more timid souls for a time, but that do not solve the religious problem for today.

That problem will never be solved until the liberal leaders are willing to face frankly and honestly all the new facts and conditions that science and industrialism have disclosed. There must be a thorough-going grappling with these new forces in modern life in their bearing upon the religious experience of man. There must be a complete reconstruction of religion, so far as that may be possible, without fear or evasion or compromise, in the light of all the new knowledge that has been gained and the new conditions under which man must live his life both individually and collectively. This task must be undertaken, not for the sake of belittling or destroying anything good or true that we have received from the past, but rather, in order to free religion from the traditional encumbrances that are today choking its life and paralyzing its influence.

According to Kirsopp Lake, the weakness of religion today lies in the fact that "the living dogmas of the dead have become the dead dogmas of the living." When the historic creeds of the church were first formulated they were living and dynamic things; they were the natural expression in terms of religion of man's knowledge and experience at that time; men were willing to live for them, and, if necessary, to die for them. But in this twentieth century the boundaries of man's knowledge in every field have been widened immeasurably over the knowledge of the third and fourth centuries when the creeds were born, and his social environment has become totally transformed. It is no evidence of a living faith that multitudes still repeat every Sunday these theological formulations of a far-away past, out of which for most people all meaning has fled; it is rather an evidence of a slavish and parrot-like repetition

of mere words. A living faith coupled with a genuine intelligence would dare to pierce beneath the outward husk of words which belongs to yesterday, not to today, and set free the eternal truth that lies imprisoned at the heart of every one of these old dogmas, in terms of today's thought and life. On its intellectual side, the demand today is for "a religion that will satisfy the soul of a saint without at the same time insulting the intelligence of the scholar." Only thus can an intellectually reconstructed religion, adapted to today's thought and life, play its true and fundamental part in interpreting and guiding these great new forces of the twentieth century in the direction of unity and coöperation.

(3) *Religion must become increasingly ethical and social, rather than dogmatically theological and individualistic.*

It was in 1886 that Canon Freemantle of England published his epoch-making book entitled "The World the Subject of Redemption." It set forth the view that the business of religion is not merely "to save" as many individual souls as possible, and see them through this wicked world to some distant heaven of bliss, but that its chief concern was to save this world—the world of political relations, of economic relations, of all that concerned the manifold life of man. The idea that religion had a social mission, that it had a message not only for the individual but for society as a whole, came almost as a revelation to the religious leaders of that day. Since then the conception of the social mission of Christianity has been taught more and more widely by men like Washington Gladden, Lyman Abbott, Walter Rauschenbusch, and other prophetic leaders in this country, as well as by many others abroad.

And yet it is safe to say that social Christianity has hardly

as yet become popular in the rank and file of the churches. In spite of Jesus' dream of a kingdom of God on earth, in spite of the burning social messages of the Hebrew prophets that fill so large a part of our Old Testament, the individualistic conception of religion that has come down from the early Christian centuries, still dominates the thinking and the activities of the vast majority of the churches of every name. Even among the younger ministers who have glimpsed the meaning of a social Christianity, there are few as yet who either dare, or are fitted, to deal with the problems involved in an intelligent and thoroughgoing way; and there are many more who admit frankly that their congregations would not stand for the preaching of a social religion from the pulpit. This is not to deny that there has been a tremendous increase in the social activities of most of the churches in their own particular communities. But in the larger sense demanded today, there are comparatively few ministers or churches that are grappling earnestly with the moral significance for humanity of such problems as nationalism, imperialism, pacifism, the relations of capital and labor, etc. As a matter of fact, how many of the religious leaders are keenly conscious of the "new relations into which we have come on this planet," or how many are voicing prophetically the implications of these new relations for the world's life?

As an illustration of how far the churches as a whole are as yet from accepting in any real sense the social mission of religion, let me quote the words of the Rector of one of the strongest churches of one of the leading denominations in New York City, as they appeared in the Annual Year Book of that church for 1929. He is making a plea for the

churches of the United States to attend to their "real business—the souls of men," and to avoid political activities, wholesale methods, etc. He states that ever since the passing of the Eighteenth Amendment the churches have become more and more enmeshed in "politics" and that these activities are "definitely hurting the cause of religion." "Many parishioners have dropped their membership because of it, and there is a growing resentment by many who are loyal to religion. . . . The Church should not be used as centers of propaganda for either pacifism or prohibition. . . . The real business of the Church is to deal with the souls of men. This cannot be done by wholesale methods. . . . There seems to be a desire to make the clergymen the directing head of a corporation giving his attention to general subjects such as world peace, law enforcement, prohibition, disarmament, etc. . . . But this is certainly not the way to strengthen the church. It is not the way to win people to religion."

Without in any sense disparaging the needs of "the souls of men," or denying that it is the business of the Church to satisfy them, this is certainly a frank revelation of the utter blindness of organized religion to the social and moral demands of this age; and there is no question but that this statement finds a very wide response from Christian people, both clergy and laity, throughout the country. It is not strange that the age is looking less and less to the churches for moral inspiration and guidance, among the many problems presented by the new civilization, when they can thus deliberately turn their backs upon their social mission in this critical twentieth century.

The critical problems and pressing needs that confront

us insistently demand new ethical formulations and fresh insights. If organized religion is to live and grow it cannot ignore this challenge. It is not enough to believe that the Golden Rule can suffice to straighten out all the ethical tangles of a complex industrial society, or that the conceptions of justice enunciated by Hebrew prophets for a simple peasant folk twenty-five hundred years ago are calculated to furnish the intricate and detailed social guidance men are today struggling to work out. It is peculiarly the task of religion to furnish new moral inspiration. But we shall not discover it by reducing our moral heritage to a single element. We must draw upon all the wisdom that the past offers. Yet all the past affords is not enough. We must resolutely face the moral problems of today and work them out for ourselves; we can find no short-cut to their solution by turning back to an age forever gone.

We must work out an ethic that will teach us the wise use of the new powers industrialism has brought to our society. To abandon these material opportunities in disgust, as the sensitive and spiritually minded are often tempted, is to leave them to the exploitation of the callous and the worldly. We cannot afford to flee the world and the flesh; we must endeavor to master them. The machine is making possible a gradual release from long hours of servile toil and the more irksome forms of labor; here are new opportunities of leisure presented for the development of the human spirit, provided intelligence is brought to bear upon their proper utilization. Still more imperative is an ethic that shall make man, whether employer or employee, the master rather than the slave of the machine, that shall lift him above the tyranny of mere things, and set him free

to use these riches of industrialism to enhance human life, not to standardize and mechanize his every impulse.

To a degree unknown in simpler societies, the fortunes of civilization have come to depend upon the interactions of organized groups. Trade acts upon trade, class upon class, party upon party, church upon church, state upon state—all are caught up in a complex network of group relations. The very scale of such group action is unprecedented. This enormous increase in the variety and range of group activity is due to the coming of industrial organization into a democratic society, to the permeation of social groups by the democratic spirit. The individual moral agent is involved in a host of often conflicting groupings that determine his opportunities for action and regulate his life. But while democratic industrial society has thus multiplied the number and importance of group activities, it has failed to create the moral standards by which group relations may be ordered. In most cases, the actions of the individual are more consciously directed by ethical standards than are those of the groups in which he participates.

The profound challenge to religion is to create a morality for group action that shall not content itself with opportunistic self-seeking. Men must come to realize the consequences of group policies lightly undertaken, on themselves and on other men. They must bestow the same care in tracing out the effects of group action, and in choosing thoughtfully between alternatives, that the more conscientious now spend on personal moral deliberation. They must explore the ideal possibilities resident in the activities of their groups and adjust them to each other and to the ends of other groups. The structure of social groupings is usually

closely limited by material and economic conditions; but within those limits there is room for the fomulation of a more adequate group pattern that will release the spiritual energies of man. Such a moral enterprise can hardly set itself any static structure, any fixed Utopia as a goal; but it can work toward the most fruitful coöperation of all groups in the achievement of a common purpose that shall mean the highest good of human society. In a truly civilized world, the morality of group activity would become the highest morality known to man. And it is this new morality that religion must search after and endeavor to consecrate.

In the new world which science and industrialism have created, the first demand is for new attitudes—the creation, in the place of our present provincialisms, of the international mind, the bringing to birth of a world-consciousness, more inclusive than our present nationalistic consciousness, the conception of a functional society in which our present divided political, economic, social and religious groups—competing and warring fragments of humanity—shall at length be brought together in a coöperative commonwealth of groups and nations. In the kind of world into which we have come, the spiritual principle must be, "all for each and each for all."

In a world setting its face more or less clearly toward some kind of unity in the life of races and nations that has not yet existed on this planet, that is seeking more or less blindly a way toward a kind of coöperation in the life of men and nations never known in the past, that is groping for a new understanding and appreciation of other peoples and races, religion must dare to challenge the nations, as

nations, to rise to a higher level of morality in their relations with one another. It must hold before men the vision of a civilization that has subordinated the quarrelsome work of exploiting the material world to the coöperative labor of developing the spirit of man; that has made the material values of riches and power serve to release the moral and spiritual values latent in human nature. It must impel men to seek to transform the nations into institutions for helping their citizens to live the good life in coöperation with all mankind.

If religion is to devote itself to the "souls of men," exclusive of these larger moral and social relationships in which all men must live, it will fail utterly to adapt itself to the new age and its imperative demands; its death-knell will be sounded because it will have ceased to grow in this growing, changing world. If religion is to play any real part in developing this new morality, it must possess the courage and ability to do creative thinking in the field of morals, and especially, in the field of social and international morality. Accepting gratefully all the moral insight and inspiration the past can furnish, it must recognize that "new occasions teach new duties." No ethical teacher of the past, however great, has uttered the final words in morals. Man's moral experience grows and expands just as does his intellectual experience. What, more than anything else, is holding religion back just now, is its unthinking enslavement to the letter rather than the spirit of the ethical teaching of a bygone age.

It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance of intelligence to effect results. The first things needed are "vision of the goal, a new synthesis, a program conceived

in terms of the common good, behind which might be marshaled the driving power of an awakened world. The curse of man has been his ignorance, his aimlessness, his paucity of ideas in regard to his own career on the earth, his disbelief in his own powers to shape his future. Let us devise a plan, a chart, an objective. Let us determine where we want to go and the best methods of advance. Let the surveyors and the engineers stake out the boundaries of the new homestead and map the roads. And then, with the promise of the new land beckoning ahead, humanity can strike its tents and once more take up its march toward the City of God."[1] But this is not the only need.

Religion is marking time today because of the lack of a great objective with sufficient power to appeal to, and call forth, the very deepest personal devotion of the heart and mind and imagination of men and women. Building new churches, adding to their membership, taking part in all the varied activities of church life—Christian missions in their sectarian and evangelical form—how paltry seem these demands of religion as compared with the demands of the age that men everywhere should join hands in building the new world-community. The great days for religion have always been the times that demanded great heroism, real sacrifices, unselfish service to great causes, and untiring devotion to lofty ends. Religion must catch the vision of an objective great enough to match the greatness of this age if it is to furnish any real moral leadership to the twentieth century.

Professor A. Eustace Haydon, of the University of Chi-

[1] Raymond Fosdick: "The Old Savage in the New Civilization," p. 164.

cago, in a keen analysis of the present religious situation, given at the Institute of World Unity at Hyannis this summer, uses these words: "The Western world is now eating the bitter fruit of the refusal of Christianity to make adjustment to the new era of civilization which began with the Renaissance. The result of this refusal has been that not since the fourteenth century has there been harmony and balance between all phases of life in the unity of a religious ideal. One by one, the determining factors which make the civilization in which men pass their lives, have broken away from the control of religious idealism—science, philosophy, politics, education, art and business. Each of these factors, once mutually related in and through Christianity, has now become thoroughly secular and not subject to the guidance of a religious leadership, which failed to turn its vision from the dead past to the living present and future.

"The new civilization of the new era of applied science and industrialism has been created without any consciousness of a religious vision, of any consecration to the ideal of making a world in which the ordinary man's dream of a worthy and full life can be realized. An age which has more knowledge, better tools, and greater power than any previous epoch, finds itself entangled in a network of evils that menace not only man's happiness and prosperity, but the very foundations of civilization itself. Christian leaders of all denominations are aware of the necessity of harnessing science, material power and national authority to the service of human progress, but the problem cannot be solved by any mere superficial rephrasing of the church creeds.

"The conflict between fundamentalism and modernism is

only a passing episode. The effort of modernist theologians to save mediæval theology by rationalizing and re-interpreting it is futility. A much more terrific onslaught on Christianity than the old attack of natural science has arisen recently through the development of the social and religious sciences. Supernaturalism is no longer the heart of religion, but the determination to establish the basis of the good life here and now. Truly religious men and women are no longer interested in the theoretical differences of theology; they seek, rather, to make all knowledge and power serve in the building of a social order, including races, nations and religions, and offering justice and opportunity to every human being. The first task, however, is the abolishing of war."

In the last chapter of his recent book, "The Public and Its Problems," John Dewey says, as has already been quoted, "the greatest need of the world today is not for new organizations or new institutions, but rather, for an awareness of the new relations into which we have come on this planet," and then he adds these significant words, "what we need is a new spirit, a new consciousness." It is peculiarly the function of religion to create and foster this new spirit, to awaken this new consciousness, so greatly needed in this twentieth century. But whether religion succeeds in achieving this end will depend upon its willingness to rise above all petty sectarianisms, its ability to become so possessed by the new knowledge that it will find expression in terms of man's best and highest thought of today, its whole-hearted dedication of itself to the supreme task of building a genuine world-community here on the earth.

In the noble words of Gilbert Murray, "the world is mov-

ing slowly out of chaos toward a new cosmos. We must integrate our world by the weapon of thought." But thought is not enough if we are to establish a world-community. "We may ask something of that spirit which, since the very beginnings of history, men have expected and found in the average common soldier—a will to endure hardship for the sake of duty, and to use life as one who knows of things better than life."

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WORLD UNITY

A Monthly Magazine
interpreting the spirit of the new age

John Herman Randall, *Editor*
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World Unity Magazine, as its title implies, will endeavor to interpret and record those significant changes in present-day thought which mark the trend toward worldwide understanding and a humanized civilization able to release the finer aspirations of mankind.

Its essential purpose is to make accessible to awakened minds the views and conclusions of creative workers on subjects of truly general interest and importance. The emergence of new and higher values in philosophy, science, religion, ethics and the arts from the alembic of universal unrest represents the focal point of vision for World Unity Magazine.

To create a medium capable of responding faithfully, without prejudice of race, creed, class or nationality, to the uprush of the spirit of the age wherever or however manifested—this is the ideal to which World Unity Magazine is devoted; and faith in humanity arising at last to assert its organic oneness, the foundation on which it stands.

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